Emotion regulation in patients with Functional Neurological Disorder by Williams, Isobel Anne
Emotion regulation in 
patients with Functional 
Neurological Disorder 
 
 
 
 
Isobel Anne Williams 
 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
 
 
The University of Sheffield 
Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry, and Health 
 Department of Neuroscience 
 
 
March 2018 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In loving memory of my mother, Rosie. 
Dulcius ex asperis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4 
 
Acknowledgements 
 Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisors, Prof. Markus Reuber and Dr. Liat Levita, 
for their guidance, sense of humour, understanding, and encouragement. I feel really lucky to 
have had two supervisors who were actively involved, available, and helpful throughout the 
entirety of my PhD. I will be forever grateful for the opportunities they have given me, and 
plan to use what they have taught me throughout the rest of my career.  
I would also like to thank the other members of staff who have supported and advised 
me. Thank you to Stephanie Howlett for supervising me at the start of my PhD, and to Aimee 
Morgan-Boon for the discussion and ideas. Thank you to Dr. Richard Grünewald for the 
conversation and help with recruitment. I am grateful to Dr. Athi Ponnussamy for his advice 
on Heart Rate Variability analysis, and Dr. Luis Mannsuer for his help with MATLAB and 
programming the facial electromyography study. Thanks also to Dr. Celeste Pidcott who was 
a great Thesis Mentor, and Dr. Richard Mead for being a brilliant personal tutor and advocate.  
I also wish to thank the nurses, support workers, neurologists, and EEG technicians 
who have been so accommodating and helpful during the recruitment phase – I really 
appreciated the cups of tea in clinic. 
Thank you to my fellow students in Academic Neurology and The Developmental 
Affective Neuroscience Lab, in particular Samantha Linton for your friendship, help, and for 
being a very patient ‘sounding board’. Thank you to Dr. Barbora Novakova for taking the time 
to give me advice even when you had long since left the University of Sheffield and are 
incredibly busy. I am also grateful for all the other postgraduate students and staff I have made 
friends with across the Medical School and Department of Psychology. 
A special thank you to my partner Tom, for his love, kindness, and for always cheering 
me on. Thank you also to Tom’s parents, Barbara and Keith, and his wider family for instantly 
welcoming and unconditionally supporting me throughout these past three years in Sheffield 
5 
 
(and also for being my guinea pigs).  
To my brother Alex, my Auntie Liz, Uncle Allan, my cousins Fiona, Simon, and Louis, 
Auntie Cheryl, thank you for a lifetime of love and support. To my family who are no longer 
with us - Mum, Grandma Jill, Grandad Peter, Nanna, and Budda – you remain my inspiration. 
I hope I have made you all proud.  
Finally, I would like to thank the patients, patient organisations (FND Action and FND 
Hope), and participants for taking part in the studies presented in this thesis. Without them, this 
work would not have been possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Abstract 
Functional Neurological Symptom Disorder (FND) is defined in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) as one or more symptoms of altered voluntary motor or sensory 
function. In the absence of any clear structural or physiological aetiology, FND has 
long been believed to have an emotional cause. However, the relationship between 
emotion regulation and FND has received relatively little attention from the scientific 
community. The overall aim of my project was empirically to test hypotheses 
concerning emotion dysregulation generated from the Extended Process Model of 
emotion regulation (EPM) (Gross, 2015) in patients with FND, using a combination 
of self-report, behavioural, and physiological measures. Additional aims were to 
explore other important issues, including whether emotion dysregulation is related to 
specific manifestations of FND, and whether changes in emotion regulation can be 
tracked across psychotherapeutic intervention by self-report. 
A systematic review of the available literature on emotion dysregulation in 
patients with Nonepileptic Attack Disorder (NEAD) (N = 52), suggested that this 
patient group exhibit impairments in the identification of their own emotional states, 
as well as a tendency to select and implement maladaptive regulatory strategies. 
Studies also suggested that patients with NEAD experience biased cognitive-affective 
processing of exteroceptive emotional information, which may further impede the 
implementation process. However, these impairments appear to be heterogeneously 
spread throughout the population, and linked to other clinical / aetiological factors 
such as psychological trauma.  
Study One aimed to explore whether emotion dysregulation and co-morbid 
psychopathology is linked to whether or not patients self-report Impairment of 
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Consciousness (IOC) as part of their disorder. 163 patients with FND completed self-
report measures of emotion dysregulation (The Emotional Processing Scale – 25; EPS-
25), as well as measures of Major Depressive Disorder (PHQ-9), Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD-7), Somatization Disorder (PHQ-15), and Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PCL-5) symptomology. Patients with IOC scored significantly higher on the 
GAD-7 (p = .03), PHQ-15 (p = .002), and PCL-5 (p  = .02) but there were no between-
group differences on the EPS-25 (p = .45, both groups exceeding healthy norms). 
These results support the view that FND is associated with emotion dysregulation, but 
suggest that clinical presentations including IOC are related to symptoms of anxiety, 
Somatization disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Study Two aimed to experimentally test the hypothesis that patients with FND 
are impaired in their ability to identify their own emotional states, and that this 
impairment would be further exacerbated by stress.  Twenty-six patients with FND 
and 27 healthy controls participated in the Heart Beat Detection Task (HBDT; 
Schandry, 1981) at baseline and following stress-induction with the Cold Pressor Test 
(Lovallo, 1975). The ‘impoverished emotional experience’ subscale of the EPS-25 
was included as a self-report measure of participants’ ability to identify their own 
emotional states. Patients were significantly impaired on the HBDT compared to 
controls (p = .04) and reported significantly greater difficulties on the ‘impoverished 
emotional experience’ subscale. However, there were no significant main effects of 
stress-induction on HBDT performance. These results suggest that patients with FND 
are impaired in the identification stage of the EPM, as characterised by reduced 
interoceptive sensitivity and insight into their emotional experiences, but that 
impairments in interoception are not exacerbated by the kind of stress induced by the 
Cold Pressor Test.  
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Study Three aimed to experimentally test the hypothesis that patients with 
FND habitually select and implement a maladaptive regulatory strategy, expressive 
suppression. Twenty-six patients and 28 healthy controls completed a picture viewing 
paradigm designed to elicit negative affect, and were instructed to either passively 
view the pictures or suppress their responses to the images. Facial responses to the 
images were measured using electromyography, implicit emotional responses to the 
images were measured with the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Task (Quirin, 
Kazen, & Kuhl, 2009), and explicit emotional responses were measured with a self-
report scale. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) assessed 
self-reported habitual implementation of expressive suppression. Patients reported an 
increased tendency to select / implement expressive suppression on the ERQ (p = 
.005), and experienced less positive emotion in response to the pictures (implicitly) 
than healthy controls (p = .002), consistent with the hypothesis that patients with FND 
are ‘habitual suppressors’. However, facial electromyography recordings were greater 
in the second (p = .02) and third (p = .04) post-stimulus second epochs for patients 
than controls when instructed to suppress. These results suggest that patients with 
FND perceive themselves to be habitual suppressors, but struggle to suppress the 
physiological expression of their emotions.  
Study Four aimed to examine emotion dysregulation in patients with FND by 
comparing a physiological measure of chronic autonomic arousal (resting Heart rate 
Variability; HRV) against healthy controls. This study also aimed to explore for 
associations between HRV and the other measures of emotion dysregulation and 
psychopathology used in this thesis. Five minute ECG recordings from 26 patients and 
28 healthy controls were analysed for vagal and sympathetic HRV indices. Vagal, but 
not sympathetic HRV components were found to be lower in patients than controls (p 
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= .02). Vagal tone correlated negatively with self-reported symptoms of emotion 
dysregulation (rs = -.27) and PTSD (rs = -.31), and positively with HBDT performance 
across both groups (rs = .36 - .39). These results suggest that patients with FND 
experience chronic autonomic arousal, associated with emotion dysregulation and 
psychological trauma.  
Finally, Study Five sought to assess whether changes in emotion regulation 
following Brief Augmented Psychodynamic Interpersonal Therapy for FND could be 
assessed with a self-report measure, i.e. The EPS-25. Self-report data from 44 patients 
who returned pre- and post-intervention questionnaires including the EPS-25 were 
analysed. EPS-25 scores were significantly lower following intervention (p = .049), 
suggesting that emotion dysregulation improved following psychotherapy. Treatment-
associated changes in EPS-25 scores correlated positively with change scores in 
psychological distress (CORE-10; partial correlation = .57) and mental health-related 
quality of life (SF-36 MHS subscale; partial correlation = .31) sharing 45% and 40% 
of variance respectively. These results suggest that this EPS-25 is sensitive to therapy-
associated change in patients with FND.  
The question of whether FND is caused by emotion dysregulation cannot be 
answered by this thesis. However, the associations found in these studies suggest that 
patients with FND experience emotion dysregulation as defined by the EPM, that 
clinical presentation is linked to co-morbid psychopathological symptoms, and that 
emotion dysregulation might be successfully treated in this population. 
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Glossary of terms as they will be used in this thesis 
Term Definition 
Disorder 
(noun) 
A pathological symptom or set of symptoms caused or 
characterised by a disruption to ‘normal’ (as defined by 
social norms or diagnostic manuals such as the DSM or 
ICD) functioning, which causes significant distress and 
/ or impedes daily activities of living. 
 
Psychological 
(adjective) 
Relating to all cognitive processes, including but not 
limited to: behaviour, action-selection, emotion, 
movement, executive function, memory, sensation, 
meta-cognition, social cognition, learning, agency 
 
Mental 
(adjective) 
Synonymous with psychological. 
 
 
Physical 
(adjective) 
Relating to physiological processes, or a structure 
located within, the human body.  
 
Neurological 
(adjective) 
Relating to physical processes involving the brain or 
nervous system which currently fall under the remit of 
the medical speciality of neurology (e.g., epileptiform 
activity, Parkinson’s disease). 
 
Psychiatric 
(adjective) 
Referring to psychological processes in the brain or 
nervous system causing disorders which currently fall 
under the remit of the medical speciality of psychiatry 
(e.g., “Major Depression is a psychiatric disorder.”). 
 
Medical 
(adjective) 
Referring to physical and psychological processes 
associated with the manifestations of disorders which 
currently fall under the remit of medical specialities 
(including general internal medicine, psychiatry, and 
neurology). 
 
Functional Neurological 
Disorder 
(noun) 
A disorder with neurological symptoms associated with 
no easily identifiable physical cause / mechanism which 
would be consistent with traditional / existing accounts 
of neurological disorder, for example limb weakness in 
absence of a lesion to the motor cortex or descending 
motor projections. 
 
Conversion Disorder 
(noun) 
Neurological symptoms brought about by the 
transference of ‘unspeakable’ psychological distress / 
dilemma into ‘physical’ symptoms. This is a psychiatric 
concept most recently described in the DSM-V. 
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Psychogenic 
(adjective) 
Describes a ‘physical’ symptom (e.g., tremor) caused by 
psychological / mental factors (e.g., psychological 
trauma), assuming that psychological processes are 
separate from physical processes. Psychogenic 
symptoms are commonly associated with psychiatric 
disorders.  
 
Somatoform 
(adjective) 
Referring to psychogenic symptoms resembling those of 
medical disorders (e.g., Irritable Bowel Syndrome). 
 
Medically unexplained 
(adjective) 
A symptom that cannot be accounted for by known / 
presently understood medical aetiological mechanisms. 
 
Substance dualism 
(noun) 
A philosophy of the mind which states that mental and 
physical processes / substances are two distinct, separate 
entities (i.e. that mental phenomena are non-physical).  
 
Nonorganic 
(adjective) 
A disorder not caused by a physical process – implies a 
disorder caused by psychological / mental dysfunction. 
 
Dissociative 
(adjective) 
Describes a symptom that is caused by a breakdown in 
the integration of normally integrated psychological / 
mental processes for example, movement and agency. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Functional Neurological Symptom Disorder 
Functional Neurological Symptom Disorder (FND) is defined in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013) as one or more symptoms of altered voluntary motor 
or sensory function. In order for a diagnosis of FND to be given, clinical findings must 
demonstrate incompatibility between the Functional Neurological Symptom (FNS) 
and other known medical conditions. The symptoms must also cause clinically 
significant distress / impairment in a patient’s functioning which warrants medical 
evaluation. FND can affect motor or sensory function. As such the DSM-V criteria 
also specify a range of FND symptom types, which may be short- or long-lasting and 
occur with or without a psychological stressor (Figure 1). Most patients diagnosed 
with FND by the DSM-V would also be classified as having a Dissociative Disorder 
in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) (World Health Organization, 
2016), a definition which also excludes malingering / conscious simulation of 
symptoms.  
The DSM-V definition of FND is subsumed within a new category called 
‘Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders’ (previously called ‘Somatoform 
|Disorders’). This category contains what are proposed to be related, but categorically 
different diagnoses, including Illness Anxiety Disorder, Factitious Disorder, and 
Somatic Symptom Disorder. In the context of the DSM-V, a ‘somatic’ symptom refers 
to symptoms of ‘physical’ illness, such as fatigue or pain, which cannot be fully 
explained by another medical or psychiatric disorder. In order for a diagnosis of 
Somatic Symptom Disorder to be given, a patient must experience one or more 
somatic symptoms that are distressing and disrupt the patient’s daily life, as well as 
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excessive thoughts, feelings, or behaviours related to the symptom(s) or associated 
health concerns (e.g., persistent thoughts, health anxiety, excessive time/energy 
devoted to health concerns). The somatic symptom should also be persistent – 
typically longer than six months – to meet diagnostic criteria. The DSM-V separates 
FND from Somatic Symptom Disorder by emphasising loss of function in FND and 
the distress caused by the symptom in Somatic Symptom Disorder. However, in 
practice, there is considerable overlap between the two diagnoses (the experience of 
pathological symptoms with no obvious identifiable structural or functional cause and 
an association with psychological factors being two examples), and many patients with 
FND also experience somatic symptoms such as chronic pain and fatigue. This 
diagnostic ambiguity is reflected in more recent theoretical models of functional 
somatic symptoms  (e.g., Van den Bergh, Witthoft, Petersen, & Brown, 2017), which 
make no real distinction between the two diagnoses in terms of presumed aetiology 
and mechanism (see section 1.3 for further discussion). This example illustrates one 
of the limitations of the DSM-V definition of FND – that in reality, the boundaries 
between FND and other disorders are not as clearly defined as the DSM-V might 
suggest. 
Nevertheless, FND are one of the most frequently diagnosed conditions in 
neurology outpatient clinics (Stone et al., 2010). While it is difficult to formally 
establish the exact frequency of individual FNS, Nonepileptic Attack Disorder 
(NEAD) seems to be the most common. NEAD is a condition in which the patient 
experiences paroxysmal seizure-like episodes often involving alterations in 
consciousness. While nonepileptic attacks superficially resemble epilepsy, 
epileptiform activity is absent in Video Electroencephalographic (vEEG) recordings 
(LaFrance, Baker, Duncan, Goldstein, & Reuber, 2013). In a breakdown of 587 
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‘psychological / functional’ patients diagnosed in Scottish neurology outpatient clinics 
over approximately 14 months, the largest group (n = 85) were patients with NEAD. 
This was followed by patients with Functional Sensory Symptoms (n = 68, including 
hemisensory and visual deficits), and Functional Movement Disorders (FMD) (n = 56, 
including weakness, movement disorder, and gait disturbances) (Stone et al., 2010). 
In reality, many patients with FND exhibit multiple FNS, with new ones developing 
or existing ones evolving over time. 
Historically, there have been numerous different synonyms for FND, many of 
which imply a psychological aetiology; ‘Psychogenic’, ‘Hysterical’, and 
‘Psychosomatic’ have all been used to indicate that a neurological symptom is 
considered functional.  Commonly used alternative names for nonepileptic attacks 
include ‘Pseudoseizures’, ‘Psychogenic Nonepileptic Seizures’ and ‘Dissociative 
Seizures’.  Indeed, both the current ICD-10 (Dissociative Disorder) and DSM-V 
(Conversion Disorder) definitions allude to a psychological symptom or a 
psychological aetiology (conversion of psychological distress into physical 
Specify symptom type: 
With weakness or paralysis (e.g., Functional Hemiparesis) 
With abnormal movement (e.g., Functional Tremor) 
With speech symptom (e.g., Functional Dysphonia) 
With attacks or seizures (e.g., Nonepileptic Attack Disorder) 
With anaesthesia or sensory loss (e.g., Functional Hypoesthesia) 
With special sensory symptom (e.g., Persistent Postural-Perceptual Dizziness) 
With mixed symptoms 
 
Specify if: 
Acute episode: Symptoms present for < 6 months 
Persistent: Symptoms occurring for ≥ 6 months 
 
Specify if:  
With psychological stressor 
Without psychological stressor 
Figure 1. DSM-V FND symptom types and specifications.  
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symptoms). While in the last iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders the presence of a psychological stressor was removed as a necessary 
condition, many experts maintain the view that psychological factors play an 
important role in the genesis and maintenance of symptoms for the majority of people 
with FND (Carson et al., 2012). However, psychological factors may not always 
appear relevant; many patients do not show any signs of other psychopathology and 
do not report any traumas or dilemmas which could be related to the symptoms (van 
der Hoeven et al., 2015).  Moreover, a ‘psychological’ prefix overshadows biological 
and social factors which are likely involved in the genesis and maintenance of FND 
(Ejareh Dar & Kanaan, 2016). 
Other synonyms for FND such as ‘Non-organic’ or ‘Medically Unexplained 
Symptoms’ simply state what the condition is not, containing no indication of the 
presumed or likely cause (Stone et al., 2011). These ‘negative diagnoses’ may risk 
giving patients the impression that the diagnosing clinician does not know what the 
diagnosis really is, even though there are an increasing number of positive diagnostic 
indictors for FND, such as Hoover’s sign for functional weakness (McWhirter, Stone, 
Sandercock, & Whiteley, 2011) or the typical semiology of  NEAD (Duncan, 2016). 
The prefix ‘Functional’ is used to describe a problem with the workings of, 
and not the structure of, the Nervous System. It makes no assumptions about aetiology 
but likens FND to a problem with the software and not the hardware of a computer.  
Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies in FND implicated 
altered activity within a number of brain regions associated with motor-planning, 
motor-selection, and autonomic responding (Boeckle, Liegl, Jank, & Pieh, 2016), 
which seems consistent with this analogy. Furthermore, patients with NEAD find 
‘functional’ more acceptable and less offensive than psychological or negative labels 
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(Stone et al., 2003). However, even the term  ‘functional’ is not without issue; there is 
now also evidence of structural brain changes in patients with NEAD (McSweeney, 
Reuber, & Levita, 2017). It is therefore most likely that structural alterations can be 
implicated in the genesis and / or maintenance of FND, although they are yet to be 
elucidated. What is more, the nervous system is an adaptive biological system in which 
certain patterns of functioning (such as learning a new skill) can cause demonstrable 
structural changes, so the analogy with software problems has clear limitations. 
Nevertheless, the term ‘Functional Neurological Disorder’ (FND) is currently least 
problematic and will be used to refer to Functional Neurological Symptom Disorder 
throughout this thesis.  
1.2. Epidemiology and prognosis of FND 
Issues surrounding definition and case ascertainment of FND have obfuscated 
the attempts of large-scale studies to establish incidence and prevalence. For example, 
should an epidemiological study recruit only patients with medically unexplained 
neurological symptoms, or only those thought to have a psychogenic disorder? 
Furthermore, a diagnosis of FND can only be confirmed following neurological 
examination, meaning that studies are likely to miss individuals not in contact with 
neurology services. Despite this, FND are one of the commonest reasons why patients 
consults a neurologist (Stone et al., 2010). In a prospective cohort study of 300 new 
neurology outpatients, one third were found to have neurological symptoms not 
explained by any known ‘organic’ pathology (Carson et al., 2000). In a community 
sample, reported incidence rates range between 4 and 12 per 100,000 per year (Akagi 
& House (2001) cited in Carson et al., 2012). These estimates are comparable to the 
incidence of Multiple Sclerosis, which is one of the most common disabling 
neurological disorders (Mackenzie, Morant, Bloomfield, MacDonald, & O'Riordan, 
 28 
 
2014). Based on information extracted from population-based case registers, lower 
estimates of the prevalence rate of FND reaches 50 in 100,000 members of the 
population (Akagi & House (2001), cited in Carson et al., 2012). Based on a 
calculation, Benbadis and Hauser (2000) estimated the prevalence of NEAD as 
between 1 in 50,000 and 1 in 3000. However, these figures likely under-represent the 
true incidence and prevalence of FND. 
Broadly speaking, FND are more frequently diagnosed in women than men, 
with estimates of up for 75% of patient samples being female, although this figure 
may exaggerate true differences in the population prevalence as women are 1.5 times 
more likely than men to present to health services (Carson & Lehn, 2016). Age of 
symptom onset for FND in a series of 3781 newly referred patients to NHS 
neurological centres in Scotland, tended to be between 35 and 50 years of age (Stone 
et al., 2010). However, other reports suggest that NEAD symptom onset is earlier, 
frequently occurring in adolescence and early adulthood (Asadi-Pooya & Sperling, 
2015). Nevertheless, FND can begin at any age, in any gender. 
Outcomes from studies conducted in specialist centres often associate FND 
with significant disability and a poor prognosis. Patients with ‘Medically Unexplained 
Neurological Symptoms’ in a Scottish cohort were found to be more disabled, more 
distressed, and in receipt of more disability-related benefits than their medically-
explained counterparts (Carson et al., 2011). However, it should be noted that these 
studies do not include patients who present to their General Practitioner or Accident 
and Emergency departments with symptoms that remit quickly, hence there are likely 
many patients with FND who have good outcomes. Nevertheless, having the belief 
that one will not recover, rejecting the influence of psychological factors on health, 
and the receipt of disability-related benefits have been shown to predict poor outcome 
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at one year post-consultation (Sharpe et al., 2010).  Many patients with FND are 
initially misdiagnosed, and face a long wait before their diagnosis is corrected. One 
study found that, for patients ultimately found to have NEAD, it took an average of 
7.2 years from manifestation to diagnosis. In the meantime, most of these patients had 
been subjected to unnecessary treatment with antiepileptic drugs, and many had 
undergone interventions such as intubation or the emergency administration of 
intravenous medications associated with a significant risk of iatrogenic harm (Reuber, 
Fernandez, Bauer, Helmstaedter, & Elger, 2002). Conversely, data suggests that once 
a diagnosis of FND is made, it is rarely changed at follow-up (Stone et al., 2009).     
In view of its prevalence and the risk of poor outcomes, FND represent a 
significant challenge for healthcare provision. The cost of healthcare provision for 
somatizing patients is estimated to be £3 billion (equating to 10% of the NHS budget 
in 2008), and the cost of sickness and decreased health-related quality of life is 
estimated to exceed £14 billion (Bermingham, Cohen, Hague, & Parsonage, 2010). 
Unfortunately for these patients, FND is a diagnosis that has been stigmatized both by 
society and the medical profession (Rommelfanger et al., 2017), to the extent that in a 
survey of neurologists, FND came last on a list of neurological symptoms that 
neurologists ‘like to treat’ (Evans & Evans, 2010). It is hoped that multi-disciplinary 
research embracing a biopsychosocial framework as well as the rejection of dualist 
approaches to medicine will help to eliminate this stigma and improve outcomes for 
patients with FND (Rommelfanger et al., 2017). 
1.3. Theories of FND – a role for emotion dysregulation 
Recent theories of FND adopt a multi-factorial perspective, in which 
psychological, biological, and social factors have the potential to predispose an 
individual to the disorder, precipitate, and / or perpetuate the symptoms (Reuber, 
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Howlett, Khan, & Grunewald, 2007). In a naturalistic study of aetiological factors 
recorded during a screening interview by a single psychotherapist, identified 
predisposing and precipitating factors included sexual trauma, non-sexual trauma, 
bereavement, social / family factors such as family dysfunction and life pressures, and 
health issues. Identified perpetuating factors included, bereavement, health anxiety or 
physical health problems, financial or social gain (i.e., through illness identity), Axis 
1 affective disorders, sexual trauma, and social / family factors including life pressures 
and family dysfunction. Of note, there was a subgroup of patients for whom no 
predisposing, precipitating, or perpetuating factors could be identified, illustrating the 
heterogeneity of risk factors for FND.  Of course, many of the factors listed above are 
generic risk factors for mental disorders. Hence, there remain open questions about 
what mechanisms specifically lead to FND. To date, a number of psychological 
theories concerning the genesis and maintenance of FND have been proposed, some 
of which will now be discussed. 
 The Integrative Cognitive Model of Medically Unexplained Symptoms 
(MUS) proposed by Brown (2004) incorporates the concepts of dissociation, 
conversion, and somatisation and interprets them within a cognitive psychological 
framework as disorders of perception and control. According to this theory, ‘rogue 
representations’ are essentially symptom representations acquired through the 
patient’s own history of physical illness, exposure to illness in others, sociocultural 
transmission, or verbal suggestion.  A malfunctioning attentional control system 
persistently activates and selects these ‘rogue representations’, which gives rise to 
symptoms characterised by altered perception (e.g., pain, anaesthesia, visual 
disturbance) or impaired control (e.g., tremor). These alterations may be misattributed 
to physical illness by the patient, consistent with a loss of agency and the perception 
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that symptoms are involuntary. 
Computational neuroscientists have provided predictive coding accounts for 
the mechanism of FND (Edwards, Adams, Brown, Pareés, & Friston, 2012; Van den 
Bergh et al., 2017), in which prior expectations and attentional processes play a role. 
Within a Bayesian framework, the brain is constantly generating probabilistic internal 
models to infer the causes of sensory inputs (referred to as posterior beliefs), which 
are calculated from prior expectations (learned knowledge) about the world and 
current sensory input. Mismatches between prior expectations and sensory input result 
in ‘prediction errors’, which the brain will try to reduce either by adjusting the prior 
expectation to better fit the sensory data, or by adjusting the representation of sensory 
data (e.g., through increased or decreased attentional allocation) to better fit the prior 
expectation. This process is continuous and iterative, moving bi-directionally through 
a hierarchical structure such that lower levels represent basic properties of sensory 
input and higher levels represent more abstract and complex properties. Bottom-up 
prediction errors depend on top-down input from predictions (which are also 
influenced by previous prediction errors). Over time and experience, predictions and 
prediction errors build a level of confidence (variance around a mean distribution), 
which can also be thought of as ‘precision’ (smaller variance translating to greater 
precision). Precise prior expectations represent strong predictions, and the stronger the 
prior the more likely it is the inferred cause of the sensory input (posterior) will be 
weighted in favour of the prior prediction. Conversely, if the sensory input has high 
precision the posterior will be biased towards the sensory data. Consequently, as more 
sensory inputs are accumulated over time the prior will be updated to reflect the 
sensory data. The system also weights prediction errors based on how likely they are 
to be a result of noise or an accurate reflection of input. When precise sensory data is 
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expected (e.g., in the light) the posterior will be weighted more in favour of sensory 
input. However, if the sensory input is expected to be imprecise or noisy (e.g., in the 
dark) the posterior will remain biased towards the prior. Ultimately, this process will 
generate an optimal posterior model to infer the cause of sensory inputs. 
 Edwards et al. (2012) propose that in the case of FND, sensory and motor 
symptoms are generated by two disruptions to this process of inference. The primary 
failure of inference is that the perception of a sensation or movement (or lack thereof) 
is generated from abnormal prior expectations which are given too much weight by 
attentional processes. The second failure of inference is that because the resulting 
posterior perception was not predicted, it is falsely inferred to be a symptom. The 
theorised role of an imbalance between prior expectations and sensory input in the 
phenomenology of functional tremor has been supported by Parees et al. (2012), who 
demonstrated that patients with functional tremor overestimated the duration of their 
tremor throughout the day more so than patients with ‘organic’ tremor. This may be 
interpreted as the consequence of an overly precise prior expectation (that a tremor is 
present all day) over-riding sensory proprioceptive sensory data from the affected limb 
(which should inform the generative model that the tremor is intermittent). The undue 
influence of beliefs or prior expectations on FND patients’ phenomenology is also 
demonstrated through curative response to placebo; Edwards, Bhatia, and Cordivari 
(2011) showed that fixed dystonia patients experienced symptomatic relief almost 
immediately following a Botox injection (i.e., because they believed it would work), 
when in reality Botox takes 72 hours to take effect. Abnormal prior symptom 
expectations may come about through a number of social and cultural influences such 
as illness exposure. Hotopf, Mayou, Wadsworth, and Wessely (1999) found that the 
presence of MUS in adulthood was related to parental ill-health in childhood which 
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could conceivably lead to increased symptom monitoring - this can also be thought of 
as the pathological direction of attention to an abnormal prior. The authors note 
however, that while affective factors may be related to attentional and belief-driven 
processes in FND, affective factors are not always necessary and are not sufficient to 
produce Functional Movement or Sensory Symptoms.  
Van den Bergh et al. (2017) recently proposed a predictive coding model of 
symptom perception in MUS, which incorporates concepts from both the Edwards et 
al. (2012) Bayesian inference model with factors from the Integrative Cognitive Model 
(Brown, 2004). This model extends to all functional symptoms including autonomic 
dysfunction, functional syndrome, and other somatization problems but places greater 
emphasis on the role of interoception. Within this model, FND symptoms can be 
thought of as ‘somatovisceral illusions’ brought about by a generative system which 
gives too much weight to priors predicting the presence of pathological symptoms or 
the ‘normal’ interoceptive condition of the body, coupled with a reduction in the 
detailed processing of sensory input. This set of conditions leads to a large mismatch 
between the prior and sensory input (prediction error) and the patient experiences, “a 
subjectively real but objectively illusory,” symptom. In this model, the abnormally 
precise priors result from an over-representation of previously learned experience 
about the cause of a particular interoceptive sensation, analogous to symptom 
representations in the Integrative Cognitive Model. The reduction in detailed 
processing of sensory cues is moderated by a number of factors including low 
interoceptive sensitivity, attentional modulation, sensitivity to contextual cues, and 
threat processing strategies (such as high trait negative affect) – all of which are 
relevant to emotion dysregulation.  
Other theories attempting to explain the mechanism by which FND manifest 
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have been derived from neuroimaging research.  Based on their review of such studies, 
Perez et al. (2015) propose that NEAD and FMD are brought about by alterations in 
neural networks mediating emotional expression, regulation, and awareness (Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (ACC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex, insula, amygdala, vermis), 
cognitive control and motor inhibition (ACC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior 
frontal gyrus), perceptual awareness (temporoparietal junction, posterior parietal 
cortex), and motor planning / coordination (supplementary motor area, cerebellum). 
They suggest that pathological changes to these circuits may be precipitated by chronic 
stress.   
With respect to NEAD, Baslet (2011) proposed a conceptual framework in 
which psychopathological mechanisms (dissociation, somatization, and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)), a narrow window of arousal tolerance, emotional 
deficits (alexithymia and avoidance),  cognitive deficits (maladaptive attentional 
styles), and disrupted automaticity / volitional control interact to facilitate a 
predisposition to NEAD which may be triggered by emotionally salient stimuli. Other 
psychological theories place emphasis on factors such as fear avoidance (Goldstein et 
al., 2010), and family dysfunction (Salmon, Al-Marzooqi, Baker, & Reilly, 2003).  
Given the reported higher rates of trauma, anxiety, alexithymia, dissociation, and 
pathological personality traits in patients with NEAD (e.g., Driver-Dunckley, 
Stonnington, Locke, & Noe, 2011; Ekanayake et al., 2017; Reuber, Howlett, et al., 
2007; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 2004), it is generally considered that NEAD aetiology 
may be more closely related to emotion dysregulation than the aetiology of FMD or 
other FNS.  
The theories discussed above do not constitute an exhaustive list of those put 
forward to explain FND. However, they do serve to illustrate the point that even 
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though purely psychological accounts of FND are now considered insufficient, current 
theories of FND either explicitly endorse or give space for factors relating to emotion 
regulation such as trauma, attentional biases, illness beliefs, or emotion processing 
deficits. These contributions represent an important step forward in the study of FND, 
but are limited by a failure to adequately explain how or why psychological factors 
may render an individual susceptible to one particular FNS (e.g., NEAD) and not 
another (e.g., functional tremor). Indeed, FND is a highly heterogeneous disorder, with 
variations in symptom presentation between and within individuals. This 
heterogeneity extends to patients’ psychosocial history; many will endorse a history 
of trauma, some will categorically deny any predisposing or precipitating traumatic 
experiences. Likewise, Axis 1 and Axis 2 disorders can be identified in many patients, 
but the nature of these varies widely between patients. Whether patients with FND 
should be lumped together or split into individual diagnostic categories is a 
contentious issue. However, given that response to therapeutic intervention is likely to 
depend on symptom aetiology, elucidating the nature and causes of psychological and 
clinical heterogeneity in FND will hopefully help clinicians to better diagnose and 
treat this patient group.   
One potential solution to tackling the issue of heterogeneity in FND research 
is to embed identified psychological deficits or risk factors within a more 
comprehensive model. Taking this structured approach could conceivably help to 
systematically explain some of the differences in the aetiology and phenomenology of 
FND, by allowing for the generation and testing of specific and related hypotheses.  
We propose the Extended Process Model (EPM) of emotion regulation (Gross, 2015) 
as a candidate model in which to constrain the conceptualisation of, and operationalise 
emotion dysregulation in FND. 
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1.4. What is an emotion?  
Before introducing the Extended Process Model of emotion regulation, it is 
helpful to define what an emotion is. Given the vast array of emotions humans are 
capable of experiencing, it is easier to say what emotions have in common, than to say 
what they are not. According to Appraisal Theory (Lazarus, 1991), one core feature 
of an emotion is that it occurs when an individual attends to and evaluates a situation 
as being relevant to a particular goal. Another core feature of emotions is that they are 
multi-faceted whole-body phenomena involving loosely coupled changes in subjective 
experience, behaviour, and physiology (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & 
Gross, 2005).  The Modal Model of emotion (Gross, 1998) is a simple, linear 
conceptualisation of the emotion generative process (Figure 2). Emotions begin with 
attentional allocation to a psychologically relevant situation, which is then appraised 
in reference to a particular goal, ending in experiential, physiological, and behavioural 
changes within an individual. This response may then serve to alter the original 
situation which gave rise to the emotion in the first instance. The Modal Model 
illustrates another core feature of emotions; that they unfold over time.  
1.5. The Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation 
Emotion regulation can be defined as the process by which a person modifies 
or controls what emotions they are experiencing, when they have them, and the nature 
Figure 2. The Modal Model of Emotion (Gross, 1998b). Adapted from Gross (2014). 
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in which they are experienced or expressed (Gross, 1998). The goal of emotion 
regulation can be to change emotion in oneself (intrinsic) or in another (extrinsic) 
(Zaki & Williams, 2013). The aim of emotion regulation is not necessarily to down-
regulate negative emotions and up-regulate positive emotions; sometimes it is helpful 
to increase negative emotions, such as in the case of increasing fear to achieve the goal 
of successful threat-avoidance. Emotion regulation can be instrumental in achieving 
shorter- or longer-term goals, for example in the case of delayed-gratification during  
which one may down-regulate immediate pleasure in order to up-regulate pleasure in 
the future (Tamir, 2009). Emotion regulation may be explicit and effortful (such as 
instructing a participant to deliberately reappraise an upsetting stimulus) or implicit 
and automatic (such as a habitual tendency to avoid upsetting stimuli) (Gyurak, Gross, 
& Etkin, 2011). Emotion regulation can also aim to modify some specific aspect of 
the emotion, such as intensity or frequency (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015).   
The Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation (EPM) (Gross, 2015) is 
the most recent iteration of the popular ‘Process Model of Emotion Regulation’ 
(Gross, 2001). The Process Model is an information-processing model based on the 
Modal Model of Emotion, which reframes each step of the emotion generative process 
(i.e., Situation, Attention, Appraisal, Response) as a target for emotion regulation. This 
yields five general categories of emotion regulation strategies (Table 1). Response 
Modulation is considered a ‘response-focused’ general regulation category because it 
is used after the emotional response has been elicited. Accordingly, the other 
categories are considered ‘antecedent-focused’.  
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Table 1- General categories of emotion regulation strategies. 
 
Process 
Model 
Stage 
 
General Emotion 
Regulation 
Category 
 
 
Description 
Situation Situation Selection Taking actions to increase / decrease 
likelihood of encountering situation (e.g., 
avoiding upsetting films). 
 
 Situation 
Modification 
Modifying an external situation to alter its 
emotional impact (e.g., physically 
distancing oneself from an argument). 
 
Attention Attentional 
Deployment 
Directing attention to alter one’s emotions 
(e.g., distraction). 
 
Appraisal Cognitive Change Changing the way one thinks about an 
internal or external event (e.g, positively 
reframing criticism). 
 
Response Response 
Modulation 
Directly influencing experiential, 
behavioural, or physiological components 
of the generated response (e.g., expressive 
suppression). 
 
While the Process Model has been highly influential in the emotion regulation 
literature, it does not try to explain what initiates emotion regulation, or what would 
give rise to ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ emotion regulation – questions which are 
especially relevant to clinical research. Gross therefore presented the EPM (Gross, 
2015) which essentially views emotion regulation a series of ‘valuations’ across three 
stages; identification, selection, and implementation (Figure 3). Each valuation begins 
with a representation of the internal or external environment (World) which is 
perceived (Perception) and compared against a goal-state (Valuation). If there is a 
sufficient discrepancy between the internal / external environment and the goal-state, 
the Action sub-step is triggered. The function of the Action sub-step is constrained by 
the stage of the EPM that the valuation system is within.  During identification, an 
ongoing emotion is identified (e.g., disgust) and a decision is made whether or not to 
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regulate the emotion based on the discrepancy between the current emotion and goal 
emotional state.  During selection, a general emotion regulation strategy (e.g., 
attentional deployment) is decided upon in light of the type and strength of the emotion 
identified. During the implementation stage, the general emotion regulation strategy 
is translated into specific tactics suitable for the current situation (e.g., distraction from 
the disgust-eliciting stimulus). In the case of successful emotion regulation, the 
process cycles through again until the emotion regulation goal is reached (e.g., the 
individual is no longer feeling disgusted).  According to the EPM, emotion regulation 
is a continuous, multi-modal, and iterative process. 
The term ‘emotion dysregulation’ describes a disruption at any sub-step of 
these stages. Thinking about emotion dysregulation within this framework is helpful 
because this generates testable predictions about the nature of emotion dysregulation 
in FND. Sheppes et al. (2015) have already given examples of what emotion 
dysregulation would constitute in various forms of psychopathology according to the 
EPM, some of which are presented below.  
 Identification-stage difficulties result in trouble initiating emotion regulation. 
This can happen because the generated emotion is over- or under-represented 
Figure 3. The Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation (Gross, 2015). 
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(Perceptual sub-step) or because of an erroneous analysis of the cost vs. benefits of 
maintaining an ongoing emotion (Valuation sub-step). Failures in the action sub-step 
would lead to the identified need to regulate not being translated into action. Panic 
attacks are an example of over-representation during the identification stage, during 
which current emotional states can be magnified resulting in unnecessary and 
maladaptive regulatory efforts. An example of under-representation is alexithymia – a 
personality type characterised by difficulty identifying and labelling emotional states 
(Taylor, 1984), which is likely to lead to a failure to regulate emotions at all.  
Within the selection stage, a perceptual sub-step failure results in the mis-
representation of available general regulatory categories. A valuation failure arises 
from an erroneous cost-benefit analysis associated with general regulatory categories; 
if a maladaptive category of strategies is given a strong-enough positive valuation, it 
will pass the threshold required for selection. An action sub-step impairment results in 
a failure to trigger the general regulatory category.  Within this framework, a reliance 
on emotion-focused coping strategies could be considered an example of emotion 
dysregulation at the valuation sub-step, in that the immediate relief of negative affect 
passes the threshold of valuation, even though emotion-focused coping does little to 
resolve the initial cause of distress. It has been argued that non-suicidal self-injury is 
an example of this, because it is a harmful general category of tactics which are also a 
powerful distractor from even more distressing situations (McKenzie & Gross, 2014).  
The implementation stage serves to execute a particular strategy from the 
general category of strategies yielded by the selection stage. Implementation-stage 
difficulties may arise through the misrepresentation of specific regulatory tactics 
(perceptual sub-step), erroneous valuations of the cost / benefits associated with a 
specific regulatory tactic, or a failure to enact the selected tactic. An example of the 
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latter can be seen in that the tactic of recalling positive memories to repair sad mood 
is impaired in dysphoric patients, but the ability to use distraction is intact (Joormann 
& Siemer, 2004). 
Sheppes et al. (2015) also suggest that there can be deficits in the processing-
dynamics of emotion regulation. For example, an individual may stop or switch to 
another regulatory tactic too soon, before the initially selected method has had time to 
work. This may happen because the individual has low regulatory self-efficacy (i.e., 
they believe they are not able to successfully implement regulation strategies), which 
has been linked to social anxiety (Thomasson & Psouni, 2010). Conversely, an 
individual may fail to stop or switch to another regulatory tactic even though it is 
ineffective. An example of this is the rigid style of thinking in Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder, which can also be thought of as a failure to switch from strategies (e.g., 
repeated checking) that do not work.  
1.6. Thesis aims 
The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the existing knowledge of 
emotion dysregulation in patients with FND by taking a theoretically constrained, 
hypothesis driven approach set within a biopsychosocial perspective. The EPM 
(Gross, 2015) will be used to generate hypotheses about emotion dysregulation in 
FND, which will be tested with a combination of self-report, behavioural, and 
physiological measures. We also aim to investigate changes in self-reported emotion 
dysregulation and psychological distress over the course of a psychotherapeutic 
intervention for FND. A summary of the remaining chapter aims is outlined below: 
Chapter 2 – A systematic review to synthesise the existing literature on 
emotion dysregulation in NEAD (emotion regulation is a likely to be a pertinent factor 
for FND in general (as for all medical conditions), but the literature suggests the link 
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to emotion dysregulation is particularly strong for NEAD). 
Chapter 3 – To address this issue of heterogeneity in FND by exploring the 
relationship between FND symptom manifestation and emotion dysregulation. Self-
reported emotion dysregulation and symptoms of psychopathology will be compared 
in FND patients with and without impairments of consciousness.  
Chapter 4 – To generate and test hypotheses about the identification of 
emotions, as well as the selection and implementation of emotion regulation strategies 
in patient with FND.  The identification stage will be studied using an interoceptive 
sensitivity paradigm, and the selection / implementation stages will be studied using a 
paradigm designed to investigate expressive suppression in patients with FND. 
Evidence of chronic autonomic arousal related to emotion dysregulation will also be 
studied in this chapter using a Heart Rate Variability paradigm.  
Chapter 5 – To track changes in emotion dysregulation with a self-report 
measure in patients with FND pre- and post-psychotherapeutic intervention.  
Chapter 6 – To synthesise and discuss the overall findings of this thesis as they 
relate to the EPM and emotion dysregulation in patients with FND.  
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2. Emotion dysregulation in patients with Nonepileptic 
Attack Disorder: a systematic review based on the 
Extended Process Model 
2.1. Introduction 
Nonepileptic Attacks (NEAs) are a paroxysmal FNS assumed to be a 
behavioural and experiential response to aversive triggers (Brown & Reuber, 2016a). 
Superficially resembling epileptic seizures, but un-associated with epileptiform 
activity,  NEAs are relatively common, and are associated with long-term disability as 
well as a heavy economic burden (Asadi-Pooya & Sperling, 2015). While the causes 
of NEAD are yet to be elucidated, a biopsychosocial model attributes aetiology to a 
complex interaction of pre-disposing, precipitating, perpetuating, and triggering 
factors - several of which relate to an individuals’ capacity to regulate their own 
emotions (Reuber, 2009). Examples of such relevant psychological and psychiatric 
factors include (but are not limited to) previous exposure to trauma, dissociation, 
coping, alexithymia, and interpersonal attachment styles (Brown & Reuber, 2016a). 
While there is an increasing trend for research on emotion regulation in NEAD, and 
an integrative psychological model has been proposed (e.g., Brown & Reuber, 2016b),  
it remains to be seen how observations of emotion dysregulation in NEAD can be 
fitted into a more general theory of emotion regulation. Therefore, the aim of this 
review is to synthesise the existing literature on emotion dysregulation in NEAD 
within the framework of the EPM (see section 1.5. for explanation of the EPM) (Gross, 
2015).  
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2.2. Methods 
A systematic review was conducted. Data were reported according to the 
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analysis (PRISMA) 
checklist (Moher et al., 2015). The definition of emotion regulation and dysregulation 
was based on the EPM (Gross, 2015) and NEAD was defined as a clinical diagnosis 
identical to Psychogenic Nonepileptic Seizures (PNES). The diagnosis of NEAD does 
not map neatly onto any one of the nosological categories of the DSM-V, but usually 
fulfils the diagnostic criteria of FND (Conversion) Disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) falling under the subtype of ‘with attacks or seizures’.  The 
diagnostic process clinically defining NEAD / PNES has been outlined in a consensus 
paper by the International League Against Epilepsy (LaFrance et al., 2013) 
2.2.1. Search strategy 
The electronic databases PubMed and Web of Science were searched on 18th 
January 2018 (years 1894 – 2017) using the following search terms: (nonepileptic 
NEAR attack*) OR (non-epileptic NEAR attack*)) OR (nonepileptic NEAR 
seizure*)) OR (non-epileptic NEAR seizure*)) OR pseudoseizure*) OR (dissociative 
NEAR seizure*)) OR (dissociative NEAR convulsion*)) OR pseudo- epilep*) OR 
(hysterical NEAR seizure*)) OR (hysterical NEAR convulsion*)) OR 
hysteroepilepsy*) OR (conversion NEAR seizure*)) OR (psychogenic NEAR 
seizure*)) OR (functional NEAR seizure*)) OR (nonepileptic NEAR event*)) OR 
(non-epileptic NEAR event*)) AND (((emotion NEAR regulation) OR emot*) OR 
mood)) AND (((((((((indentifi* OR alexithymi*) OR select*) OR avoid*) OR 
distraction) OR attention*) OR coping*) OR reapprais*) OR suppress*) OR 
implement*)). Search terms relating to NEAD were taken from a recent review article 
on NEAD (Wiseman & Reuber, 2015). Search terms relating to emotion dysregulation 
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were taken from or synonymous with keywords in the EPM (Gross, 2015). Further 
relevant articles were identified from the reference list of papers identified during the 
electronic database search. 
2.2.2. Study selection  
Titles and abstracts of the resulting articles were screened for relevance to the 
review topic by myself (IW) and compared against inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Only original peer-reviewed research reports were included. Review articles, case 
studies, opinion pieces, conference abstract or posters, unpublished work, and articles 
not written in English were excluded from the review. No articles were excluded on 
the basis of study design. Studies not directly relevant to the mechanism of emotion 
regulation in patients with NEAD only (i.e. explicitly defined experimental / case 
groups with mixed FNS or with comorbid epilepsy) were also excluded at this stage. 
Studies of paediatric populations or treatment for NEAD, and studies that focused on 
patients’ support networks were considered outside the scope of the review.The 
remaining full-text articles were then read in full by IW and MR. Articles were 
subsequently excluded because dependent variables were not quantitative 
psychological measures and were therefore incompatible with the quality rating 
system (Ding et al., 2014; Pick, Mellers, & Goldstein, 2016) or because the methods / 
methodologies used did not directly relate to a stage of the EPM  (Del Bene et al., 
2017; Holmes et al., 2001). Finally, each article was clustered to one or more specific 
stages of the EPM according to the methodologies or measures used (such that some 
studies are discussed in more than one section of this review, see Table 2 for list of 
measures grouped into EPM stage). The categorisation of each study / methodology 
into stages of the EPM was proposed by IW and confirmed by a second rater (LL).  
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2.2.3. Quality assessment 
The selected papers were subjected to a formal quality assessment (Table 
3).The articles were rated according to a bespoke appraisal tool designed specifically 
for quantitative psychological research in this field and published in a previous 
systematic review (Brown & Reuber, 2016a). This rating system clarifies whether i) 
all diagnoses of NEAD were confirmed with video-EEG (yes / no), ii) a diagnosis of 
epilepsy was explicitly ruled out in the group with NEAD (yes / no), iii) there was 
reference to a procedure to ensure that nonepileptic attacks could not have been 
misdiagnosed panic attacks (yes / no), iv) patients were recruited consecutively (yes / 
no), and v) dependent variables were standardised (yes / no). vi) Number, type, and 
gender ratio of control groups (where appropriate) were recorded to ensure that the 
control groups were matched and did not have a diagnosis of NEAD (yes / no) (a 
difference in gender ratio of less than 10% or mean age difference of less than five 
years between-groups was considered matched). Vii) Very few studies presented a 
formal power calculation to justify sample sizes, therefore we rated sample size 
according to the power and effect size conventions proposed by Cohen (1988) and 
used in a previous systematic review of NEAD (Brown & Reuber, 2016a). Study 
quality was calculated from a combination of ratings based on eight different quality 
criteria and sample power (Brown & Reuber, 2016a). Sample sizes for studies were 
rated as being very poor (<15 participants in each group; i.e., <80% power to detect a 
very large effect size, Cohen's d = 1.1), poor (<26 participants in each group; i.e., 
<80% power to detect a large effect size, d = 0.8), moderate (26–63 participants in 
each group; i.e., ≥80% power to detect a large effect size, d=0.8) or good (≥64 
participants in each group; i.e., ≥80% power to detect a medium effect size, d = 0.5), 
assuming a two-tailed independent t test with alpha = .05. To establish inter-rater 
 47 
 
reliability, each article was rated by IW and MR. Any disagreements on ratings were 
resolved following discussion. Studies which were rated as ‘unacceptable’ were 
subsequently excluded from the review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. PRISMA flowchart 
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2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Quality assessment 
Fifty-two papers were included in the quality assessment (Table 3). Quality 
was rated as unacceptable in four (7.7%), low in 24 (46.2%), medium in 21 (40.4%), 
and high in 3 (5.8%) studies. The median size of case group included in the review 
was 30 but only 50% of studies (with a case-control design) were adequately powered 
(defined as moderate or good power). Sixteen of the 24 low quality studies would have 
been rated as medium quality if they had a sample size ≥26. Likewise, the four studies 
which were excluded were deemed inadmissible because of sample size of <15; all of 
these studies would have been classed as being of moderate to high quality on the basis 
of the other quality criteria. In terms of individual quality rating criteria, all dependent 
variables were standardised in 92%, an explicit reference to epilepsy being ruled out 
was made in 76%, all NEAD cases were confirmed with video-EEG in 71%, anxiety 
attacks were ruled out in 50%, and patients were recruited consecutively in 38% of 
studies subjected to the quality review. Forty eight studies were included in the final 
review.  
2.3.2. Categorisation of studies  
Twenty-three studies were categorised as relevant to the identification stage of 
the EPM because the measures and methodologies used captured participants’ 
perception of their own emotional state. Thirty-four studies were deemed relevant to 
the selection and implementation stages (Table 2).  
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Table 2 - Categorisation of measures and methodologies into stages of the Extended Process Model. 
EPM stage Construct         Methodology / measures used 
Identification  Emotional 
awareness / 
Alexithymia 
TAS-20, EPS-25 impoverished emotional experience subscale, patient-endorsed ictal somatic panic 
symptoms versus panic item on HADS, patient-endorsed ictal emotions, BNI Screen for Higher 
Cognitive Function (affect subscale) vs. patient-reported irritability, The Heart Beat Detection Task 
 Perceived stress PERI (Life Events Scale), EPCL, LEC, PSS, NEO-PI-R Neuroticism subscale, DAPP-BQ 
Selection and 
implementation 
Regulatory / coping 
style 
DERS, UCS, COPE Inventory, CERQ, WOC, MHLOC, ERQ, REM, MMPI, CISS, EPS-25, HRV, 
The Courthauld Emotional Control Scale 
 Dissociation DES, CADDS, DIS-Q, Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire, SCID-D, CDS, patient-endorsed 
ictal dissociative symptomology, TSI-2 Dissociation subscale 
 Avoidance Short TCI (Avoidance subscale), WOC, MEAQ, Fear Questionnaire, CISS Avoidance subscale, EPS-
25 Avoidance subscale 
 Exteroceptive / 
others 
Emotional N-Back Task, Emotional Stroop Task, Task-switching experiment (emotional 
categorisation), Animated Morph Task, Movie for Assessment of Social Cognition, HRV 
Note. TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale – 20, EPS-25 impoverished subscale = Emotional Processing Scale -25 impoverished emotional experience 
subscale, HADS= Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, PERI = Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview, EPCL = Everyday Problems Checklist, LEC= 
Life Events Checklist, PSS = Perceived Stress Scale, NEO-PI-R = NEO Personality Inventory Revised, DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale, UCS 
= Utrecht Coping Scale, DES = Dissociative Experiences Scale, CADDS = Clinician Administered Dissociative States Scale, DIS-Q = The Dissociation 
Questionnaire, CERQ = Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, Short TCI = Short Temperament and Character Inventory, SCID-D = Structured Clinical 
Interview for Dissociative Disorders, WOC = Ways of Coping Scale, CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale, MEAQ = Multidimensional Experiential 
Avoidance Questionnaire, MHLOC = Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Scale, ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, REM = Response Evaluation 
Measure, TSI-2 = Trauma Symptom Inventory, MMPI = Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, CISS = Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations, HRV 
= Heart Rate Variability, DAPP-PQ = Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology – Basic Questionnaire. 
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Table 3 - Quality rating assessment of studies identified in the literature search. 
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Akyuz et al. (2004) Case control Moderate ES N Y Y N Y Y Y 71 Medium   
Alper et al. (1997) Case control Good ES Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 100 High   
Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009) Case control Poor HC Y Y Y N Y Y Y 71 Low   
Bakvis, Spinhoven, et al. (2009) Case control Poor HC & ES Y Y Y N Y N N 57 Low   
Bakvis, Spinhoven, et al. (2011) Case control Very poor HC Y Y Y Y Y N N 57 Unacceptable - - 
Bakvis et al. (2010) Case control Poor HC Y Y N N Y Y Y 100 Low   
Baslet et al. (2010) Case series - - N N N Y Y - - 29 Low   
Bewley et al. (2005) Case control Poor HC & ES Y Y N N Y Y Y 71 Low   
Bodde et al. (2013) Case series - - Y N Y Y Y - - 57 Medium   
Bodde et al. (2007) Case series - - Y Y N Y Y - - 57 Medium   
Bowman et al. (2000) Case control Poor ES Y N N N Y Y Y 57 Low   
Brown et al. (2013) Case control Moderate ES N Y N N Y Y Y 57 Medium   
Cohen et al. (2014) Case series Moderate - Y Y Y Y Y - - 71 Medium   
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Cragar et al. (2005) Case control Very good ES Y Y N Y Y N Y 71 Medium  
Cronje & Pretorious (2013) Case control Poor HC Y Y N N Y Y Y 71 Low   
Demartini et al. (2016) Case control Poor HC & FMD Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 100 Low   
Dikel et al. (2003) Case control Poor ES Y N N N Y N Y 43 Low   
Dimaro et al. (2014) Case control Moderate HC & ES Y Y N N Y Y Y 71 Medium   
Ekanayake et al. (2017) Case control Moderate FMD Y Y N Y Y Y N 71 Medium   
Fleisher et al. (2002) Case control Moderate ES Y N Y N Y Y Y 71 Medium   
Frances et al. (1999) Case control Moderate ES & HC N Y Y N Y Y Y 71 Medium   
Goldstein et al. (2000) Case control Poor HC N Y Y N Y Y Y 71 Low   
Goldstein et al. (2006) Case control Poor ES N Y Y N Y N Y 57 Low   
Gul and Ahmad  (2014) Case control Good HC N Y Y N Y Y Y 71 Medium   
Hendrickson et al. (2014) Case control Good ES Y Y Y Y N N N 57 medium   
Hingray et al. (2011) Case control Very poor NEAD  - T Y N Y Y Y N N 57 Unacceptable - - 
Kaplan et al. (2013) Case control Good ES Y N N N Y N Y 43 Medium   
Kuyk et al. (1999) Case control Good ES N Y N N Y N N 43 Low   
Lawton et al. (2008) Case control Moderate ES N Y N N Y N Y 43 Low   
Martino et al. (2017) Case control Very poor MMDD Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 100 Unacceptable - - 
Mazza et al. (2009) Case control Moderate ES & HC Y N Y Y Y Y Y 86 Medium   
Myers, Fleming et al. (2013) Case series - - Y Y N Y Y - - 57 High  
Myers, Matzner et al. (2013) Case control Moderate ES Y Y N Y Y N Y 86 Medium   
Myers, Perinne, et al. (2013) Case series Good NEAD - T Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 86 High   
Novakova et al. (2015) Case control Moderate HC N N N Y Y N N 29 Low   
O'Brien et al. (2015) Case control Poor HC Y Y Y N Y Y Y 86 low   
Ozcetin et al. (2009) Case control Moderate HC Y Y Y N Y Y Y 86 Medium   
Ponnusamy et al. (2011) Case control Moderate ES & HC Y Y N Y Y Y Y 86 Medium   
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Prigatano et al.  (2002) Case series - - Y N N N N - - 14 Low   
Prigatano et al. (2009) Case control Poor ES Y Y N N N N Y 43 low   
Proenca et al. (2011) Case control Poor ES Y Y N N Y Y Y 71 low   
Prueter et al. (2002) Case control Poor ES & ES+NEAD N Y N N Y N N 29 Low  
Reuber et al. (2003) Case control Good ES N Y N N Y N Y 43 Medium   
Reuber et al. (2004) Case control Very good ES & HC Y Y N Y Y N Y 57 Medium  
Roberts et al. (2012) Case control Poor High T & Low T Y Y Y N Y N Y 71 low   
Schonenberg et al. (2015) Case control Poor HC Y Y N Y Y Y Y 86 Low   
Testa et al.(2012) Case control Moderate HC & ES Y Y Y N Y N Y 71 Medium   
Tojek et al.  (2000) Case control Poor ES Y Y N N N Y Y 57 low   
Uliaszek et al. (2012) Case series - - N N Y N Y - - 29 Low   
Urbanek et al. (2014) Case control Good HC N N N N Y Y N 29 Low   
Van der Kruijs et al. (2012) Case control Very poor HC N Y Y N Y Y Y 71 Unacceptable - - 
Wolf et al. (2015) Case control Good ES Y Y Y N Y N Y 86 Medium   
Note.  HC = healthy control, ES = epilepsy control, FMD = Functional Movement Disorder, NEAD-T= non-traumatised NEAD control, ES+NEAD= 
comorbid epilepsy and NEAD control, High T= high trauma control group, Low T= low trauma control group, MMDD = Mild Major Depressive Disorder - = 
not applicable, EPM = Extended Process Model of emotion regulation. 
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2.4. The identification stage 
The identification stage describes the detection of an existing emotion 
followed by an evaluation of whether the emotion is negative or positive and whether 
the result of this evaluation is sufficiently discrepant with a goal state to warrant 
regulation (Gross, 2015). Based on this analysis, the goal to regulate an emotion will 
then be activated (or not). Studies pertaining to the identification of emotional state in 
patients with NEAD could be grouped into two themes: i) alexithymia / awareness of 
one’s own emotional state and, ii) perceptions of stress.  
2.4.1. Alexithymia / emotional awareness and NEAD 
The ability of patients to detect and interpret their own emotional states has 
mostly been assessed with self-report measures of alexithymia in the NEAD 
population (e.g., The Toronto Alexithymia Scale -20 and the Emotional Processing 
Scale-25). Alexithymia is a psychological construct describing difficulties with the 
identification and description of feelings as well as their differentiation from 
sensations associated with physiological processes (Goerlich-Dobre, Votinov, Habel, 
Pripfl, & Lamm, 2015).Other studies have investigated the accuracy of patients’ 
reporting on emotional states / feelings with the use of an interoceptive sensitivity 
paradigm or by comparing patients’ self-reported feeling states against more objective 
measures of the same construct.  
2.4.1.1. Self-report studies of alexithymia -The Toronto Alexithymia Scale. 
 The most frequently used measure of alexithymia in patients with NEAD was the 
twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20), which assesses patients’ ability 
to identify their own emotions. There are three subscales measuring ‘difficulty 
describing feelings (DDF)’, ‘difficulty identifying feelings (DIF)’, and ‘externally 
orientated thinking (EOT)’ – the latter referring to a tendency to focus on external 
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rather than internal events and experiences (Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994). Usually, 
an individual reporting a total TAS-20 score of ≥ 61 is considered ‘alexithymic’ and 
those scoring between 52 and 60 are considered ‘possibly alexithymic’ (Bagby et al., 
1994). 
Ten studies reporting a total TAS-20 score used a case-control design (Table 
4). Of these ten studies, two classified the NEAD group as alexithymic (i.e. mean total 
TAS-20 >61) with approximately 90% and approximately 63% of the NEAD group 
scored above the clinical cut off for alexithymia respectively (Bewley, Murphy, 
Mallows, & Baker, 2005; Urbanek, Harvey, McGowan, & Agrawal, 2014).  In seven 
studies, mean NEAD group scores were within the ‘possibly alexithymic range’   
(Ekanayake et al., 2017; Kaplan et al., 2013; Myers, Matzner, Lancman, & Perrine, 
2013; O'Brien et al., 2015; Schönenberg et al., 2015; Tojek, Lumley, Barkley, Mahr, 
& Thomas, 2000; Wolf et al., 2015). Patients with NEAD in five of these ten studies 
were compared against healthy controls, patients with epilepsy in five, or patients with 
FMD in two. The NEAD group scored more highly on the total TAS-20 score than 
healthy controls in all five of the studies which included a healthy control group 
(Bewley et al., 2005; Demartini, Goeta, et al., 2016; O'Brien et al., 2015; Schönenberg 
et al., 2015; Urbanek et al., 2014). NEAD patients only scored more highly than 
patients with epilepsy on the total TAS-20 in one of the three studies with an epilepsy 
control group (Kaplan et al., 2013).  Of the two studies with a FMD control group, one 
found a significantly higher TAS-20 score in the NEAD group (Ekanayake et al., 
2017). A total mean and standard deviation for total TAS-20 scores in each group in 
the nine studies was calculated (Table 6). This yielded a score of 58.6 (SD = 6.7). 
Overall, these data suggest that patients with NEAD are more alexithymic than healthy 
controls, with a tendency towards scoring in the high end of the ‘possibly alexithymic’ 
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range on the TAS-20.  
Table 4 - Mean and standard deviation (unless otherwise stated) of Total TAS-20 
scores for patients with NEAD and control group(s). 
Study authors NEAD HC ES FMD 
Bewley et al. (2005)  72.9 (11.8) 50.9 (11.9)a 68.6 (11.9) - 
Demartini et al. (2016) 50.6 (12.7) 40.9 (10.1)a - 50.3 (12.6) 
Ekanayake et al. (2017) 56.6 (12.2) - - 43.1 (10.3)c 
Kaplan et al (2013) 56.2 (12.4) - 51.9 (12.1)b - 
Myers, Matzner et al. (2013) 54.1 (1.7) - 50.1 (2.4) - 
O’Brien et al. (2015) 54.7 (13.4) 39.6 (11.2)a - - 
Urbanek et al. (2014)1 64.9 (30-9) 41.5 (22-8)a - - 
Schönenberg et al. (2015) 54.6 (11.6) 43.9 (6.7)a - - 
Tojek et al. (2000) 54.0 (11.9) - 54.4 (10.4) - 
Wolf et al. (2015) 54.7 (11.9) - 53.1 (10.8) - 
Total 57.3 (6.6) 43.4 (21.4) 55.6 (27.8) 46.7 (5.1) 
Note. NEAD = Nonepileptic Attack Disorder, HC = Healthy controls, ES = epilepsy controls, 
FMD = Functional Movement Disorder controls.  a  = Healthy control group is significantly 
different from NEAD group. b  =  Epilepsy control group is significantly different from NEAD 
group. c  =  FMD control group is significantly different from NEAD group. 1 Values are 
median and range. 
 
One study did not used the TAS-20 in a case / control design, but instead 
correlated the Total TAS-20 score against a measure of coping (as assessed by the 
Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (Myers, Fleming, Lancman, & Perrine, 
2013)). The authors found a small negative correlation (r = -.26) between the TAS-20 
total score and task-focused coping, and a moderate-to-large positive correlation (r = 
.54) between the total TAS-20 score and emotion-focused coping, suggesting 
alexithymic traits in patients with NEAD may related to coping style (although the 
direction of effect cannot be inferred). 
Six of the studies using the TAS-20 reported subscale values (Table 5). Four 
reported higher scores in the NEAD group on the DIF subscale compared to epileptic 
and healthy controls (Bewley et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2013; Schönenberg et al., 
2015; Urbanek et al., 2014). Three reported higher scores on the DDF subscale 
compared to epileptic and healthy controls (Bewley et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2013; 
Urbanek et al., 2014). None of the studies found any between-group differences in 
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EOT scores. These results suggest that alexithymic traits in patients with NEAD might 
be restricted to a difficulty with identify and describing feelings, without a tendency 
to focus on external events.  
In summary, the total TAS-20 results suggest that patients with NEAD are 
more alexithymic than healthy controls, and score close to the clinical cut-off for 
alexithymia. Given that the concept of alexithymia was developed to capture what was 
considered a core feature of psychosomatic disease (Sifneos, 1973)  it is perhaps 
surprising that the total mean score of TAS-20 found in this review did not exceed the 
clinical threshold. However, the generally low sample size of studies in this field and 
the heterogeneity in psychological profiles of patients with NEAD (Baslet, Roiko, & 
Prensky, 2010), raise the possibility that the results in these studies could be an artefact 
of sampling bias or insufficient sample size. Alternatively, the present finding might 
reflect the fact that pre-existing beliefs about the role of alexithymia in the aetiology 
or FND are too generalised, when in reality alexithymia as measured by the TAS-20 
is not ubiquitous throughout the NEAD population.  Illustrating the psychological 
heterogeneity in NEAD, a subgroup analysis of patients with NEAD found no 
differences between patients with NEAD and patients with epilepsy, but yielded two 
subgroups of people with NEAD; one group (n = 11) characterised by high total TAS-
20 scores, and a second group (n = 32) characterised by relatively low total TAS-20 
scores (Brown et al., 2013). Therefore, it may be more appropriate for study designs 
using the TAS-20 to accommodate this heterogeneity with larger sample sizes and 
subgroup analyses. The conclusion that subscale score results suggest patients with 
NEAD might be impaired at identifying and describing their feelings, but do not 
exhibit a tendency to focus more on external experiences than control groups may also 
be called into question. Concerns have been raised about the reliability of the EOT 
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subscale and the validity of its application in patients with somatization disorders; a 
quantitative review of alexithymia and somatisation disorder demonstrated that the 
EOT subscale has lower internal consistency than the other subscales (De Gucht & 
Heiser, 2003). The review also showed that unlike the DIF and DDF subscales, the 
EOT is unrelated to the number of somatic symptoms patients report. The authors 
suggest that the aforementioned lower internal consistency might be attributed to a 
larger number of negatively keyed items on the EOT subscale than the DIF and DDF 
subscales, with the resulting unreliability generating mixed findings (some positive, 
some negative, some null) across studies. Furthermore, the conclusion that patients 
with NEAD don’t focus on external events at the expense of internal events seems at 
odds with studies showing reduced attentional allocation to interoceptive information 
in patients with FND (Ricciardi et al., 2016; section 4.2) and cognitive biases towards 
exteroceptive emotional information (see section 2.5.4).  
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Table 5 - Mean and standard deviation (unless otherwise indicated) of TAS-20 subscale scores for patients with NEAD and control groups. 
 
Difficulty identifying feelings Difficulty describing feelings Externally orientated thinking 
NEAD HC ES NEAD HC ES NEAD HC ES 
Bewley et al (2005) 27.1 (6.3) 11.9 (5.8)* 25.2 (6.4) 18.5 (3.9) 12.1(4.0)* 15.7 (3.3*) 26.5 (4.8) 27.1 (4.4) 27.4 (4.6) 
Brown et al (2013)1 24 (11) - 18 (12.5) 16 (8) - 12 (7) 23 (13) - 21 (9) 
Kaplan et al (2013) 20.9 (6.9) - 18.5 (7.1)* 14.7 (4.6) - 13.4 (4.1)* 20.61 (4.2) - 20.0 (4.4) 
Urbanek et al (2014)2 25 (11-35) - 13 (7-32)* 18 (7-25) - 11 (5-25)* 22 (9-34) - 17 (9-28) 
Schönenberg et al (2015) 17.6 (7.6) 12.6 (5.2)* - 12.9 (4.1) 10.7 (2.6) - 24.1(3.9) 24.8 (3.7) - 
Wolf et al (2015) 59.1 (12.1) - 55.4 (13.2) 51.7 (11.6) - 50.2 (11.2) 49.8 (11.1) - 51.2 (9.5) 
 Note.  * = statistically significantly different from NEAD values, HC = healthy control group, ES = epilepsy control group, 1 = Values are median and 
interquartile range, 2 = Values are median and range. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
2.4.1.2. Other measures of alexithymia / emotional awareness in NEAD.  
 Other methodologies designed to assess emotion identification in patients with 
NEAD have yielded a more consistent pattern of deficiencies in emotion 
identification. A cross-sectional comparison of patients with NEAD against healthy 
controls using the Emotional Processing Scale-25 (Baker, Thomas, Thomas, 
Santonastaso, & Corrigan, 2015) found elevated scores on the ‘impoverished 
emotional experience’ subscale (Novakova, Howlett, Baker, & Reuber, 2015). This 
subscale describes a detached experience of one’s emotions due to poor emotional 
insight. Uliaszek, Prensky, and Baslet (2012) also used the Difficulties with Emotion 
Regulation Scale (DERS) to delineate two subgroup profiles of patients with NEAD; 
one with higher than normative values on the ‘emotional clarity’ and ‘emotional 
awareness’ subscales of the DERS, and one with lower than normative values on the 
‘emotional awareness’ subscale (Uliaszek et al., 2012), which supports the suggestion 
that patients with NEAD are unlikely to all have the same deficits in emotional 
regulation.   
Comparisons of patients’ self-reported emotional state against more objective 
measures also suggests that patients with NEAD are prone to difficulty with the 
identification of their emotions.  Goldstein and Mellers (2006) noted that patients with 
NEAD reported more somatic symptoms of anxiety during seizures than patients with 
epilepsy, but did not report higher subjective levels of anxiety than patients with 
epilepsy. Similarly, Dimaro et al. (2014) observed a significant discrepancy between 
an implicit measure (Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure) and explicit measure 
(State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) of anxiety in patients with NEAD but not those with 
epilepsy. Likewise, Prigatano and Kirlin (2009) found that while patients with NEAD 
and epilepsy self-reported similar levels of psychopathology on the Personality 
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Assessment Inventory, patients with NEAD performed significantly worse on a 
neuropsychological measure of emotional regulation (the Barrow Neurological 
Institute Screen for Higher Cerebral Functions Affect subtest). While objective and 
subjective measures often fail to correlate strongly, the observed discrepancies in the 
NEAD but not epilepsy groups suggests that emotion identification may be a particular 
problem for patients with NEAD.    
Finally, one other study has sought to measure patients’ ability to identify their 
emotional state, using the well-established Heart Beat Detection Task (Schandry, 
1981). This task requires the participant to count how many heartbeats they have 
within a time period (without manually checking) and is compared against how many 
they actually have, to generate an accuracy score. This test rests on the assumption 
that interoceptive processes are an important source of information for emotional 
identification (see section 4.2), and therefore a less accurate ‘interoceptive sensitivity’ 
score would suggest a more impaired ability to identify one’s own emotions. 
Demartini, Goeta, et al. (2016) compared patients with NEAD against those with FMD 
and healthy controls on the Heart Beat Detection task, and found no significant 
between-groups difference (although TAS-20 scores were elevated in both patient 
groups compared to healthy controls). The same group had previously found reduced 
interoceptive sensitivity in a group of patients with FMD relative to healthy controls 
(Ricciardi et al., 2016), which we also replicate in a sample of patients with NEAD 
and other FNS in Chapter 4.2.  
2.4.2. Perceptions of stress 
It is important to note that impaired emotion identification does not mean that 
patients with NEAD experience an absence of affect. This is clearly reflected in studies 
investigating NEAD patients’ perceptions of how stressful their lives are. Four studies 
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have demonstrated that patients with NEAD perceive their lives as more stressful than 
healthy controls or the general population (Bodde et al., 2013; Frances, Baker, & 
Appleton, 1999; Schönenberg et al., 2015; Tojek et al., 2000). One might argue that 
this is to be expected given the known detrimental effect of living with a disability on 
quality of life (Alonso et al., 2004). However,  patients with NEAD subjectively rated 
stressful life events as more distressing than patients with epilepsy, even though 
objectively they did not experience any more stressful life events than epileptic and 
healthy controls (Testa, Krauss, Lesser, & Brandt, 2012). This finding suggests that 
patients with NEAD may have magnified perceptions of stress over and above that of 
individuals living with non-functional seizure disorders.  
An increased tendency to perceive life as stressful is also reflected in measures 
of personality. Ekanayake et al. (2017) observed significantly higher scores on the 
neuroticism subscale of the NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R) 
compared to patients with FMD – elevations on this subscale reflect a ‘persistent, life-
long tendency to experience events negatively.’ Other assessments of personality in 
patients with NEAD have also shown that clusters of this group exhibit elevated levels 
of neuroticism compared to patients with epilepsy on the NEO-PI-R (Cragar, Berry, 
Schmitt, & Fakhoury, 2005), and as measured by the Dimensional Assessment of 
Personality Pathology – Basic Questionnaire (DAPP-PQ) (Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, 
Derfuss, & Elger, 2004). Furthermore, these latter two studies of personality pathology 
went on to identify clusters of personality styles characterised by higher and lower 
levels of neuroticism. As such, it may be the case that only subgroups of patients with 
NEAD exhibit a personality style prone to perceive their lives as stressful. 
2.4.3. Conclusions on the identification stage 
The ability of patients with NEAD to identify their emotional state has been 
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assessed with a combination of self-report and behavioural measures. Findings 
generated from the TAS-20 suggest that patients with NEAD have a tendency towards 
alexithymia, approaching if not exceeding the clinical cut-off and characterised by 
difficulties identifying and describing feelings. Other self-report measures suggest that 
patients with NEAD experience a lack of emotional clarity / awareness and an 
impoverished emotional experience, and the discrepancy between self-report and 
objective measures of affect seem to corroborate this conclusion. However, difficulties 
with identification do not seem to prevent patients with NEAD from perceiving their 
lives as stressful, which is reflected in the elevated scores on personality 
questionnaires capturing neuroticism. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
emotional dysregulation in NEAD involves impairments in the identification stage of 
the EPM (Gross, 2015), although subgroups of patients who are more and less 
impaired in this respect are likely to exist.  
2.5. The selection and implementation stages 
During the selection stage of the EPM, potential emotion regulation strategies 
are represented and evaluated in relation to the strength of the emotion and the 
available cognitive and physiological resources (Gross, 2015).  A general regulatory 
strategy is selected and fed-forward to the implementation stage, which is when the 
selected regulatory strategy is translated into specific tactics appropriate for the 
situation an individual is in (Gross, 2015). ‘Selection’ in this model does not 
necessarily imply a deliberate choice, as the decision to use a regulatory strategy can 
be made outside of conscious awareness, for example automatically turning away from 
an upsetting image.  Emotion dysregulation may occur at this point because the 
individual has a limited repertoire of regulatory strategies or a pre-disposition to select 
maladaptive strategies. Alternatively, a failure to accurately appraise the external 
 
 
63 
 
world (e.g., interpreting another person’s benign actions as deliberate) could result in 
a failure to implement a strategy which would otherwise successfully down-regulate 
negative affect (e.g., by reappraising another person’s potentially harmful actions as 
unintentional).  
Studies were identified relating to the selection and implementation of 
potentially maladaptive regulatory strategies (specifically emotion-focused coping, 
avoidance, and dissociation) and a tendency to misrepresent exteroceptive emotional 
information which could feasibly influence an individual’s appraisal of the external 
world. Owing to the fact that no experimental designs identified in the literature search 
allowed for a clear distinction between the selection and implementation stages of the 
EPM (if that is indeed possible), the following section will discuss research pertaining 
to these two stages together. 
2.5.1. Emotion-focused coping  
Researchers frequently categorise coping as either emotion-focused, or 
problem-focused (Lazarus, 1984). Problem-focused coping describes attempts to 
relieve negative emotion by changing some aspect of the distress-causing situation. 
Emotion-focused coping however, describes attempts to reduce negative emotions 
(e.g., denial or venting), rather than modify their cause. Emotion-focused coping is 
therefore generally considered to be less adaptive than problem-focused coping 
(Lazarus, 1984) (although there are exceptions to this rule). Within the context of the 
EPM, emotion-focused coping would fall under the ‘response-modulation’ general 
category of regulatory strategies (Table 1).  
Nine studies measuring emotion- and problem-focused coping tendencies in 
patients with NEAD were identified. Using the Ways of Coping Scale (WOCS) 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), patients with NEAD were shown to be less likely to use 
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‘planful-problem solving’ than healthy controls (Frances et al., 1999). Other 
researchers administering the WOCS, observed greater scores on the ‘distancing-
coping’ subscale in patients with NEAD relative to healthy controls, which negatively 
predicted health-related quality of life (Cronje & Pretorius, 2013). On the Utrecht 
Coping List (Schreurs, Van de Willige, Brosschot, & Tellegen, 1993), patients with 
NEAD self-reported a greater tendency towards a passive wait-and-see attitude in 
response to problems than healthy controls, suggesting that they felt unable to address 
the cause of their distress (Bodde et al., 2013). Accordingly, other studies have 
observed a greater use of emotional and expressive suppression in NEAD patients than 
healthy controls (Gul & Ahmad, 2014; Novakova et al., 2015; Testa, Schefft, 
Szaflarski, Yeh, & Privitera, 2007). An over-reliance on emotion-focused coping 
strategies may be explained by an external locus of health control; patients with NEAD 
have been demonstrated to perceive more situations as beyond their control and to 
have a stronger belief in an external locus of control over their health than healthy 
controls (Bodde et al., 2013; Goldstein, Drew, Mellers, Mitchell-O'Malley, & Oakley, 
2000). Therefore, studies seem to suggest that, in comparison to healthy control 
groups, patients with NEAD have an increased tendency to select and implement 
maladaptive emotion-focused coping strategies to manage negative emotion, with 
some indication that this may be related to an external locus of control. 
Studies including cluster and subgroup analyses provide a more nuanced 
picture of coping in NEAD by taking into account of the heterogeneity of the patient 
group as a whole. Myers, Perrine, Lancman, and Fleming (2013) categorised patients 
with NEAD according to several criteria, one of which being whether or not they had 
been traumatised. Traumatised patients were characterised by a significant elevation 
on the demoralization scale of the Dutch Short Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
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Inventory (MMPI) (Luteijn & Kok, 1985), implying a ‘persistent failure to cope 
internally or externally with life’. This suggested that only traumatised patients with 
NEAD had difficulties with coping in this study. In another subgroup analysis of 
emotion regulation profiles in patients with NEAD using the DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 
2004), only one of the two sub-groups scored more highly than normative data on the 
strategies subscale. Items on this subscale indicate that the individual believes that 
little can be done to regulate negative emotions when one is upset (Uliaszek et al., 
2012). Once again, it was not the case that all patients with NEAD felt they could not 
cope with negative emotions, only those belonging to the subgroup characterised by 
other measures of emotion dysregulation and psychopathology self-reported 
difficulties with coping.  Myers, Fleming, et al. (2013) demonstrated that an increased 
tendency to rely on emotion-focused coping strategies in patients with NEAD was 
associated with co-morbid psychological symptoms, such a depression and somatic 
complaints. Conversely, the use of task-orientated coping was negatively associated 
with alexithymia and low positive emotions as measured by the MMPI. Taken 
together, these studies suggest that a predisposition to select and implement emotion-
focused coping strategies is related to other psychological factors such as trauma and 
depression in sub-groups of patients with NEAD.  
2.5.2. Avoidance 
 Avoidance can be defined as a disinclination to sustain contact with aversive 
private experiences (including emotions, thoughts, bodily sensations, memories, and 
behavioural predispositions) or action taken to alter experiences or the events that give 
rise to them (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Within the context 
of the EPM, avoidance falls within the general regulatory category of ‘situation 
selection’ (Gross, 2015). A tendency to over-value and select avoidance often 
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becomes problematic because the short-term relief does little to relieve the cause of 
the emotion or emotion-eliciting situation. Nine studies investigated avoidance in 
patients with NEAD, all using self-report measures. With respect to the avoidance of 
events or emotion-eliciting situations, patients with NEAD endorsed a greater use of 
escape-avoidance strategies on the WOCS than healthy controls in two studies (Cronje 
& Pretorius, 2013; Goldstein et al., 2000). An increased self-reported avoidance of 
negative emotional triggers in patients with NEAD versus healthy controls has been 
reported on the EPS-25 (Novakova et al., 2015). Patients with NEAD also reported 
elevated scores on the harm-avoidance subscale of the Temperament and Character 
Inventory (Dutch version), indicating a personality style characterised by behavioural 
inhibition in response to signals of punishment and frustrative-non reward (Bodde et 
al., 2013) Furthermore, responses on the Fear Questionnaire (Marks & Mathews, 
1979) indicated that patients with NEAD have a greater tendency to avoid situations 
that may elicit feelings of agoraphobia than those with epilepsy (Goldstein & Mellers, 
2006). In addition, self-report measures have been used to assess patients’ tendency to 
avoid aversive private experiences.  Dimaro et al. (2014) demonstrated that patients 
with NEAD scored significantly higher on the Multidimensional Experiential 
Avoidance Questionnaire (Gamez, Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011) 
than epileptic and healthy controls. Experiential avoidance scores positively correlated 
with explicit (i.e. self-reported) anxiety scores and seizure frequency in the NEAD 
group only. Furthermore, experiential avoidance and somatization scores delineated 
the two patient groups in a logistic regression model (Dimaro et al., 2014). Uliaszek 
et al. (2012) identified a subgroup of patients with NEAD who scored significantly 
lower than normative values on the DERS. The authors of the study interpreted this as 
reflecting a pre-disposition to being emotionally avoidant. Despite the variety of 
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avoidance measures used, elevated levels of avoidance endorsed by patients with 
NEAD is a relatively consistent finding. 
A tendency to select and implement avoidance as an emotion regulation 
strategy may be related to previous psychological trauma, which is common in patients 
with NEAD (Beghi et al., 2015; Fleisher et al., 2002). For example, when patients with 
NEAD were categorised according to whether they self-reported trauma or not, the 
traumatised group also self-reported higher levels of ‘defensive-avoidance’ on the 
Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI-2) than the non-traumatised group (Myers, Perrine, 
et al., 2013). Higher scores on the defensive-avoidance subscale indicate a tendency 
to make intentional efforts to avoid unwanted internal experiences and emotion-
eliciting environments.  Likewise,  Bodde et al. (2013), also identified greater levels 
of ‘harm avoidance’ in a subgroup of patients with NEAD who had been traumatised 
than those who had not. Therefore, a predisposition in patients with NEAD towards 
the selection and implementation of avoidance as a regulatory strategy may also be a 
product of other psychological factors.  
2.5.3. Dissociation 
Nonepileptic attacks themselves have been conceptualised a dissociative 
response to overwhelming emotion (Roberts & Reuber, 2014; Stone & Carson, 2013). 
Dissociation, the breakdown in the normal integration of cognitive functions, has been 
considered such an important symptom of NEAD, that it is classified as a dissociative 
disorder in the ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 2016). However, the definition 
of dissociation and its relationship to NEAD is a contentious subject. For further 
explanation of this controversy see Roberts and Reuber (2014). Dissociative 
symptoms in NEAD have largely been investigated using self-report questionnaires. 
The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) ) is one such 
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instrument, which gives a total score and subscores measuring amnesic dissociation, 
absorption and imaginative involvement, depersonalization, and derealisation.  Total 
scores of 20 or more are considered consistent with dissociative disorders, including 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and Schizophrenia 
(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). However, the use of a clinical cut-off score of 20 has 
been challenged. Mueller-Pfeiffer et al. (2013) evaluated the performance of the DES 
as a screening tool for dissociative disorders in a population of psychiatric outpatients 
and day service patients, which resulted in cut-off scores of 12 and 20 for detecting 
any dissociative disorder or dissociative identity disorder respectively. Thirteen 
studies were identified in which the DES was administered to patients with NEAD 
(Table 6).  
For ten out of the thirteen studies, patients with NEAD scored significantly 
higher on the DES total score than control groups (Akyuz, Kugu, Akyuz, & Dogan, 
2004; Bowman & Coons, 2000; Demartini, Goeta, et al., 2016; Dikel, Fennell, & 
Gilmore, 2003; Goldstein et al., 2000; Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Mazza et al., 2009; 
Proenca, Castro, Jorge, & Marchetti, 2011; Prueter, Schultz-Venrath, & Rimpau, 
2002; Reuber, House, Pukrop, Bauer, & Elger, 2003). This suggests that patients with 
NEAD experience more dissociative symptoms than patients with epilepsy, FMD, or 
healthy controls. Although the mean DES score for patients with NEAD in Fleisher et 
al. (2002) was not significantly greater than that of controls with epilepsy, a 
significantly higher percentage of patients with NEAD than patients with epilepsy 
scored above the clinical cut-off (set at 30 in this case). Notably the Alper et al. (1997) 
study, which was rated as being of high quality and which has the largest sample size 
of all studies using the DES in this review, did not result in DES scores which 
exceeded the clinical-cut off, or scores which were greater than those of patients with 
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epilepsy.  Likewise, the mean DES score did not exceed the cut-off in four other 
studies (Demartini, Goeta, et al., 2016; Ekanayake et al., 2017; Mazza et al., 2009; 
Reuber et al., 2003). However, when a mean total DES score was calculated for all 
studies (Table 6), this score was greater than the cut-off of twenty, which suggests that 
when all studies are taken together, patients with NEAD do experience levels of 
dissociative symptoms consistent with an understanding of NEAD as a dissociative 
disorder.  
Table 6 - Means and standard deviations (unless otherwise stated) of Dissociative 
Experience Scale scores included in review. 
Study NEAD ES 
ES+ 
NEAD 
FMD HC 
Akyuz et al. (2004)  29.8 (20.0) 17.6 (15.5)* - - - 
Alper et al. (1997)   15.1 (13.5) 12.7 (10.8) - - - 
Bowman et al. (2000)  20.2 (18.2) 10.7 (11.3)* - - - 
Demartini et al. (2016) 17.2 (10.6) - - 7.9 (13.9)* 8.2 (7.5)* 
Ekanayake et al. (2017) 15.9 (12.2) - - 5.6 (5.1)* - 
Dikel et al. (2003) 22.8 14.11a - - - 
Fleisher et al. (2002) 22.7 (20.1) 15.1 (12.8) - - - 
Goldstein et al. (2006) 24.9 (16.5) 14.5 (10.2)* - - - 
Goldstein et al. (2000)  22.6 (16.4) - - - 13.1 (11.8)* 
Lawton et al. (2008)  20.2 (34.1) 11.8 (15.5) - - - 
Mazza et al. (2009)  17.6 (8.9) 6.4 (5.8)* - - 4.5 (2.9)* 
Proenca et al. (2011)  54.3 (23.2) 22 (16.4)* - - - 
Prueter et al. (2002)  32.0 (26.8) 6.5 (2.9)* 17.9 (9.5)* - - 
Reuber et al. (2003)  17.2 (14.0) 8.8 (8.1)* - - - 
Total Mean (SD) 23.75(10.1) 12.74 (4.7) 17.9 (9.5) 6.8 (1.6) 8.6 (4.3) 
Note. NEAD = Nonepileptic Attack Disorder, ES = Epilepsy control group, ES + NEAD = 
Comorbid epilepsy and NEAD control group, FMD = Functional Movement Disorder control 
group, HC = Healthy control group, * = control group significantly different from NEAD 
group. a = SD not reported, women only. 
The variability of findings pertaining to whether dissociation in NEAD 
exceeds a pathological cut-off may be due to the failure of single construct 
questionnaires such as the DES to capture the multiple forms of dissociation that are 
thought to exist (Brown, 2006). For instance, Alper et al. (1997) found that DES scores 
in NEAD patients were higher than in the general population, but did not differentiate 
between patients with NEAD and epilepsy.  However, when total DES scores were 
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subjected to a principal components analysis, the resulting components did 
differentiate between patient groups. A depersonalisation-derealisation component 
accounted for more variance in DES scores in the NEAD group than the epilepsy 
group. An absorption-imagination component was only raised in patients who reported 
childhood abuse, irrespective of seizure diagnosis. Finally, an ‘amnesic’ factor was 
only raised in patients with epilepsy. This finding raises the possibility that perhaps 
some types of dissociation are unique to NEAD (in this case depersonalisation-
derealisation). Accordingly, Demartini, Goeta, et al. (2016) compared patients with 
NEAD, patients with FMD, and healthy controls on three different types of 
dissociation; ‘psychoform’, ‘compartmentalisation’, and ‘detachment’ using the DES, 
the Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ-20) (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), 
and the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS) (Sierra & Berrios, 2000), 
respectively.  Patients with NEAD scored significantly higher on the DES and CDS 
than both groups, but lower on the SDQ-20 than the group with FMD. These results 
suggest patients with NEAD can be differentiated from patients with other forms of 
FND, by a susceptibility to psychoform dissociation and compartmentalisation, but 
not detachment (Demartini, Goeta, et al., 2016). In summary, the type of dissociation 
pertinent to NEAD requires further clarification.  
However, given that the grand total DES score calculated in Table 6 exceeded 
the clinical cut-off and that 75% of studies using the DES found elevated levels of 
dissociation in patients with NEAD compared to epileptic and / or healthy control 
groups, it can be concluded patients with NEAD are likely to select dissociation as a 
general regulatory strategy. Corroborating this interpretation, higher levels of 
dissociative symptoms in patients with NEAD than control groups have also been 
observed using other self-report measures including the Dissociation Questionnaire 
 
 
71 
 
(DIS-Q) (Kuyk, Spinhoven, van Emde Boas, & van Dyck, 1999), the TSI-2 (Myers, 
Matzner, et al., 2013) the SDQ (Kuyk et al., 1999), and using structured clinical 
interviews (Hendrickson, Popescu, Ghearing, & Bagic, 2015). A case series of patients 
with NEAD demonstrated that patients would recall upsetting memories from their 
childhood without expressing the emotion one would expect to be associated with such 
events, such as fear or anger. The authors argue this reflects a dissociation between 
memories and normally associated feelings (Prigatano, Stonnington, & Fisher, 2002), 
although it should be added that this study had a very small sample size (N = 15) and 
so these findings may not generalise to the wider NEAD population. 
There is also evidence of other psychological factors interacting with 
dissociation. For example, a subgroup of patients with NEAD who scored more highly 
on measures of emotion dysregulation were also shown to self-report more 
dissociative symptoms (Uliaszek et al., 2012). Other researchers have found patients 
with NEAD and comorbid psychiatric impairment had more frequent dissociative 
experiences (Baslet et al., 2010), and 70.2% of variance in DES scores was explained 
by psychological distress as measured by the Brief Symptom Inventory (Cohen, Testa, 
Pritchard, Zhu, & Hopp, 2014). Lawton, Baker, and Brown (2008) also found 
compartmentalization scores did not differentiate between patients with NEAD and 
epilepsy after controlling for anxiety and depression. Similarly, the positive 
correlation between DES scores and a NEAD severity index lost significance when 
somatisation and psychopathology were controlled for. In another study, DES scores 
did not discriminate between patients with NEAD and epilepsy in a logistic regression 
model, whereas levels of somatization and psychopathology did (Reuber et al., 2003). 
Finally, when patients diagnosed with NEAD were followed up 4-6 years post-
diagnosis, those with reduced seizure frequency also experienced fewer dissociative 
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symptoms (Bodde et al., 2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that the results 
of self-report measures of dissociation are closely related to current distress or 
psychopathology. Indeed, a relationship has been observed between dissociative 
symptoms and trauma or trauma-related distress in other populations (Gershuny & 
Thayer, 1999), raising the possibility that dissociation is selected and implemented as 
an emotion regulation strategy to mitigate negative affect in some patients with 
NEAD.  Therefore, dissociation may not be a core feature of NEAD aetiology, rather, 
dissociative experiences are an artefact of the psychological distress which causes or 
is associated with NEAD. 
2.5.4. Appraisal of external world 
According to the EPM, successful implementation of an emotion regulation 
strategy relies on an accurate representation of the external world - including the 
agents or situations one is interacting with (Gross, 2015). For example, one might 
implement reappraisal to lessen feelings of anger if they perceived an apology to be 
sincere rather than insincere.  
There is some evidence that patients with NEAD exhibit cognitive biases that 
could lead to an inaccurate or altered appraisal of exteroceptive emotional information. 
This evidence comes from experimental studies which include emotional imagery 
(pictures of faces or scenes) as stimuli.  Roberts et al. (2012) compared responses to 
standard affective pictures in patients with NEAD against seizure free-individuals with 
high or low trauma levels. Groups did not differ in their pleasantness / unpleasantness 
ratings of the images but patients with NEAD reported more intense emotional 
experiences in reaction to the images and displayed less positive emotional behaviour. 
This is suggestive of altered processing of exteroceptive emotional information. 
Altered processing of exteroceptive emotional information in patients with 
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NEAD has also been demonstrated by Bakvis, Spinhoven, Putman, Zitman, and 
Roelofs (2010) who showed that social distractors (happy, neutral, or angry faces) 
impaired working memory performance relative to healthy controls whether data were 
collected at baseline or following stress induction. Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009) also 
demonstrated that when compared to healthy controls, patients with NEAD exhibited 
a preconscious positive attentional bias to angry faces during a masked emotional 
Stroop Test. Hypervigilance to negatively-valenced emotional information correlated 
positively with self-reported sexual trauma, indicating a potential mechanism by 
which hypervigilance to social threat may be mediated. Indeed, trauma is considered 
a contributory factor to hypervigilance in military and civilian samples (Kimble, 
Fleming, & Bennion, 2013). A further analysis of data from Bakvis, Spinhoven, and 
Roelofs (2009) found that basal cortisol levels correlated positively with threat 
vigilance in patients but not healthy controls, suggesting a relationship between the 
endocrine stress response and threat vigilance restricted to patients with NEAD. These 
results allude to a hypervigilant attentional system which is biased towards the 
processing of exteroceptive emotional information in NEAD and may be related to 
trauma exposure.  
Affective-cognitive control may also be impaired in patients with NEAD. Gul 
and Ahmad (2014) asked participants to make emotional and non-emotional 
judgements about images of faces presented to them.  Patients with NEAD had greater 
difficulty switching from emotional judgements to non-emotional judgements than 
healthy controls. This switching bias correlated positively with the use of a 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategy (expressive suppression) and negatively with 
healthier forms of emotion regulation (cognitive reappraisal). This observed deficit in 
affective-cognitive control also suggests an attentional system primed towards to 
 
 
74 
 
processing of exteroceptive emotional information related to impaired emotion 
regulation.  
Cognitive-affective biases in NEAD may be related abnormalities in theory of 
mind. Schönenberg et al. (2015) found evidence of impaired theory of mind in patients 
with NEAD relative to healthy controls when observing the Movie for Assessment of 
Social Cognition (MASC). NEAD patients tended to over-mentalize the emotional 
meaning behind the actions of characters in the movie, a tendency which positively 
correlated with stress-vulnerability as measured by the Perceived Stress Scale. 
Critically, this was not a result of an impaired ability to identify emotional expression 
in others, as basal facial expression recognition was intact when viewing animated 
movies of neutral expressions slowly changing to full-blown emotions. However, it is 
worth nothing that Prigatano and Kirlin (2009) found that patients with NEAD were 
impaired in their ability to identify emotions in drawings of affective expressions 
relative to patients with epilepsy. This discrepancy in basal affect recognition in others 
might be explained by the greater cognitive demand imposed by interpreting 
emotional expression from more abstract representations of facial expressions. 
Therefore, these studies suggest that patients with NEAD can accurately recognise 
emotional expression in others, but they ascribe too much meaning to that emotional 
content – a phenomenon which could conceivably drive hypervigilance and impaired 
cognitive-affective control. Deficits in complex mentalizing ability have also been 
observed in another patient group characterised by emotion dysregulation - those with 
Borderline (emotionally unstable) Personality Disorder (Petersen, Brakoulias, & 
Langdon, 2016). Given that features of Borderline Personality Disorder are relatively 
common in patients with NEAD (Lacey, Cook, & Salzberg, 2007; Reuber et al., 2004), 
it is conceivable that there are overlapping mechanisms in both disorders causing 
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mentalizing deficits which could disrupt appraisal of the external world and precipitate 
emotion dysregulation. 
Indirect support for the proposition that patients with NEAD exhibit signs of a 
nervous system on ‘high alert’ for threat comes from studies of vagal tone (see Chapter 
4.4). According to the Polyvagal Theory, tonically low vagally mediated Heart Rate 
Variability (vmHRV) is considered to reflect a chronically aroused nervous system in 
a state of readiness to deal with external demands (Porges, 1995).  Bakvis, Roelofs, et 
al. (2009) observed lower vmHRV in a group of patients with NEAD than healthy 
controls at baseline and in the recovery phase following a masked emotional Stroop 
Task. Similarly, Ponnusamy, Marques, and Reuber (2011) observed lower vmHRV in 
patients with NEAD than healthy controls. However, vmHRV did not differentiate 
between patients with NEAD and those with epilepsy. Likewise, Roberts et al. (2012) 
observed no significant difference in vmHRV between patients with NEAD and 
patients with high or low levels of PTSD symptoms in response to affective pictures, 
suggesting that patients with NEAD exhibit resting vagal tone similar to that of a 
clinical group with known pathological hypervigilance and hyperarousal (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). A limitation of these studies is that vmHRV was not 
correlated against measures of emotion dysregulation – therefore a relationship 
between vmHRV and emotion dysregulation in NEAD is speculative at this stage (see 
Chapter 4.4). Furthermore, it has also been proposed that vagal tone serves to influence 
perceptual processes  (e.g., Park, Van Bavel, Vasey, & Thayer, 2013), and so may also 
relate to the identification stage of the EPM, by affecting perception of one’s own 
emotional state. An aim of future studies of vagal tone in patients with NEAD could 
be to further explore the relationship between vmHRV and the three stages of the 
EPM.  
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2.5.5. Conclusions on the selection and implementation stages 
In summary, there is evidence that patients with NEAD experience deficits in 
the selection and implementation of emotion regulatory strategies.  In particular, the 
literature has focused on emotion-focused coping, avoidance, and dissociation as 
emotion regulation strategies in NEAD. Correlational data suggests that these deficits 
are likely related to other psychological factors such as trauma or distress. 
Experimental studies have also begun to demonstrate the existence of affective-
cognitive biases relating to appraisal of exteroceptive information, which may also 
interfere with adaptive selection and implementation of regulatory strategies.  
2.6. Discussion 
The studies included in this review suggest that emotion dysregulation in 
patients with NEAD can be characterised as deficits in the identification, selection, 
and implementation stages of the EPM.  Difficulties in the identification stage relate 
to an impaired ability to detect and understand one’s own emotions as well as a 
heightened vulnerability to stress. While it was not possible to clearly separate the 
selection and implementation stages from the measures and methodologies included 
in the review, there is also evidence that patients with NEAD tend to select potentially 
maladaptive regulatory strategies (emotion-focused coping, avoidance, and 
dissociation). Altered processing of exteroceptive emotional information may also 
interfere with external world representations and impede the implementation stage.   
A recurring theme throughout this was review was the biopsychosocial 
heterogeneity of NEAD. One explanation is that emotion dysregulation appears to be 
related to psychological factors such as trauma, personality, and current psychological 
distress – rather than NEAD diagnosis per se. Therefore, an individual with NEAD 
who has experienced greater trauma may also experience more severe symptomology 
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and emotion dysregulation than those who have experienced less trauma. As such, 
future studies employing subgroup analyses based on psychological or clinical 
variables (cf. Baslet, Tolchin, & Dworetzky, 2017; Bodde et al., 2013; Uliaszek et al., 
2012)or including relevant psychiatric control groups  (c.f. Martino et al., 2018; 
Roberts et al., 2012) would constitute useful designs to elucidate this potential source 
of heterogeneity in regulatory deficits.   
Some studies included in this review found no differences in some measures 
of emotion dysregulation between patients with NEAD and patients with ‘organic’ 
seizure disorders (e.g., Alper et al., 1997; Brown et al., 2013; Fleisher et al., 2002; 
Wolf et al., 2015). These findings do not mean that patients with NEAD do not 
experience emotion dysregulation; rather it is possible that both groups have 
difficulties with emotion regulation, for some overlapping and some distinct reasons. 
For example, both patients with NEAD and epilepsy may carry a similar emotional 
burden associated with experiencing seizures and disabilities, although the two seizure 
disorders (or their consequences in terms of emotion dysregulation) are not the result 
of the same pathological process (Labate et al., 2012). Further exploration of neural 
correlates of emotion dysregulation in NEAD may help to clarify its neural substrate 
and further explain some of these differences; specific forms of emotion dysregulation 
may be related to particular structural or functional abnormalities. One study identified 
in the literature search has examined the neural correlates of dissociation in patients 
with NEAD (van der Kruijs et al., 2012), but was excluded due to insufficient sample 
size. The fact that patients with NEAD are a heterogeneous group reinforces the 
importance of and value in taking a person-centred and individualised approach to 
working with this population.  
Given that emotion dysregulation is considered to play a role in the 
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precipitation and maintenance of affective disorders (e.g., depression and anxiety), 
and that these affective disorders are frequently co-morbid with NEAD (Brown & 
Reuber, 2016a), it is perhaps unsurprising that emotion dysregulation is also 
commonly observed in patients with NEAD. However, the case-control design of most 
of the studies discussed here makes it impossible to say with certainty whether emotion 
dysregulation is a cause, consequence, or correlate of NEAD. It is also unlikely that 
the relationship between emotion dysregulation and NEAD is the same for every 
patient. Nevertheless, despite open questions, emotion dysregulation is likely to be 
involved in the pathogenesis of NEAD and NEAD-associated disabilities for at least 
some patients. Further support for this proposition comes from the demonstrated 
effectiveness of psychotherapeutic techniques designed to target emotion regulation 
difficulties in NEAD (Conwill, Oakley, Evans, & Cavanna, 2014; Goldstein et al., 
2010; Howlett & Reuber, 2009; LaFrance et al., 2009; Mayor, Howlett, Gruenewald, 
& Reuber, 2010; Williams, Howlett, Levita, & Reuber, 2018) although more work is 
needed to elucidate the mechanism of treatment action. Given the personal and societal 
cost of NEAD and the relevance of emotion dysregulation to psychological treatment, 
improving our understanding of emotion regulation in NEAD is clearly very 
important. 
2.6.1. Limitations and recommendations 
The number of studies which have been designed to investigate emotion 
regulation in NEAD has increased markedly over the last two decades, however, many 
are underpowered. Indeed, a small sample size was the only reason why some studies 
in this area were considered to be of such uncertain quality that they had to be excluded 
from this review (Bakvis, Spinhoven, Zitman, & Roelofs, 2011; Hingray et al., 2011; 
Martino et al., 2018; van der Kruijs et al., 2014). Small studies cannot account for the 
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obvious heterogeneity of the NEAD patient population. Although there may be 
particular problems with recruiting patients with NEAD to clinical studies (e.g., low 
patient numbers in single centres, problems with transport or engagement in research) 
the ongoing CODES treatment study in the UK, to which over 600 patients have been 
recruited to date, demonstrates that large-scale research is possible in this area with 
sufficient funding (Goldstein et al., 2015) 
In addition to a need for larger studies, there is a need for higher standard of 
reporting in this area. There was a tendency for studies to not explicitly state 
methodological criteria of importance; such as whether NEAs had been formally 
differentiated from panic attacks or whether patients were recruited consecutively. As 
recommended elsewhere (Brown & Reuber, 2016a) work should draw on established 
publication guidelines (e.g., www.strobe-statement.org), to improve both the quality 
of study design and reporting in this area. 
It is worth mentioning that while avoidance, emotion-focused coping, 
dissociation, and hypervigilance are considered maladaptive in this review, the utility 
of a regulatory strategy is context-dependent. For example, because reappraisal 
difficulty increases with emotional intensity and requires cognitive effort (Suri et al., 
2017) an individual who is vulnerable or compromised might be better off 
implementing a ‘maladaptive’ strategy such as dissociation rather than not regulate at 
all. Furthermore, strategies that involve the redirection of attentional resources (like 
avoidance) are more effective in reducing short-term negative affect than reappraisal 
in high-emotional intensity conditions (Shafir, Schwartz, Blechert, & Sheppes, 2015). 
Although arguably, a tendency to habitually select these strategies irrespective of 
context might still be considered an example of dysregulation.  
The studies reviewed here have not been designed explicitly to examine 
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emotion regulation according to the EPM, so we have clustered the literature post-hoc. 
While this categorisation was double-rated, this method does introduce risk of bias. 
Ideally, studies of emotion regulation in NEAD would be grounded in theory and 
designed to test specific models. However, the majority of studies in this area are based 
on observational data, which can be difficult to interpret within frameworks they were 
not designed to fit. Furthermore, the selection and implementation stages are arguably 
more difficult to isolate and study than the identification and selection stages. A 
possible approach to rectifying this issue could be adopted from other fields of 
psychopathology research; that is via the experimental manipulation of emotion 
regulation strategies. For example, other researchers have instructed healthy 
participants to suppress or enhance negative emotion elicited by unpleasant pictures 
(Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, & Davidson, 2000). Versions of this paradigm have 
been applied to other patient populations characterised by emotion dysregulation, such 
as those with Major Depression (e.g., Heller et al., 2009). Designs such as this could 
present a powerful way to empirically test the selection and implementation stage of 
the EPM in patients with NEAD. There are of course, other models of emotion 
regulation which could facilitate our understanding of NEAD (Parkinson & Totterdell, 
1999; Thayer, Newman, & McClain, 1994). In spite of the fact that there is at present 
only ‘modest’ support for the EPM and that the substeps require further empirical 
assessment (Sheppes et al., 2015), we chose the EPM as it is the most recent iteration 
of a well-established and widely used model of emotion regulation. The EPM may not 
bear up to future scientific scrutiny, however there is value in adopting the more 
structured approach of grounding studies within broader psychological theory. 
2.7. Conclusion 
Research conducted to date suggests that emotion dysregulation in patients 
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with NEAD can be characterised by deficits in the identification, selection, and 
implementation stages of the EPM (Gross, 2015). However, the spread of these deficits 
throughout the NEAD population is heterogeneous and likely linked to other 
psychological factors such as trauma, personality, and psychological distress. Future 
studies of emotion regulation in NEAD should seek to elucidate subgroups of NEAD 
patients based on the presenting style of emotion dysregulation, as well as the 
relationship between emotion dysregulation and other psychological or clinical 
variables. 
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3. Impairment of consciousness and emotion regulation in 
patients with Functional Neurological Disorder (Study 1) 
3.1. Introduction 
 Functional Neurological Disorder (FND) is defined by the presence of at least 
one FNS, but symptoms can present with a wide range of different clinical 
manifestations. FNS may take the form of seizures, abnormal movements, sensory 
impairments or cognitive disruption. Most patients have more than one FNS, the same 
symptom (e.g., tremor) can present differently between patients, and FNS can also 
evolve over the course of time (e.g., a tremor can spread to another part of the body). 
There are open questions pertaining to the potential meaning behind this variability in 
FNS presentation. For example, whether or not overlapping aetiological factors mean 
that all presentations of FND (and indeed other functional somatic symptoms such as 
Irritable Bowel Syndrome or non-cardiac chest pain) should be included under one 
classification, or sub-divided into symptom-specific disorders is a contentious issue 
(Wessely & White, 2004). The DSM-V suggests classifying FND as separate from 
functional syndromes which affect other systems in the body, such as the digestive 
tract or the cardiovascular system, but does not comment on whether or not it is 
important for diagnosis and treatment to disambiguate between different FND 
presentations. The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine whether different FND 
symptoms are related to different forms of emotion dysregulation and 
psychopathology. Answering this question may give some indication as to whether all 
FNS should be considered part of the same syndrome or individual, symptom-specific 
syndromes. 
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The clinical heterogeneity of FND can be illustrated by considering NEAD. 
Nonepileptic Attacks (NEAs) are generally characterised by paroxysmal symptoms 
and signs which superficially resemble those associated with epileptic seizures, but 
are not associated with any abnormal cortical electrical discharges. However, despite 
being one of the most common FNS, the diagnostic criteria for NEAD lack specificity  
(LaFrance et al., 2013). This means that patients with very different seizures may all 
receive the same diagnosis of NEAD. For example, for some patients NEAs involve 
only motor symptoms, for others sensory, cognitive or combined manifestations may 
occur. Likewise, patients with NEAD may experience impairment of consciousness 
(or not) as part of their seizures.  
 Impairment of consciousness (IOC) is not a universally agreed diagnostic 
requirement although reported or observed impairment of awareness differentiates 
NEAD from other paroxysmal problems (such as panic attacks, tics, flashbacks or 
FMD). While IOC is therefore used an inclusion criterion in some research studies of 
NEAD (Reuber et al., 2011), other patient series include patients whose consciousness 
is never impaired in their NEAs. For instance, in one retrospective chart review study, 
21 of 116 of NEAD patients were found not to experience alterations of consciousness 
(Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011), and 5 out of 30 patients with NEAD self-reported no 
alterations of consciousness in a study comparing psychological profiles between 
patients with NEAD and those with FMD (Hopp, Anderson, Krumholz, Gruber-
Baldini, & Shulman, 2012). It is possible that patients classified as having NEAD 
without impairment of consciousness in an epilepsy clinic would have been diagnosed 
with FMD if they had presented to a movement disorders clinic. Conversely, some 
patients with a diagnosis of paroxysmal FMD (not labelled as having NEAD) do report 
impairments of consciousness; 3 of 56 of patients with FMD in one study (Driver-
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Dunckley et al., 2011) and 32 of 104 in another (Hopp et al., 2012) were reported to 
experience alterations of consciousness. This raises the question, if these patients had 
presented to an epilepsy clinic, would they have been diagnosed with NEAD rather 
than FMD?  When one considers that diagnosis is likely influenced by the medical 
speciality that the patient first makes contact with, and that both NEAD and FMD can 
manifest with paroxysmal motor symptoms (e.g., intermittent tremor or convulsions) 
with or without IOC, the boundary between NEAD and FMD becomes blurred. 
NEAD and FMD are often managed by different subspecialists in neurology, 
so comparative studies are rare.  While the few previous studies examining emotion 
regulation or psychopathology in NEAD versus FMD suggest that there are more 
commonalities than differences between these two types of FND (Erro et al., 2016), 
there are still some divergent findings between studies. For example, Driver-Dunckley 
et al. (2011) compared frequency of common psychiatric comorbidities between 
patients with NEAD and FMD, finding no difference in rates of  depressive disorder 
but that patients in the NEAD group had more frequently been diagnosed with an 
anxiety disorder (Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011). Conversely, Stone et al. (2004) found 
no difference in the rate of Axis 1 disorders (including anxiety and depression) 
between the two groups. However, they did observe a greater incidence of Borderline 
(Emotionally Unstable) Personality Disorder (an Axis 2 disorder) in the patients with 
NEAD. With respect to somatic symptoms, Demartini, Goeta, et al. (2016) observed 
more unexplained physical symptoms in patients with FMD than those with NEAD, 
but Hopp et al. (2012) observed no significant difference in somatisation scores as 
measured by the Brief Symptom Inventory between the two groups. While there are 
several explanations for these discrepancies, the failure of FND diagnostic labels to 
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account for the variable ways in which these symptoms present is conceivably an 
important confound. 
Given the lack of clear diagnostic boundaries between different FND 
presentations, it might be more useful to examine the relationship between objective 
clinical features and emotion regulation / psychopathology irrespective of diagnostic 
label. To date, authors have compared psychopathology in patients with NEAD 
according to higher or lower DES scores (Sarisoy et al., 2015) or altered ictal 
responsiveness (Baslet et al., 2017).  Another clinical feature of theoretical interest, is 
whether or not the patients experience IOC as part of their FND. In NEAD, IOC is a 
semiological feature theorised to be a dissociative response to overwhelming emotion 
(Roberts & Reuber, 2014).  We therefore aimed to compare deficits in emotion 
regulation and psychopathology in patients with FND who experience subjective 
impairment of consciousness (IOC+) against those who do not (IOC-), predicting that 
patients who experience IOC would self-report more severe emotion dysregulation 
than those who do not. We also hypothesised that the IOC+ group would report higher 
levels of comorbid psychopathological symptoms than the IOC- group.  
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Regulatory Approvals 
This study was granted ethical approval by the Sheffield Local Research Ethics 
Committee (REC 16/YH/0196, 31st May 2016). Research governance approval was 
given by the research departments of the Sheffield Teaching Hospitals Foundation 
trust. 
3.2.2. Participants  
 Adult patients with a diagnosis of FND under the care of a consultant 
neurologist at the Royal Hallamshire Hospital in Sheffield, United Kingdom (n = 70), 
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and adult patients responding to an online advertisement on UK- and US-based FND 
patient organisation websites (n = 94) were recruited to the study. For those recruited 
from the hospital, a clinical diagnosis of FND was established on the basis of all 
available evidence and the expert opinion of the patient’s consultant neurologist. For 
patients recruited online, confirmation of the FND diagnosis was sought from a 
selected subgroup of  the participants’ General Practitioner or Consultant Neurologist, 
but these recruits were not excluded if confirmation of the diagnosis could not be 
secured. Patients were not eligible for the study if they had any neurological 
comorbidity which could partially or wholly account for their symptoms, if they were 
unable to complete the questionnaires, or if they were unable to give informed consent. 
3.2.3. Measures 
3.2.3.1. Demographics / IOC questionnaire.  A questionnaire designed by 
the research team was used to capture information on demographics and relevant 
information regarding any FNS that the patient experiences. This included questions 
regarding the type and number of FNS, and whether or not the patient experienced 
IOC as part of their symptoms (Appendix 1). Patients indicated whether they 
experienced any of the following IOC by answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the following 
questions:  
i) I have spells in which I black out / lose consciousness completely. 
ii) I have spells in which am aware of what is going on, but I am unable to respond 
to other people. 
iii) I have spells in which I can perform actions, but I am not aware of what I am 
doing. 
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Patients were categorised as experiencing IOC if they experienced any of these 
phenomena.  
3.2.3.2. The Emotional Processing Scale – 25 (EPS-25). The EPS-25 
(Appendix 2), is a 25-item self-report scale measuring emotion processing styles and 
deficits. It is comprised of five subscales measuring suppression (excessive control of 
emotional experience and expression), signs of unprocessed emotions (intrusive and 
persistent emotional experiences), unregulated emotion (inability to control one’s 
emotions), avoidance (of negative emotional triggers) and impoverished emotional 
experience (detached experience of emotions due to poor emotional insight) (Baker et 
al., 2009).  Participants respond on a 0-9 Likert scale to indicate their response to a 
question. Higher scores indicate greater difficulties with emotion processing and 
regulation. This measure has previously been used in patients with lower back pain 
(Esteves, Wheatley, Mayall, & Abbey, 2013), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(Compare et al., 2012), and patients with NEAD (Novakova et al., 2015). The EPS-25 
has also been demonstrated to be sensitive to psychotherapy-associated change in 
patient with FND (Williams et al., 2018).  
3.2.3.3. Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9). The PHQ-9 (Appendix 3) 
is a nine item self-report questionnaire measuring symptoms of Major Depressive 
Disorder over the past two weeks (Kroenke et al., 2001). The PHQ-9 has a sensitivity 
of 88% and a specificity of 88% for Major Depression. Respondents indicate the 
frequency of each symptom on a 0-3 Likert scale. The PHQ-9 is also a widely used 
clinical measure and has been administered to patients with NEAD (Chen et al., 2014). 
3.2.3.4. Generalized Anxiety Disorder -7 (GAD-7). The GAD-7 (Appendix 
4) is a seven item self-report questionnaire, designed to assess symptoms of 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder experienced over the past two weeks (Spitzer, Kroenke, 
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Williams, & Lowe, 2006). Participants indicate the frequency of each symptom on a 
0-3 Likert scale. The GAD-7 has a sensitivity of 89% and a specificity of 82% for 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and is a widely used measure in psychiatric 
populations. It has also previously been administered to patients with functional 
somatic symptoms (Vijay, Avasthi, & Grover, 2014).  
3.2.3.5. Patient Health Questionnaire-15 (PHQ-15). The PHQ-15 
(Appendix 5) is a 15 item self-report questionnaire assessing the frequency and 
severity of Somatization Disorder symptoms experienced over the past four weeks 
(Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001).  Responses are indicated on a 0-2 Likert scale. 
The PHQ-15 has been administered to patients with NEAD and patients with other 
FNS previously (Novakova et al., 2015; Reuber, Burness, Howlett, Brazier, & 
Grunewald, 2007).  
3.2.3.6. PTSD Checklist for DSM-V (PCL-5).  The PCL-5 (Appendix 6) is a 
20 item self-report questionnaire, which assesses 20 symptoms of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder as defined by the DSM-V. It can be used as a screening tool and to 
measure change over time. Rating scale indicators range from 0-4 for each symptom, 
corresponding to ‘not at all’, ‘a little bit’, ‘moderately’, ‘quite a bit’, and ‘extremely’. 
It has been validated for use in a range of clinical populations including US combat 
soldiers (Hoge, Riviere, Wilk, Herrell, & Weathers, 2014), problem drinkers (Keane 
et al., 2014), and natural disaster survivors (Gruebner, Lowe, Sampson, & Galea, 
2015).  The PCL-5 provides a total symptom severity score (0-80), with higher scores 
indicating a greater level of trauma. To the author’s knowledge, the PCL-5 has not yet 
been administered to a population of patients with FND. 
3.2.4. Design 
This study used a between-subjects design, with IOC (+ / -) as the independent 
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variable and self-report scores on a measure of emotion regulation (EPS-25) and 
symptoms of psychopathology (PHQ-9, GAD-7, PHQ-15, and PCL-5) as the 
dependent variables. 
3.2.5. Procedure 
Patients were approached in four settings: 
In outpatient clinics. A consultant neurologist identified patients and 
introduced them to the researcher. Patients were then provided with study information 
and the opportunity to ask questions. Patients were given as much time as they wished 
to consider whether they wanted to take part. Participants then completed the 
questionnaire pack either in clinic or at home, returning the pack in a stamped 
addressed envelope if they chose the latter option (n = 66). 
From consultant caseloads. Consultant neurologists at the Royal Hallamshire 
Hospital identified patients with FNS from their case load. Suitable patients were 
mailed a Participant Information Sheet and an invitation letter with details of how to 
contact the researcher if they were interested in participating. Patients who made 
contact with the researcher to express interest in participation were then sent the 
questionnaire pack and consent forms to complete and return in freepost envelope (n 
= 1). 
On the neurology ward. A consultant neurologist identified patients meeting 
the study inclusion criteria and introduced them to the researcher with the patient’s 
permission. The researcher then explained the study to the patient with the information 
sheet and allowed them to ask any questions. The patient was given as much time as 
they wished to consider participation. If they chose to take part, written informed 
consent was obtained and the patient was given the questionnaire pack to complete 
during their inpatient stay (n = 3). 
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Online from patient organisation websites. The study was advertised on 
patient organisation websites (i.e. FND Hope and FND Action) along with a brief 
description and link to an online version of the study where participants could also 
view the information sheet and complete the consent form (hosted on Google Forms) 
(n = 93). A selection of patients’ (i.e. those who reported taking medication which 
may also be prescribed for an ‘organic’ neurological condition such a Pregabalin or 
Sodium Valproate) consultant neurologists / General Practitioners were contacted in 
writing and asked to verify their patient’s diagnosis of FND (n = 20).  
3.2.6. Data collection and statistical analysis 
All questionnaire data were scored and any missing data were handled 
according to their respective questionnaire scoring manuals. Patients were categorised 
as either experiencing IOC or not according to their responses in the demographic 
questionnaire. This categorisation was made irrespective of FND clinical presentation.  
Data were entered into SPSS (version 22) and screened for normality using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. All self-report measures were found not to be normally 
distributed (p = <.05) so parametric analyses of these responses were bootstrapped and 
reported with confidence intervals. Levene’s test indicated equality of variance for all 
self-reported dependent measures (p = >.05). Alpha was set at p = .05. False discovery 
rate was controlled for using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (FDR = .05).  
3.3. Results 
3.3.4. Demographic and clinical characteristics 
One hundred and sixty three patients participated in the study (70 were 
recruited from the Royal Hallamshire, 93 were recruited from online). 115 patients 
(56.9%) reported experiencing any IOC. Of these, 63 (31.2%) reported having spells 
during which they black out / lose consciousness completely, 90 (44.6%) reported 
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having spells during which they are aware of what is going on but are unable to 
respond, and 55 (27.2%) reported having spells during which they are responsive but 
unaware. Demographic and clinical features of the IOC+ and IOC- group are presented 
in Table 7. Groups were matched on gender, economic activity, whether they had 
previously received psychological treatment, the number of medications they were 
prescribed, and the duration of their symptoms. The IOC+ group were significantly 
younger and more likely to have a current diagnosis of NEAD than the IOC- group. 
Of note, 16.67% of the IOC- group had a current diagnosis of NEAD, and 19.13% of 
the IOC+ group did not have a diagnosis of NEAD.  
Table 7- Demographic and clinical comparison of patients with impairments of 
consciousness (IOC+) against those without (IOC-). 
 
Characteristic 
IOC-  
(n = 48) 
IOC+  
(n = 115) 
 
p value 
Mean age (SD) 45.9 (13.8) 40.4 (12.6) .014a 
Female (%) 83.0 81.2 .803b 
Economically active (%) 50.0 42.1 .356b 
Psychological Treatment (%) 58.7 68.1 .256b 
Mean medication (SD) 3.4 (3.8) 2.9 (3.1) .451a 
Mean duration in months (SD) 79.7 (95.9) 89.76 (106.9) .575a 
First FNS (%)    
NEAD 14.5 53.0 <.001b 
Paralysis / weakness 31.3 21.7 .198b 
Sensory 10.1 3.5 .191b 
Pain 8.3 2.6 .100b 
Vestibular 4.2 .9 .153b 
Tremor 16.7 12.2 .444b 
Jerk / twitch 4.2 1.7 .361b 
Fatigue 2.1 .0 .121b 
Cognitive 4.2 .9 .153b 
Spasm / rigidity 2.1 3.5 .638b 
Current NEAD diagnosis 16.7 80.9 <.001b 
Note. NEAD = Nonepileptic Attack Disorder, Mean medication = mean number of prescribed 
medications, Psychological treatment = patient has previously received psychological therapy, 
Economically active = in full - / part-time work / education or homemaker, SD = standard 
deviation, a = between-groups t test, b = Chi squared test of association. 
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3.3.5. Emotion dysregulation 
 A series of bootstrapped ANCOVAs with IOC+ / IOC- as the between-subjects 
factor were conducted on the EPS-25 total score and subscores. Given that the IOC+ 
group were significantly younger than the IOC- group, age was entered as a covariate. 
Scores were generally elevated above the 25th percentile for mental health norms – 
suggesting that both groups had deficits in emotion regulation (Table 8).  
Table 8 - Descriptive statistics of EPS-25 total and subscale scores in the IOC+ and 
IOC- groups. 
 IOC- IOC+ CI 
MH 
EPS-25 M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE LL UL 
Suppression 5.1 2.2 5.1 .4 5.2 2.6 5.2 .2 -.87 .84 3.8 
Unprocessed 4.9 2.6 5.0 .4 5.2 2.7 5.2 .3 -1.11 .70 5.0 
Unregulated 3.7 1.9 .37 .4 4.2 2.5 4.2 .2 -1.20 .23 3.0 
Avoidance 4.2 1.9 4.2 .3 4.5 2.4 4.2 .3 -1.03 .41 4.0 
Impoverished 3.7 2.5 3.7 .4 4.2 2.6 4.2 .2 -1.33 .33 2.6 
Total 4.4 1.9 4.4 .3 4.6 2.3 4.7 .2 -.99 .43 4.0 
Note. IOC- = no impairment of consciousness, IOC+= impairment of consciousness, MH = 
25th percentile for UK Mental Health Norms, CI= Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Interval; LL 
= lower limit, UL = upper limit, M = unadjusted means, Madj = Adjusted mean. 
 
Although the EPS-25 total score was slightly greater in the IOC+ group, this 
difference was not significant; F(1, 160) = .57, p = .45, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Similarly, subscale 
scores were slightly elevated in the IOC+ group compared to the IOC- group, but these 
differences did not reach significance for suppression; F(1,160) = .06, p = .79, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.00, unprocessed emotions; F(1,160) = .07, p = .78, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, unregulated emotions; F 
(1,160), = 1.56, p = .21, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, avoidance; F(1,160) = .51 =, p =.46, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or 
impoverished emotional experience; F(1,160) = 1.31, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. With the 
exception of the unprocessed subscale in the IOC- group, all scores exceeded the 25th 
percentile for UK Mental Health Norms. Therefore, the FND patients in this sample 
self-reported similar emotion regulation deficits, irrespective of whether or not they 
experienced IOC.  
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3.3.6. Psychopathology 
Both groups exceeded the cut-off suggestive of moderate Major Depression on 
the PHQ-9 and moderate Somatisation Disorder on the PHQ-15 (i.e. ≥ 10). However, 
only the IOC+ group exceeded the clinical cut-off for moderate Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder on the GAD-7 (i.e. ≥10) and the cut-off for likely Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (i.e. ≥33) (Figure 5). In order to assess the significance of differences in self-
reported symptoms of psychopathology between the IOC+ and IOC- group, a series 
of bootstrapped between-subjects ANCOVAs were conducted on depression (PHQ-
9), anxiety (GAD-7), number and severity of somatic symptoms (PHQ-15), and Post-
Traumatic Stress symptoms (PCL-5) scores (Table 9).  Patients with IOC scored 
significantly higher on the GAD-7; F(1,159) = 3.63, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, PHQ-15; 
F(1,157) = 10.47, p =.002, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06 and PCL-5; F(1,153) = 4.38, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03. 
Differences on the PHQ-9 were non-significant; F(1,157) = .29, p =  .09, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02. 
The observed between-groups differences in GAD-7, PHQ-15, and PCL-5 scores 
retained significance after controlling for false-discovery rate.  
Self-reported symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Somatization 
Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder were therefore greater in patients with 
IOC than those without.  However, there was no difference in self-reported symptoms 
of Major Depressive Disorder between the two groups.  
Table 9 - Descriptive statistics of psychopathology in the IOC+ and IOC- group. 
 IOC- IOC+ CI 
Measure n M SD Madj SE n M SD Madj SE LL UL 
PHQ-9 47 11.2 7.1 11.3 1.1 113 13.5 7.4 13.5 .7 -4.61 .35 
GAD-7 47 7.8 6.1 8.2 .9 115 10.6 6.5 10.5 .6 -4.39 -.32 
PHQ-15 46 11.7 5.5 11.9 .9 114 15.6 6.6 15.5 .6 -5.71 -1.51 
PCL-5 47 24.8 19.9 25.8 3.3 109 34.6 23.7 34.2 2.2 -16.81 -2.39 
Note. CI = 95% Bootstrapped Confidence Interval; LL = Lower Limit, UL = Upper Limit, 
PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire – 9 (Major Depression), GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder – 7, PHQ-15 = Patient Health Questionnaire – 15 (Somatization Disorder), PCL-5 = 
PTSD Checklist for DSM 5. M = unadjusted mean, Madj = Adjusted mean. 
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3.3.7. Confirming diagnosis of patients recruited online 
Fifteen out of 20 clinicians responded to our request to confirm their 
patient’s diagnosis. All 15 of these confirmed the diagnosis of FND with no 
comorbid neurological disorder which could partially explain the patients’ 
symptoms. 
3.4. Discussion 
 The results give evidence of elevated levels of emotion dysregulation, whether 
or not the patient experiences IOC as part of their FND. However, higher levels of 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress symptomology, as well as 
an increased number and severity of somatic symptoms, were observed in patients 
Figure 5. Mean emotion dysregulation and psychopathology symptom scale scores 
represented as percentage of maximum scale score for FND patients with and without IOC. 
Emotion dysregulation (EPS-25) cut-off = 25th percentile for mental health norms. Cut-off 
for PHQ-9, GAD-7, PHQ-15 = moderately severe symptoms of Major Depression (PHQ-
9), Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7), Somatization Disorder (PHQ-15). Cut-off for 
PCL-5 = clinical cut-off for likely Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PCL-5). * = statistically 
significant difference. 
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with IOC compared to those without (Figure 6). These findings corroborate the 
putative association between emotion dysregulation and FND, and suggest that a 
symptomatology including IOC, may be related to anxiety, somatization, and 
psychological trauma. By associating these measures of psychological functioning and 
previous experiences with FNS presentation, this study represents a step towards 
elucidating some of the psychological heterogeneity in FND. This has implications for 
treatment of FND; if a patient reports IOC as part of their FND, they might be more 
likely to benefit from psychological interventions targeting anxiety, somatization, and 
psychological trauma than those who do not report IOC. Given that patients with IOC 
are also more likely to self-report psychopathology, they may also be more likely to 
accept psychological accounts of their FND and understand the rationale for 
psychotherapy (Howlett, Grunewald, Khan, & Reuber, 2007; Howlett & Reuber, 
2009). 
Although EPS-25 scores were slightly greater in patients with IOC, they did 
not differ significantly between-groups. This is perhaps not surprising given that 
several psychological constructs measured by the questionnaire, including avoidance 
(Cronje & Pretorius, 2013; van Beilen, Griffioen, & Leenders, 2009), alexithymia 
(Ekanayake et al., 2017; Steffen, Fiess, Schmidt, & Rockstroh, 2015), and suppression 
(Gul & Ahmad, 2014; Steffen et al., 2015) have previously been shown to be elevated 
in patients with either NEAD or FMD relative to healthy controls. These findings 
therefore lend support to the view that there is some overlap between patients with 
FND with different clinical manifestations – at least in terms of emotion regulatory 
style. In order to help address the question of whether FND should be included in the 
same category as other assumed somatization disorders, it would be useful to 
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administer the EPS-25 to other relevant patient populations, such as those with 
Irritable Bowel Syndrome or Fibromyalgia to compare emotion regulation profiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Diagrammatic representation of IOC findings. Patients with Impairments of 
Consciousness (IOC+) reported symptoms exceeding the cut-off for moderately severe Major 
Depressive Disorder, Somatization Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms. Patients without Impairments of Consciousness (IOC-
) reported symptoms of moderately severe Major Depressive Disorder and Somatization 
Disorder. Both groups reported levels pathological levels of emotion dysregulation. * = 
significant between-groups difference.  
 
To our knowledge, there have been no other studies comparing emotion 
dysregulation and psychopathology in FND patients with and without IOC. One recent 
study has compared emotion regulation and psychopathology in patients with NEAD 
who experience altered responsiveness (defined as patient not responding, verbally or 
otherwise, and not remembering three words given to them during at least one of their 
vEEG recorded events during hospital admission) during their attacks against those 
who don’t. Lower emotional resilience / tolerance was observed in patients with 
altered responsiveness, but no differences were found in measures of dissociation, 
somatization, mood, trauma, or psychiatric co-morbidity (Baslet et al., 2017). 
However, due to the patient group being comprised totally of patients with NEAD (i.e. 
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patients with predominantly episodic, seizure-like symptoms), these findings cannot 
be directly compared with our own.   
Studies with the most similar design and patient group to the present study 
have compared psychopathology in patients with NEAD with those with FMD. How 
do our findings concerning anxiety and depression compare with previous work? We 
found significantly higher self-reported levels of Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
symptomology (GAD-7) in the IOC+ group which exceeded the threshold for 
moderately severe symptoms. However, the IOC- group mean score on the GAD-7 
fell within a non-clinical range. We also found that levels of depressive symptomology 
did not differ between the groups (as measured by the PHQ-9), but both exceeded the 
cut-off suggestive of moderately severe Major Depression. These findings are partially 
consistent with a study by Grimaldi, Dubuc, Kahane, Bougerol, and Vercueil (2010) 
who found that levels of depressive symptomology, as measured by the Beck 
Depression Inventory, did not differ in group of eight patients with NEAD compared 
with a group of nine patients with FMD. However, they only found a trend towards 
higher levels of anxiety in the NEAD group as measured by the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (although the small sample size should be noted). Also in 
accordance with the present findings, Hopp et al. (2012) observed no between-group 
differences on the depression subscale of the Brief Symptom Inventory (a measure of 
overall psychiatric symptoms) in patients with NEAD and those with FMD (the 
authors do not report findings on the anxiety subscale). However, in direct contrast to 
our findings, Driver-Dunckley et al. (2011) found that patients with FMD were 
significantly more likely to have a pre-existing psychiatric diagnosis of anxiety than 
patients with NEAD, and Stone et al. (2004) observed no difference in rates of any 
Axis 1 disorder between the two patient groups. Therefore, our findings on depression 
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and anxiety in patients with and without IOC do not clearly align with pre-existing 
findings on depression and anxiety in patients with NEAD compared to those with 
FMD. 
Regarding somatization, we observed higher scores on the PHQ-15 in the 
IOC+ group (which exceeded the cut-off for severe Somatization Disorder) than the 
IOC- group (which still exceeded the cut-off for moderately severe somatization 
disorder). These data are at odds with those of Hopp et al. (2012), who found no 
differences between patients with FMD and NEAD on the somatisation subscale of 
Brief Symptom Inventory. It is possible that IOC represent a more severe somatic 
symptom, which drives the increased somatization scores in our data, an effect which 
is diluted by the use of diagnostic category as an independent variable by Hopp et al. 
(2012). However, Baslet et al. (2017) manipulated an objectively more severe 
semiological feature as an independent variable, altered responsiveness during 
nonepileptic attacks, and found no differences in somatization as indexed by the PHQ-
15. A key difference between the methodology used by Baslet et al. (2017) and our 
own is that impaired responsiveness was assessed by a clinician whereas IOC in our 
data were self-reported. Indeed, over 50% of observers report that patients with NEAD 
‘always’ completely lose consciousness during their attacks, whereas only 30% 
patients endorse this ictal phenomenology (Reuber et al., 2011). It is therefore possible 
that reporter biases influencing how patients are categorised into groups partially 
account for the difference between our PHQ-15 findings and those of Baslet et al. 
(2017). 
As previously mentioned, inconsistent findings on depression, anxiety, and 
somatization in patients with NEAD versus those with FMD may be due to the fact 
that these diagnostic labels are not clearly defined and that patients have 
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heterogeneous biopsychosocial and clinical profiles. For example, Duncan and Oto 
(2008) demonstrated that patient endorsement of antecedent trauma to the 
development of NEAD was predicted by a later age of onset and having additional 
medically unexplained symptoms. However, having a Learning Disability predicted 
an absence of patient-reported antecedent trauma. Furthermore, different forms of 
antecedent trauma were related to different predictors; bullying was predicted by early 
onset of NEAD, whereas health-related trauma was predicted by late-age onset, sexual 
abuse was predicted by female gender, physical abuse, self-harm and other medically 
unexplained symptoms. These findings resonate with our own, and raise the possibility 
that categorising patients according to objective clinical characteristics or features 
which are demonstrably linked to psychopathology might therefore be more fruitful 
than using labels such as FMD or NEAD in future research.  This approach could also 
have important ramifications for the psychological treatment of FND – given the 
unclear boundaries between diagnostic categories and clinical presentation, might 
symptom manifestation give more important clues about aetiology than the diagnostic 
label?  Indeed, IOC were not restricted to patients with NEAD; in the present study 
19.13% of patients with NEAD did not report experiencing any IOC, and 16.67% of 
the IOC- group reported a diagnosis of NEAD.  
Our finding of significantly higher levels of PTSD symptomology in the IOC+ 
group than the IOC- group is consistent with the literature. Not only were self-reported 
symptoms of trauma higher in the IOC+ group, but PCL-5 (PTSD symptomology) 
scores fell within a non-clinical range in the IOC- group. Psychological trauma is one 
of the most commonly cited psychological risk factors for NEAD.  Antecedent trauma 
is reported in up to 70% of patients with NEAD (Proenca et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
trauma seems to be a more pertinent aetiological factor to NEAD than FMD. A 
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retrospective chart review of 116 patients with NEAD and 56 with FMD found patients 
with NEAD were more likely to report one or more traumatic events that precipitated 
or exacerbated symptoms (Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011). Similarly, Reuber, Howlett, 
et al. (2007) found psychological trauma to be more common in patients with NEAD 
than those with other FNS. Stone et al. (2004) compared clinical characteristics in 
patients with NEAD against FMD, and found that patients with NEAD reported a 
greater number of traumatising events, including a lower perception of parental care, 
incest, parental divorce, and as higher number negative life events relating to changes 
in family life in 12 months prior to symptom onset. Although trauma is reported in 
patients with FMD, it appears be less frequent than one might expect in a supposedly 
‘psychogenic’ disorder (Kranick et al., 2011). If FND accompanied by IOC were 
viewed as more intense dissociative symptoms than FND without IOC, then the 
suggestion that traumatic experiences could serve to intensify dissociative symptoms 
in FND but are not necessary for the disorder to manifest (Kienle et al., 2017), would 
seem appropriate.  
Our findings therefore suggest that IOC in FND symptomology appears to be 
related to increased self-reported symptoms of anxiety, somatization, and 
psychological trauma. However, an emotion regulatory style characterised by 
avoidance, suppression, impoverished emotional experience, unregulated emotions, 
and unprocessed emotions is common to patients at with FND (at group level) whether 
or not they experience IOC. This conclusion is consistent with the theory that IOC in 
NEAD represent a dissociative response to overwhelming emotion (Roberts & 
Reuber, 2014). 
 The neural mechanism driving IOC in FND is not yet known, but Roberts and 
Reuber (2014) have proposed three mechanisms which may occur in isolation, or in 
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combination. Firstly, IOC may represent a “side-effect” of excessive emotion 
inhibition in reaction to overwhelming emotions, which the individual may have 
learned over time or may be biologically predisposed to. Secondly, overwhelming 
emotion may directly trigger IOC. Thirdly, minor emotional fluctuations may be 
conditioned to elicit the behavioural response of IOC.  
While our data do support the idea of a relationship between psychopathology 
and FND symptom semiology, it is important to stress that the cross-sectional study 
design does not allow for a causal interpretation. It may be that IOC is brought about 
by a deficient emotion regulatory style in combination with trauma, a tendency to 
experience more and more severe somatic symptoms, and higher levels of anxiety. It 
may also be the case that the IOC themselves are psychologically traumatizing, and 
result in the kind of bodily symptoms described in the PHQ-15, or that living with IOC 
induces feelings of anxiety that are captured by the GAD-7.  
3.4.1. Limitations 
One potential limitation of this study is that approximately half of the sample 
were recruited online and not directly from consultant neurologists who were able to 
verify the diagnosis at entry to the study. This is a particular concern, as the reliability 
of patients with Medically Unexplained Symptoms to report previous functional and 
‘non-functional’ medical diagnoses has been brought into question (Schrag, Brown, 
& Trimble, 2004). However, this approach did enable us to recruit a good sample size 
and we have contacted a selection of patients’ clinicians to confirm their diagnosis. 
Reassuringly, all of the clinicians who responded (15 / 20) confirmed the diagnosis of 
FND with no comorbid neurological conditions which could partially account for their 
symptoms. The range of recruitment methods used also increases the generalizability 
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of our findings to the wider population of patients with FND, many of whom may not 
currently be attending specialist clinics.  
The methodology might also be criticised for a failure to ask patients what 
‘stressful event’ they were referring to when completing the PCL-5. This was a 
conscious decision, designed to protect patients completing the study measures 
without any immediate recourse to emotional support from the researchers as far as 
possible from the potentially harmful effects of reactivating trauma memories. 
However, given the subjective nature of trauma, it can be argued that it is not always 
necessary to know the exact nature of the traumatic stressor when assessing Post-
Traumatic Stress symptomology.  
Given that IOC was conceptualised as a dissociative response, the study design 
might have benefited from the inclusion of a measure of dissociation. However, there 
are concerns over the validity of self-report measures of dissociation in patients with 
NEAD (Roberts & Reuber, 2014). Other authors have argued that given the complex 
nature of dissociation, multiple measures of dissociation (e.g., compartmentalization, 
depersonalisation, and derealisation) might be needed when studying dissociation in 
patients with FND (Alper et al., 1997; Lawton et al., 2008). Others have argued that 
dissociation as measured by the Dissociative Experience Scale is not necessarily 
relevant for all patients with NEAD, and the tendency to express psychosocial distress 
through unexplained medical symptoms is a more relevant aetiological factor (Reuber 
et al., 2003). Therefore, a measure of dissociation may not have added any value to 
the findings. We were keen not to make the questionnaire pack too lengthy for patients 
to complete, and so concede that this study cannot come to any firm conclusions about 
the role of dissociation in IOC. 
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A final consideration is the unequal sample sizes of patients with and without 
IOC. While this is interesting in that it suggests more patients with FND are likely to 
experience IOC than those who don’t, unequal sample sizes can affect the 
homogeneity of variance assumption of the ANOVA model. However, Levene’s test 
of homogeneity of variance was non-significant in the present data, therefore the 
unequal sample sizes recruited to the study should not invalidate the findings.  
3.5. Conclusion 
 There is evidence of emotion dysregulation in patients with FND, whether or 
not they experience IOC as part of their symptom. Both groups also reported elevated 
levels of Major Depressive Disorder symptomology. However, patients with IOC 
reported more symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Somatization Disorder, 
and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder than patients without IOC. Despite the limitation 
of the cross-sectional design, our study suggests that differences in patients’ 
psychopathological profiles and their histories of traumatic experiences may 
contribute to shaping the symptomology of their FND.  
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4. Testing the Extended Process Model of emotion 
regulation in patients with Functional Neurological 
Disorder 
4.1.1. Introduction 
The experimental work presented in this chapter used a combination of self-
report, physiological, and behavioural measures to test the EPM (Gross, 2015) in 
patients with FND compared to healthy controls. This chapter is organized in three 
subsections. Section 4.2 examines the identification stage through assessing 
interoceptive sensitivity in patients with FND compared to healthy controls. The 
selection and implementation stage are addressed in section 4.3, which examines the 
use of expressive suppression as an emotion regulation strategy in patients with FND 
relative to healthy controls. Section 4.4 assesses for physiological evidence of chronic 
autonomic dysregulation in patients with FND (resting Heart Rate Variability (HRV)) 
and its relationship measures of emotion dysregulation, emotion identification, as well 
as emotion regulation strategy selection and implementation assessed in the previous 
two sections. The chapter begins with a description of the overall procedure and a 
comparison of the participants on demographics and self-report measures of emotion 
dysregulation and psychopathology. 
All studies presented in this chapter received ethical approval from the 
Sheffield Local Research Ethics Committee on the 31st May 2016. All patient 
participants who completed Study One (Chapter 3) were given the opportunity to 
express their interest in studies two, three, and four, and all of those who expressed 
interest were invited to attend the University of Sheffield Department of Psychology 
for testing. Healthy controls were recruited via the university volunteer email list.  The 
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overall procedure is depicted in Figure 7. The experimental set up is depicted in Figure 
8. 
4.1.2. Participants 
Twenty-six patients diagnosed with FND by a consultant neurologist and 28 
healthy controls with no known medical (including mental health) diagnoses were 
recruited to the study. The control group was gender-matched to the patient group, but 
significantly younger. The control group were also more economically active, taking 
fewer prescribed medications, and less likely to have received psychological treatment 
than the patient group (Table 10) which was unsurprising given the poor social, 
economic, and health outcomes associated with FND (Carson et al., 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patient participants complete the demographic questionnaire, EPS-25, 
PHQ-9, GAD-7, PHQ-15 and PCL-5 as part of Study 1. 
All participants attend for studies 2, 3, and 4. Written informed consent 
is taken and healthy controls complete the demographic questionnaire. 
 
All participants complete the following paradigms in the same order: 
1.  Resting Heart Rate Variability (Study 4) 
2. Expressive Suppression (Study 3) 
3. Interoceptive sensitivity (Study 2) 
Healthy controls complete the EPS-25, PHQ-9, GAD-7, PHQ-15, and 
PCL-5. Both patients and healthy controls complete the ERQ. 
Participants are thanked and debriefed. 
Figure 7. Outline of Stage Two procedure 
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Table 10 – Comparison of demographic details between the patient and control group. 
Characteristic n Control n Patient p  value 
Mean age (SD) 28 33.3 (11.6) 26 41.6 (14.3) .021a* 
Female % 28 78.6 26 88.5 .330b 
Economically active % 28 100 26 36.0 <.001b* 
Mean medication (SD) 28 .4 (.6) 26 2.3 (2.7) <.001a* 
Psychological treatment % 28 14.3 25 68.0 <.001b* 
Note. ‘Mean Age’ = mean age in years, ‘Economically active’ = in full- or part-time work or 
education or a homemaker, ‘Mean medication’ = mean number of medications, ‘Psychological 
treatment’= previously received psychological treatment, a = t-test. b = chi-squared test of 
association. * = p <.05. 
The most commonly reported FND in the sample was NEAD (Table 11). Other 
symptoms included movement and sensory disturbances. FND were chronic (Mean 
duration = 99.7 months, SD = 126.4). Over half of the sample had been diagnosed with 
NEAD (n = 15) and the mean number of Nonepileptic Attacks in the past month was 
19.8 (SD = 26.6).  The majority of patients reported experiencing impairments of 
consciousness as part of their FND (n = 19).  
Figure 8. Experimental set up. The participant is seated on the right in front of a computer 
monitor with a keyboard. A privacy screen separates the experimenter who would be sat on 
the left.  
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Table 11- FNS characteristics in patient group 
FNS Characteristics n 
First symptom   
NEAD 12 
Paralysis / weakness 7 
Sensory 1 
Vestibular 1 
Tremor 1 
Jerk / twitch 2 
Spasm / rigidity  1 
Impairments of consciousness   
Blackout  11 
Unresponsive  15 
Unaware 10 
Total 19 
Note. NEAD = Nonepileptic Attack Disorder, Blackout = patient ‘blacks out’ / loses 
consciousness completely, Unresponsive = patient has periods during which they are 
conscious but unresponsive, Unaware = patient has periods during which they are responsive 
but unaware. 
 
Patients also reported significantly greater emotion regulation deficits (EPS-
25) as well as more symptoms of Major Depression (PHQ-9), Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD-7), Somatization Disorder (PHQ-15), and Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PCL-5) than healthy controls (Table 12). 
 
Table 12- Comparison of emotion processing and psychopathology between patients 
and healthy controls. 
Measure Control Patient    CI 
 n M SD n M SD df t p LL UL 
EPS-25 28 2.8 1.3 26 5.0 1.6 52 -5.5 <.001 -2.9 -1.4 
PHQ-9 28 3.2 2.7 26 10.9 4.9 37.6 -7.0v <.001 -9.9 -5.5 
GAD-7 28 3.7 4.8 26 11.0 5.0 52 -5.4 <.001 -9.8 -4.5 
PHQ-15 28 4.8 3.4 26 13.5 4.6 45.7 -7.8v <.001 -10.7 -6.6 
PCL-5 28 8.2 9.7 26 34.5 18.2 37.6 -6.7v <.001 -34.3 -18.4 
Note. EPS-25 = Emotional Processing Scale- 25, PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire – 9, 
GAD-7 = Generalised Anxiety Disorder – 7, PHQ-15 = Patient Health Questionnaire- 15, 
PCL-5 = PTSD Checklist – 5. CI = Bootstrapped confidence interval; LL = Lower Limit, UL 
= Upper Limit. v = equal variances not assumed. 
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4.2. The identification stage: Interoceptive sensitivity in 
patients with Functional Neurological Symptoms 
(Study 2) 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Successful emotion regulation depends on an individual’s ability to identify 
the emotion they are experiencing (Gross, 2015), and there is evidence to suggest that 
emotion dysregulation in FND might be characterised by deficits in the identification 
of patients’ own emotions. For example, several self-report studies using the TAS-20 
have found raised levels of alexithymia in patients with NEAD (see section 2.4.1) 
compared to healthy controls and patients with epilepsy. Similar results have also been 
observed when comparing patients with FMD to healthy controls and those with 
‘organic’ movement disorders (Demartini, Petrochilos, et al., 2014; Demartini, 
Ricciardi, Crucianelli, Fotopoulou, & Edwards, 2016). However, significant 
differences are not always observed between patient and control groups when using 
the TAS-20 (Brown et al., 2013; Ricciardi et al., 2016; Wolf et al., 2015). This may 
be because alexithymia is not as ubiquitous in FND as has previously been suggested 
and there are subgroups of patients who are not alexithymic, or because of issues with 
the validity and reliability of the TAS-20. Indeed, concerns have been raised about the 
validity of the Externally Oriented Thinking subscale of TAS-20, which reflects a 
tendency to focus on details of the external world rather than focus attention on 
internal states (e.g., Gignac, Palmer, & Stough, 2007). It is also possible that a group 
of patients who have difficulty reflecting on their emotional experiences would not 
reliably be able to accurately self-report on their emotional experiences – in which 
case, a more objective non-self-report measure of alexithymia would be preferential. 
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The aim of this chapter was therefore to test the hypothesis that patients with FND 
have a deficit in the identification of their own emotions using measures other than the 
TAS-20.  
One such alternative approach to assessing emotion identification is to 
examine interoception - the sensation and representation of the physiological state of 
the body  (Craig, 2002), which has historically been regarded as integral to emotional 
experience. One of the earliest theories of emotion, the James-Lange theory, held that 
emotions resulted from the perception of physiological changes within the body which 
had been elicited by emotional stimuli – and that this perception itself constitutes an 
emotion (James, 1994). While the James-Lange theory does offer a role for 
interoception in emotion identification, it has been criticised for being too simplistic 
and received numerous other challenges. For example,  Cannon (1927) severed 
afferent sympathetic nerves in cats and found that the animals still displayed emotional 
behaviours when provoked, demonstrating that the perception of physiological states 
was not necessary for emotional experience -  as the James-Lange theory asserts. 
Instead, Cannon (1927) argued that these physiological states are actually caused by 
emotions, and not the other way around. As a result, later theories of emotion give a 
more nuanced account of the role of interoception in emotion identification. For 
example, Schachter and Singer (1962) famously demonstrated that emotional 
experience also depended on one’s cognitive appraisal of their physiological state. 
Peripheral injections of adrenaline causing a state of physiological arousal elicited 
either elation or anger in participants depending on the presence of an elated or 
irritated confederate. More recently, The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1996) 
proposed that physiological sensations over time become consciously and / or 
unconsciously associated with corresponding emotions (e.g., a rapid heartbeat with 
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anger or a churning stomach with anxiety). These physiological sensations therefore 
become ‘somatic markers’ which serve to inform the individual about what emotion 
they are experiencing and help to guide decision making. While the major theories 
differ in their accounts of the specific process by which emotions are generated and 
identified, all agree that the ability to perceive ones internal physiological milieu has 
an important role to play in emotion identification. In doing so, these theories offer a 
possible mechanism for alexithymia in FND – impaired interoception. 
 Several lines of converging evidence support the assumed relatedness between 
interoception and alexithymia. During a widely used behavioural measure of 
interoception, the ‘Heart Beat Detection Task’ (Schandry, 1981), participants are 
instructed to silently count their heartbeats over a period of time without any manual 
checking. The number of counted heartbeats is compared against the actual number of 
heart beats and an accuracy score is calculated. More accurate responses are 
considered a measure of greater interoceptive sensitivity which is related to how well 
an individual can identify and label their emotions. Herbert, Herbert, and Pollatos 
(2011) demonstrated a negative correlation between self-reported measures of 
alexithymia (TAS-20) and interoceptive sensitivity in a sample of 155 healthy 
volunteers. In support of this association, there is also growing behavioural evidence 
that individuals with alexithymia are impaired on the Heart Beat Detection Task (e.g., 
Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016). From a neuroanatomical perspective, interoception 
and emotion processing appear to be supported by overlapping neural systems, 
including both the anterior insula and cingulate cortices (Medford & Critchley, 2010). 
Alexithymia has been associated with abnormalities of these structures; Goerlich-
Dobre, Bruce, Martens, Aleman, and Hooker (2014) demonstrated that greater cortical 
thickness in the anterior cingulate and posterior insula cortices were associated with 
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worse scores on self-report measures of alexithymia in healthy participants. 
Furthermore, abnormal interoception and alexithymia have been observed to co-occur 
in a number of conditions in which emotion dysregulation are a common factor, such 
as chronic pain (Di Lernia, Serino, & Riva, 2016) and eating disorders (Garfinkel, 
Moldofsky, Garner, Stancer, & Coscina, 1978; Rozenstein, Latzer, Stein, & Eviatar, 
2011). It is therefore possible that if patients with FND are alexithymic according to 
self-report measures, they will also have impaired interoceptive sensitivity. 
An interoceptive deficit could have two consequences for emotion 
identification in patients with FND; i) problems with differentiating physiological 
sensations from emotions could result in the misattribution of emotions to physical 
symptoms leading to ‘disease conviction’ and the rejection of psychological factors as 
being related to health (e.g., Binzer, Eisemann, & Kullgren, 1998), or ii)  attenuated 
intensity of emotional experience, rendering emotional states more difficult to detect, 
identify, and differentiate from one another. An attenuated emotional experience 
seems less likely given findings which suggest that patients with NEAD perceive their 
lives as more stressful than the general population (e.g., Frances et al., 1999; 
Schönenberg et al., 2015; Testa et al., 2012; Tojek et al., 2000). One research group 
have proposed that impaired interoception, in conjunction with physical or 
psychological stress may be important in the development of FND (Demartini, Goeta, 
et al., 2016; Demartini, Petrochilos, et al., 2014). They propose that when emotional 
arousal becomes overwhelming in alexithymic patients, they are not able to interpret 
the accompanying automatic arousal correctly and confuse feelings of anxiety or panic 
with ‘physical’ symptoms. This breakdown in the normal integration of emotion 
processing with sensorimotor processing represents a dissociative response – in the 
case of NEAD this is would take the form of detachment (loss of consciousness) and 
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in FMD this would take the form of compartmentalisation (somatization).  
 Accordingly, researchers have begun to investigate interoceptive sensitivity 
in patients with FND – with mixed results. Ricciardi et al. (2016) have demonstrated 
reduced interoceptive sensitivity in a group of patients with FMD relative to healthy 
controls, but have not found any group differences in interoceptive sensitivity between 
patients with FMD, patients with NEAD, and healthy controls (Demartini, Goeta, et 
al., 2016).  The aim of the present study was therefore to test the hypothesis that 
patients with FND have an impaired ability to identify their emotions, characterised 
by reduced interoceptive sensitivity (Heart Beat Detection Task) and less insight into 
their emotional experiences than healthy controls. Given that psychological stress has 
been endorsed as triggering factor for FND, we elaborated on the paradigm by 
including a stress induction procedure to test the idea that interoception in patients 
with FND is vulnerable to psychophysiological arousal. Owing to self-report literature 
that has found patients with FND to be alexithymic and the theoretical relationship 
between alexithymia and interoception, we hypothesised that patients with FND 
would exhibit lower interoceptive sensitivity than healthy controls. Given the 
proposed interaction between stress and interoception in FND (Demartini, Goeta, et 
al., 2016; Demartini, Petrochilos, et al., 2014), we hypothesised that the interoceptive 
sensitivity deficit would be exacerbated by stress. We also hypothesised that patients 
would self-report higher levels of alexithymia (as measured by the EPS-25) than 
healthy controls.   
4.2.2. Methods 
4.2.2.1. Participants  
Twenty-six patients with FND and 28 healthy controls performed the study. 
Data from one healthy control was excluded due to a technical malfunction, resulting 
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in a final sample of 26 patients and 27 healthy controls.  
4.2.2.2. Materials / apparatus  
4.2.2.2.1. Stimuli. Task instructions, including when to start and stop counting, 
were presented to the participant on a computer monitor positioned in front of them, 
running an E-Prime (2.0) script coded specifically for the experiment (Psychology 
Software Tools, 2012). The instructions to start and stop counting were accompanied 
by an audible tone (.01 seconds, 44.1 kHz) played on speakers. 
4.2.2.2.2. ECG recording. The number of heartbeats within each trial was 
recorded with an electrocardiogram (ECG). The ECG was arranged in a Lead II 
configuration, with electrodes (EL503 Biopac systems) applied with electrode gel 
(Signagel, Biopac Systems) placed on the participant’s right inner arm (negative lead), 
left ankle (positive lead), and right ankle (ground lead) to form an Einthoven’s triangle. 
The ECG leads (SS2L BSL Shielded Electrode Assembly, Biopac Systems) fed into a 
Biopac MP36R amplifier. The ECG trace was recorded with AcqKnowledge 4.4 
software (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, CA) and sampled at a rate of 2000 Hz 
(preset .05 - 35Hz, gain x 2000). Triggers sent from the Eprime script running on the 
participant’s computer marked the start and finish of trials. One heartbeat was defined 
as one complete R-R interval. The number of R-R intervals within each epoch was 
calculated using the cycle detection algorithm within AcqKnowledge. 
4.2.2.2.3. The Cold Pressor Test (Lovallo, 1975). A 20 litre cooler filled with 5 litres 
of ice-water (0 - 4˚C) was used for the Cold Pressor Test (CPT). Water temperature 
was checked and recorded immediately prior to the test. Length of handimmersion 
was timed using a stop watch. The researcher verbally indicated when the participant 
should submerge their hand. 
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4.2.2.3. Measures 
4.2.2.3.1. The Emotional Processing Scale – 25. Participants’ responses to 
the ‘Impoverished Emotional Experience’ subscale on the EPS-25 were employed as 
a measure of alexithymia. This subscale captures a, “detached experience of ones 
emotions due to poor emotional insight” and higher scores indicate difficulty with 
awareness, labelling, and linking of emotional experience (Cronbach’s Alpha = .82) 
(Baker et al., 2009).   
4.2.2.3.2. Interoceptive Sensitivity. Interoceptive Sensitivity was measured 
using the Heart Beat Detection Task (Schandry, 1981), which yields an Interoceptive 
Sensitivity (IS) score, ranging between 0 – 1 (1 being more accurate). The IS score is 
calculated from the number of verbally reported (counted) heartbeats and the number 
of recorded heartbeats averaged across the three trials using the following calculation: 
IS = 
1
3
Σ[(1 – (|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats|/ recorded heartbeats))] 
4.2.2.4. Design 
A mixed-measures design was used. There were two independent variables; 
group (patient versus healthy control) as the between-subjects variable, and stress-
induction (pre- versus post - CPT) as the within - subjects variable. There were two 
dependent variables; ‘interoceptive sensitivity’ score, and baseline ‘impoverished 
emotional experience’ score on the EPS-25. All participants took part in all conditions 
of the experiment.  
4.2.2.5. Procedure 
Participants were seated and viewing a computer monitor running the EPrime 
2.0 script, which presented the following task instructions for the Heart Beat Detection 
Task (Schandry, 1981): 
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“We will ask you to silently count how many heart beats you can feel during 
a period of time. Please do this by paying attention to your body only. Do not 
take your pulse to count. If you feel unable to do this, please try to guess.” 
The beginning of each trial was signalled to the participant by an audio tone 
and the instructions ‘start counting’ presented on the screen. At the end of the trial, 
another audio tone was played and the instructions to ‘stop counting’ were presented 
on the monitor screen. The participant then verbally reported the number they had 
counted to the researcher, who was sat behind a privacy screen (Figure 8). 
Participants had a 15 second practice trial to familiarise themselves with the 
procedure, after which they were instructed to count their heartbeat in three 
experimental trials which differed in duration, lasting 25, 35, or 45 seconds (order 
randomised). There was a 30 second break in-between trials. Participants were not 
informed of the length of each trial or given any feedback on their performance. This 
Heart Beat Detection Task was performed before and after the Cold Pressor Test 
(CPT) which is known to elicit a strong physiological stress response (Lovallo, 1975). 
During the CPT participants were instructed to immerse their non-dominant hand into 
cold water (0-40C) to above the wrist, for as long as possible (but up to three minutes). 
This was repeated three times, with 30 second intervals in-between immersions.  
4.2.2.6. Statistical analysis  
Data were screened for normality. IS scores were normally distributed, as 
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality (p >.05). There was homogeneity of 
variance as assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances (p >.05) and 
covariance as assessed by Box’s M (p >.05). Therefore, parametric analyses were used 
to analyse the IS data.  The EPS-25 violated the assumption of normality (Shapiro-
Wilk p <.05), and so all analyses of the EPS-25 and its subscales were bootstrapped 
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and reported with confidence intervals. Alpha was set at p <.05 but adjusted to control 
for False Discovery Rate (FDR = .1) for the exploratory correlational analyses.  
4.2.3. Results 
4.2.3.1. Interoceptive sensitivity 
To investigate group differences in interoceptive sensitivity as well as the 
effect of physiological stress on interoceptive sensitivity, a 2x2 ANCOVA with Group 
(Healthy Control vs. Patient) as the between-subjects factor and stress-induction (Pre- 
vs. Post-CPT) as the within-subjects factor was conducted on mean IS scores. Owing 
to the significant difference in age between groups, age was entered as a covariate.  
There was a significant main effect of group; F(1, 50) = 4.60, p = .04, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .08, 
revealing that patients had significantly lower IS than healthy controls (Table 13). 
There was also a significant main effect of stress-induction; F(1,50) = 5.06, p = .03, 
𝜂𝑝
²  = .09. IS became more accurate after stress induction (Table 13). The interaction 
effect was non-significant; F(1,50) = .27, p = .61, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .01, suggesting that the effect 
of stress-induction on IS did not vary as a function of group (Figure 9).  
4.2.3.2. Self-reported alexithymia 
To assess for differences in self-reported levels of alexithymia, a between-
subjects ANCOVA was conducted on the Impoverished Emotional Experience 
subscale of the EPS-25. Patients reported significantly greater impairments (M = 3.99, 
SD = 2.13) than healthy controls (M = 1.74, SD = 1.30); F(1, 51) = 20.00, p = <.001, 
𝜂𝑝
² = .28, 95% CI [-3.38, -1.49].  Patients’ mean reported Impoverished Emotional 
Experience scale score exceeded the 75th percentile for UK healthy norms (3.8) and 
the 25th percentile for UK Mental Health norms (2.6) suggesting a pathological lack 
of insight into emotional experience.  
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Table 13- Interoceptive Sensitivity Scores for healthy controls and patients, pre- and post- stress-induction with the Cold Pressor Test. 
 Pre – Cold Pressor Test trials Post- Cold Pressor Test trials 
 25 seconds 35 seconds  45 seconds  All 25 seconds  35 seconds  45 seconds All 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Healthy control .76 .16 .66 .26 .73 .16 .71 .17 .76 .16 .76 .20 .76 .18 .76 .17 
Patient .65 .22 .70 .22 .65 .23 .67 .21 .69 .24 .69 .24 .65 .26 .67 .22 
Total .69 .19 .67 .24 .69 .21 .68 .19 .72 .21 .72 .22 .69 .24 .71 .21 
Note.  M = Unadjusted mean, SD = Standard Deviation, 25 seconds = 25 second trial, 35 seconds = 35 seconds trial, 45 = 45 second trial, All = mean of 25, 
35, and 45 second trials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Healthy Control and Patient Interoceptive Sensitivity scores pre- (Pre-CPT) and post- stress-induction (Post-CPT) with the Cold 
Pressor Test. Higher scores indicate greater accuracy on the Heart Beat Detection Task. Error bars are Standard Error of the Mean. 
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4.2.3.3. Manipulation checks 
To ensure that the stress-induction was administered equally between groups, 
between-subjects t tests were conducted on water temperature and length of hand 
immersion during the CPT. Water temperature did not differ significantly between the 
healthy control group (M = .35 °C, SD = 1.72) and the patient group (M = .16, SD = 
1.51); t(49) = .41, p = .68.  Similarly, the mean time (secs) that participants kept their 
hand immersed during the CPT (Table 14) also did not differ significantly between 
healthy control and the patient group; t(51) = -.17, p = .91. Therefore, any observed 
group-differences cannot be explained by differences in the intensity of cold exposure 
or its duration.  
Table 14 - Cold Pressor Test hand immersion times (seconds) over the three trials. 
 Cold Pressor Test Immersion Time (seconds) 
 1st trial 2nd trial 3rd trial Total 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Healthy control 37.2 45.3 30.5 52.1 29.2 48.6 32.3 47.3 
Patient 32.9 31.2 32.3 64.6 36.0 67.9 33.9 51.8 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, Total = Mean of all three trials.  
It is also possible that lower IS in patients may be explained by difficulties 
sustaining attention. If this were the case, one would predict IS to decrease as trial 
length increased and that this effect would be larger in patients than controls. To that 
end, a mixed ANCOVA with Trial Length (25, 35, and 45 seconds) and Stress-
Induction (Pre- versus Post-CPT) as the within-subjects variables, Group (Healthy 
Control versus Patient) as the between-subjects variable, and age as a covariate was 
conducted on IS scores. As expected, there was a significant main effect of Stress-
Induction, meaning that IS increased following stress-induction (Table 13); F(1,48) = 
5.59, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
² . = .10.  However, there was no significant main effect of Trial Length; 
F(2,96) = .11,  p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
² = .05 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied) meaning that 
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IS did not systematically decrease as trial length increased. Moreover, the Trial Length 
* Group interaction was non-significant; F(2,96) = 2.59, p = .09, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .05 
(Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied). Therefore, patients’ lower IS cannot be 
explained by a relative deficit in sustaining attention over longer time periods.   
4.2.3.4. Exploratory correlational analyses 
To explore for potential relationships between interoceptive sensitivity and an 
impoverished emotional experience / psychopathology, a series of bootstrapped 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted on IS scores pre- and post-stress induction, and 
all self-report measures (Table 15). There were no significant correlations between IS 
and any of these measures 
Table 15- Correlations between Interoceptive Sensitivity and self-report measures of 
psychopathology in Patients, Healthy Controls, and across both groups. 
 Bootstrapped Pearson correlation coefficients 
 Healthy control Patients All 
 Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Impoverished -.19  -.18  .26  .15  -.02 -.11 
PHQ-9 -.13 -.21 .21 -.01 .03 -.18 
GAD-7 .01 .00 .28 .18 .09 -.03 
PHQ-15 .06 -.19 .06 -.04 -.01 -.20 
PCL-5 -.23 -.14 -.05 -.08 -.12 -.19 
Note.  Pre- = Pre-stress induction, Post- = Post-stress induction. Impoverished = Impoverished 
Emotional Experience subscale of the Emotional Processing Scale-25, PHQ-9 = Patient Health 
Questionnaire- 9, GAD-7 = Generalised Anxiety Disorder – 7, PHQ-15 = Patient Health 
Questionnaire- 15, PCL-5 = PTSD Checklist – 5. 
 
4.2.4. Discussion 
In support of our hypothesis, we found reduced interoceptive sensitivity in 
patients with FND relative to healthy controls. We also found that interoceptive 
sensitivity improved following the Cold Pressor Test in both groups, suggesting that 
patients’ interoceptive sensitivity is not differentially sensitive to stress. Patients did 
self-report higher scores on the impoverished emotional experience subscale of the 
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EPS-25 than controls. Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis that 
patients with FND exhibit impairments in the identification stage of the EPM (lower 
IS and higher levels alexithymia), but suggest that this deficit does not interact with 
the kind of stress induced by the Cold Pressor Test.  
Our finding of reduced IS in patients with FND is consistent with one other 
study examining interoception in FND. Ricciardi et al. (2016) also observed lower IS 
during the Heart Beat Detection Task in a group of 17 patients with FMD relative to 
healthy controls. However, the same lab did not find significant group differences in 
IS between 20 patients with NEAD, 20 with FMD, and 20 age-matched healthy 
controls (Demartini, Goeta, et al., 2016). The reason for this discrepancy is unclear, 
but might be attributed to heterogeneity in FND samples – which is illustrated by the 
relatively greater spread of IS scores in patients relative to controls (Figure 9). 
Nevertheless, impaired interoception has also been observed in other disorders 
associated with emotion dysregulation, such as Major Depressive Disorder (Furman, 
Waugh, Bhattacharjee, Thompson, & Gotlib, 2013) and chronic pain (Di Lernia et al., 
2016). Conversely, increased interoceptive sensitivity has been associated with an 
increased tendency to relate bodily responses to emotional experience in healthy 
controls (Dunn et al., 2010). Overall, these findings support the suggestion that 
reduced interoceptive sensitivity may be a marker of, or confer vulnerability to, 
emotion dysregulation in FND.  
 Indeed, greater impairments in IS have been associated with more severe 
symptoms of psychopathology. In a sample of patients with Panic Disorder, ‘frequent 
panicers’ were shown to have lower interoceptive awareness than patients who 
panicked less frequently (Zoellner & Craske, 1999). Similarly, IS negatively 
correlated with more severe depressive symptomology in patients with Major 
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Depressive Disorder (Avery et al., 2014) as well as more severe somatic symptoms in 
patients with Major Depressive Disorder (Avery et al., 2014)  and somatoform 
disorders (Schaefer, Egloff, & Witthoft, 2012). During the exploratory correlational 
analyses, we did not find any association between IS and the self-report measures of 
psychopathology used in this study (Anxiety, GAD-7;  Depression PHQ-9; 
Somatisation Disorder, PHQ-15; Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, PCL-5) or 
alexithymia (impoverished emotional experience) in patients or controls. This finding 
suggests that impaired IS in patients with FND may not be related to these forms of 
comorbid psychopathology. Likewise, other studies have also found no correlation 
between interoceptive awareness and self-report measures of psychopathology in 
healthy participants (Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Ricciardi et al., 2016). Ricciardi 
et al. (2016), did find a significant negative correlation between IS and depression as 
measured by the Montgomery Asberg Depression Rating Scale when FND patient data 
were pooled with healthy control participants’ data, but we found no associations 
between IS and depression or the other measures of psychopathology with FND and 
matched control data combined – this may be due to the fact that we used different 
self-report measures of depressive symptomology. The lack of significant correlation 
between our self-report measure of alexithymia and IS score may be because the 
impoverished emotional experience subscale and interoceptive sensitivity paradigm 
measure different components of an identification impairment (for example, 
cognitions about emotions versus sensitivity to bodily feelings respectively). 
However, owing to the fact that the EPS-25 is a relatively new scale which has not 
previously been correlated with IS scores (unlike the TAS-20 which has been more 
extensively used in interoception paradigms), it is difficult to be confident about why 
these measures were not significantly associated. Unfortunately, the sample size in our 
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study was too small for sub-group analyses, but one potential avenue for future 
research might be to categorise patients with FND into ‘good’ and ‘poor’ IS categories 
and test for group differences in psychopathology or the type of emotion regulation 
strategies patients tend to habitually select.  
 Turning to the self-report findings on alexithymia, patients reported a 
significantly more impoverished emotional experience relative to controls. This 
subscale of the EPS-25 measures a “detached experience of one’s emotions due to lack 
of insight”, which is analogous to a difficulty in labelling and identifying emotions as 
measured by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby et al., 1994). Alexithymia has 
long been regarded a risk factor for the development of functional symptoms, and 
raised levels of alexithymia in patients is one of the more robust findings in the 
emotion regulation literature on FND. We have previously shown elevated scores on 
the impoverished emotional experience subscale of the EPS-25 in a group of patients 
with NEAD relative to healthy controls (Novakova et al., 2015). The present data 
extend this finding to include a group of patients with other forms of FND. Numerous 
studies have found raised levels of alexithymia in patients with NEAD relative to 
healthy controls (see section 2.4.1).  Higher levels of alexithymia have also been 
reported in patients with Conversion Disorder (Gulpek, Kelemence Kaplan, Kesebir, 
& Bora, 2014) and a quantitative review found patients suffering from somatoform 
conditions were significantly more alexithymic, with medium to large effect sizes (De 
Gucht & Heiser, 2003). Alexithymia has also been implicated in the development of 
FMD, through a phenomenon called emotional overmodulation. According to this 
theory, patients have difficulty differentiating emotions from physical sensations and 
so misattribute their symptoms of anxiety (e.g., tremor) to physical illness’ (Demartini, 
Petrochilos, et al., 2014).  Our findings raise the possibility that emotional 
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overmodulation may also apply to patients with NEAD as well, although replication 
of this study in a sample comprised purely of patients with NEAD would be needed 
to confirm this. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not observe an interaction between stress-
induction and IS.  The emotional overmodulation model suggests that alexithymic 
traits become particularly problematic for patients with FND during conditions of high 
emotional arousal. While patients’ IS scores remained lower than healthy controls’ 
throughout the study, they were not further decreased by stress induction. As we did 
not include a self-report measure of stress, it is possible that participants did not find 
the CPT stressful. It is also possible, that the type of stress induced by the CPT is not 
particularly pertinent to the genesis of FND. Other forms of stress, such as 
psychosocial stress, might be more salient for patients. Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009) 
combined the Trier Social Stress Test with an emotional Stroop paradigm in a group 
of patients with NEAD, and found a positive attentional bias towards masked angry 
faces relative to healthy controls at baseline, but not following stress induction. 
Another option might be to use a more cognitive stressor, such as a mental arithmetic 
task which has been shown to reduce interoceptive accuracy in healthy females 
(Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007). A natural next step would therefore be to repeat the 
present study with a different form of stress induction to the physiological stressor 
employed here. However, it is also possible that stress is not problematic for patients 
with FND because it disrupts interoception, but that it is the combination of low 
interoceptive sensitivity as a trait and the presence of a stressor that results in emotion 
dysregulation.  
Other possibilities for future work on interoception in FND could be to take 
advantage of the different interoceptive paradigms and measures that have been 
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developed since the Heart Beat Detection Task (Schandry, 1981). For example, the 
Heartbeat Discrimination Task (Störmer, Heiligtag, & Knoll, 1989), in which 
participants have to decide whether or not their heart beat is synchronised with an 
auditory or visual stimulus, requires the integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive 
information (whereas Heart Beat Detection Task performance relies only on 
interoceptive processing). Performance on the Heartbeat Discrimination Task has 
previously been shown to be adversely effected by the Cold Pressor Test, whereas 
Heart Beat Detection Task performance is enhanced (Schulz, Lass-Hennemann, 
Sütterlin, Schächinger, & Vögele, 2013). Given the theorised pre-existing imbalance 
between exteroceptive and interoceptive affective processing in patients with NEAD 
(see Chapter Two), and relationship between stress and FND, one might predict 
patients with FND to be further impaired on Heartbeat Discrimination Task 
performance following stress-induction than healthy controls.  
The late Heartbeat Evoked Potential (HEP) might also provide further insight 
into interoceptive deficits in FND. The late HEP is an EEG component that occurs 
400-600 msecs after the ECG R wave, and has been interpreted as a Central Nervous 
System representation of sensory information processing related to cardiac 
interoceptive sensitivity (Pollatos & Schandry, 2004). The late HEP has been more 
recently related to aspects of interoception including ‘worrying about body sensations’ 
(Baranauskas, Grabauskaitė, & Griškova-Bulanova, 2017). As proposed by Bayesian 
accounts of FND  (Edwards et al., 2012; Van den Bergh et al., 2017), ‘worrying about 
body sensations’ could conceivably result from a combination of pathological prior 
beliefs about the causes of sensation and vague imprecise sensory interoceptive 
sensory data.  The additional advantage of using the late HEP to study interoception 
in FND would be that this approach would circumnavigate the need for verbal 
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responses and the associated risk of bias introduced by these.  
Finally, an alternative approach could be to investigate the different 
dimensions of interoception proposed by Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, and 
Critchley (2015), in patients with FND. These include interoceptive accuracy, 
interoceptive sensibility (defined as an individual’s “self-perceived tendency to be 
internally self-focused and interoceptively cognisant”), and interoceptive awareness 
(metacognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy). Bayesian accounts of FND 
(Edwards et al., 2012; Van den Bergh et al., 2017) would predict low interoceptive 
accuracy, high interoceptive sensitivity, and therefore low interoceptive awareness as 
being mechanistic in the generation of functional symptoms.  
4.2.4.1. Limitations 
While we have demonstrated that patients’ IS is not differentially sensitive to 
the kind of stress induced by the CPT, the cross-sectional design of our study means 
that we cannot know whether the lower IS observed in patients with FND is a cause 
or consequence of the disorder. Also, we cannot say whether reduced IS causes 
alexithymia or vice versa, or both are produced by a third factor– we can only say that 
the two impairments co-exist in this sample.  
In addition, while we did well to recruit a respectable sample size of patients 
with FND in a group with recognised barriers to recruitment (n = 26), the sample size 
was too small to conduct sub-group analyses. Given that our findings in Chapter 3 
show that there are subgroups of patients with FND according to whether or not they 
experience impairments of consciousness, it is possible that subgroups of patients with 
higher or lower IS are obscured by the analysis – indeed, patients with FND do seem 
to have a slightly larger variance in IS scores than healthy controls.  
A further  arguable  limitation is that we did not measure Body Mass Index in 
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participants – there is some evidence to suggest that IS is attenuated in overweight and 
obese individuals (Herbert & Pollatos, 2014). However, reduced IS has also been 
reported in patients with Anorexia Nervosa who are underweight (Mean BMI = 16.59) 
(Pollatos et al., 2008), suggesting that IS does not necessarily decrease as body weight 
increases. Therefore, a failure to measure Body Mass Index in this study may not be a 
critical confound. 
4.2.5. Conclusion 
Interoceptive Sensitivity was lower and self-reported levels of alexithymia 
were higher in a group of patients with FND relative to healthy controls. Interoceptive 
Sensitivity improved in both groups following stress induction with the Cold Pressor 
Test. Taken together, these findings suggest that patients with FND experience deficits 
in the identification of their own emotional states, which may be associated with a 
deficit in detecting physiological changes related to emotional states and / or lacking 
insight into emotions.  
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4.3. The selection and implementation stages: Expressive 
suppression in patients with Functional Neurological 
Disorder (Study 3) 
4.3.1. Introduction 
 During the ‘selection stage’ of the EPM, a conscious or unconscious choice is 
made about which general regulatory strategy category should be used in response to 
the identified emotion. The purpose of the implementation stage is to enact a specific 
strategy from this general category (Gross, 2015). Two of the most studied and well-
defined regulatory strategies in emotion regulation research are expressive 
suppression and cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive reappraisal refers to changing the 
way an emotion-eliciting situation is construed in order to lessen the emotional impact, 
and is considered to belong to the ‘cognitive change’ category (Table 1). With respect 
to the EPM (Gross, 2015), cognitive reappraisal occurs relatively early in the emotion-
generative process, and is therefore considered an ‘antecedent-focused’ strategy 
(Gross, 1998). Conversely, expressive suppression, can be defined as the inhibition of 
ongoing emotional-expressive behaviour in response to an emotion-eliciting situation, 
with no attempt to change the way the situation is construed (Gross, 1998). As such, 
expressive suppression belongs to the 'response modulation’ category (Table 1). This 
strategy tends to be employed later in the emotion-generative process and is therefore 
also categorised as a ‘response-focused strategy’ (Gross, 1998). The stage at which 
these emotion regulation strategies are employed is not the only difference between 
them; expressive suppression is (with some exceptions) considered a less healthy 
emotion regulation strategy than cognitive reappraisal (John & Gross, 2004). It has 
been argued that patients with NEAD have a tendency habitually to select emotion 
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regulatory strategies which would be considered as maladaptive in many 
circumstances and which could be related to the high levels of emotion dysregulation 
found in many of these patients (see section 2.5). The aim of this chapter is therefore 
to investigate whether patients with FND are more likely than healthy controls to select 
and implement a maladaptive emotion regulatory strategy - expressive suppression.  
The automatic or deliberate inhibition of negative emotions has long been held 
to have negative consequences for health. Folk-wisdom advising against ‘bottling up 
your emotions’ has been corroborated by over 70 years of research. With respect to 
physical health, expressive suppression has been linked to a number of illnesses 
including asthma and hypertension (Gross, 1998). Expressive suppression has been 
repeatedly shown to increase sympathetic activation (e.g., heart rate) (Dan-Glauser & 
Gross, 2015; Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Krantz & Manuck, 1984) which 
can cumulatively have adverse effects on health over time, and is one of the assumed 
mechanisms by which habitually suppressing emotions can lead to ‘physical’ ill 
health. The extent to which an individual selects or implements expressive suppression 
and cognitive reappraisal can be measured with the self-report scale, The Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003).  
To date, the ERQ has been used in several experimental studies to demonstrate 
how the habitual implementation of expressive suppression can also result in more 
disadvantageous psychological, social, and cognitive outcomes for an individual than 
cognitive reappraisal. In the development of the ERQ,  Gross and John (2003) found 
that there were systematic individual differences between people who were habitual 
‘suppressors’ or ‘re-appraisers’.  In line with the view that habitual suppression has 
deleterious effects on mental health, more frequent ‘suppressors’ were shown to 
experience less positive emotion,  have less clarity about their feelings in general, and 
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possess less favourable views about their emotions. Regarding social outcomes, more 
frequent suppressors were shown to report having more closed and less emotionally 
intimate relationships than people who suppressed less. Intuitively, expression 
suppression could therefore also impact negatively on wellbeing by limiting an 
individual’s access to social support through increasing isolation and weakening 
relationships (Butler et al., 2003). With respect to cognition, Richards and Gross 
(2000)  had previously demonstrated that the recruitment of expression suppression 
lead to impaired recall of information presented in films and slides, and that expressive 
suppression was associated with poorer objective and self-reported memory – 
probably owing to the distracting effect of consciously inhibiting emotional expression 
interfering with encoding. In spite of the potentially high biological, psychological, 
cognitive, and social cost of habitually suppressing ones emotions, expressive 
suppression has been shown to have no effect on the subjective experience of negative 
emotions (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Roberts, Levenson, & Gross, 2008), while 
simultaneously decreasing the experience of positive emotions (e.g.,  Brans, Koval, 
Verduyn, Lim, & Kuppens, 2013). In light of this information, expressive suppression 
can therefore be considered a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy to habitually 
select and implement.  
The tendency to habitually select and implement expressive suppression might 
be one form of emotion dysregulation relevant to patients with FND, constituting a 
potential pre-disposing, precipitating, or perpetuating factor within a multifactorial 
biopsychosocial account (Reuber, 2009). Anecdotally, patients and psychotherapists 
report a tendency for individuals with FND to have difficulty showing their emotions 
to others. This observation seems to be reflected in studies which have examined 
expressive suppression in patients with FND.  Gul and Ahmad (2014) demonstrated 
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that compared to healthy controls, patients with NEAD self-reported an increased 
tendency to regulate their emotions with expressive suppression relative to healthy 
controls. Urbanek et al. (2014) administered the Courtauld Emotional Control Scale 
(which measures emotional control and expression) to patients with NEAD and 
healthy controls. Patients reported a significantly greater tendency to control their 
emotional expression in response to feelings of sadness and anxiety. Similarly, 
Roberts et al. (2012) showed that fewer patients with NEAD expressed positive 
emotional behaviour to pleasant, but not unpleasant pictures than healthy controls. 
These initial findings corroborate the suggestion that patients with FND are inclined 
to suppress their emotional expression, even though this regulatory strategy is 
associated with unchanged negative affect (Gross & Levenson, 1993), reduced 
positive affect (Brans et al., 2013), and increased autonomic arousal (Dan-Glauser & 
Gross, 2015).   
While the studies described above do support the idea that patients with FND 
could be habitual suppressors, no researchers have yet adopted the powerful 
experimental design of manipulating expressive suppression as an independent 
variable in this patient group. Inspired by paradigms adopted by researchers in the 
emotion regulation field (e.g., Dan-Glauser & Gross, 2015), the primary aim of the 
present study was to test the hypothesis that patients with FND have an increased 
tendency to select and implement expressive suppression in response to negative 
emotions as compared to healthy controls.  Participants were instructed to respond as 
they ‘normally would’ to negatively valenced affective stimuli, or deliberately 
suppress their responses (expressive behaviour). If patients are ‘habitual suppressors’, 
one might expect reduced expressive behaviour at baseline compared to healthy 
controls (reflecting a natural tendency to suppress), and even less expressive behaviour 
 
 
131 
 
when instructed to suppress relative to healthy controls (because habitual suppressors 
would be well-practiced in inhibiting their facial expression, they would implement 
this strategy more effectively). A secondary aim was to explore for task-related 
changes and group differences in emotional experience. Our third aim was to assess 
whether patients self-report a habitual tendency to select expressive suppression as an 
emotion regulation strategy relative to healthy controls, and to explore for associations 
between the endorsement of these strategies and self-reported emotion dysregulation 
(as measured by the EPS-25). Specifically, we hypothesised that: 
1. Expressive behaviour - Based on anecdotal reports and experimental findings  
(Gul & Ahmad, 2014; Roberts et al., 2012; Urbanek et al., 2014), patients with 
FND would express less emotion (facial expression as measured by 
electromyography) than healthy controls in response to negative affective 
stimuli, both spontaneously and when instructed to implement expressive 
suppression. 
2. Emotional experience - Owing to the association between expressive 
suppression and unchanged negative affect but decreased positive affect 
(Brans et al., 2013; Gross & Levenson, 1993) patients will exhibit similar 
levels of negative affect in response to negative affective stimuli but decreased 
positive affect relative to healthy controls.  
3. Habitual expressive suppression - Patients with FND will self-report an 
increased tendency to habitually select expressive suppression and a 
decreased tendency to habitually select cognitive reappraisal relative to 
healthy controls as measured using the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003).  
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4.3.2. Methods 
4.3.2.1. Participants  
Twenty six patients with FND and 28 healthy controls participated in the study. 
See section 4.1.2. for demographic and clinical details. 
4.3.2.2. Materials / apparatus 
4.3.2.2.1. Task presentation. The task was presented on a computer monitor. 
EPrime 2.0 software presented all stimuli, instructions and recorded participants’ 
responses to measures of emotional experience. The ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) was 
completed with pen and paper at the end of the experiment.  
4.3.2.2.2. Stimuli. We chose to elicit negative emotion, and selected disgust 
because it is considered a relatively ‘universal’ and well-studied emotion (e.g., 
Chapman & Anderson, 2012). Twelve ‘disgusting’ pictures were identified from a 
database of images used and validated during a master’s degree project (Walsh, 2012). 
The images were rated on a scale of 1-100 (least – most) for four valences: 
pleasantness, unpleasantness, disgusting, and agreeableness. Given the elevated levels 
of self-reported trauma and anxiety we expected to find in the patient group, images 
which depicted injury or images which were rated as extremely disgusting (i.e. a 
disgust rating of >90) were not selected for inclusion.  The mean disgust ratings for 
the passive (M = 75.43, SD = 4.23) and suppress (M = 75.78, SD = 5.07) conditions 
were matched; t(10) = -1.3, p = .90, 95% CI [-5.03, 5.78]. See Appendix 8 for further 
details.  
4.3.2.2.3. EMG recording. EMG recordings were taken with reusable 4-mm 
standard silver / silver-chloride electrodes filled with conductive gel (Larsen, Norris, 
& Cacioppo, 2003). EMG signals were relayed through shielded cable to an MP36R 
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Biopac amplifier (Biopac Systems, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA), amplified x5000, and 
sampled at 2000Hz. Electrodes were positioned according to recommendations set out 
by Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986), and skin was prepared with sterile saline wipes.  
4.3.2.3. Measures 
4.3.2.3.1. Expressive behaviour (facial). Facial EMG was recorded over the 
corrugator supercilii (brow) on the right side of the face (Figure 10). We chose this 
site as negative affective states can reliably be distinguished based on the activity of 
this muscle – activity is facilitated during negative affective states and simultaneously 
inhibited during positive affective states (Larsen et al., 2003).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2.3.2. Emotional Experience.  Measures of explicit and implicit affect 
were taken. 
Explicit affect.  Explicit affect was measured using a Likert scale adapted from 
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale, which is a self-report measure designed to 
capture to what extent the participant feels each of 20 emotions in the moment 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). For brevity, participants were only asked to 
Figure 10.  Image of electrode placement for facial EMG recording of 
corrugator supercilii face muscle activity. 
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indicate how ‘positive’ and how ‘negative’ they were feeling ‘right now’ by pressing 
a key on scale from 1-5 (1 = very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely).  
Implicit affect.  Owing to the possibility that alexithymic traits might prevent 
patient participants from reporting accurately on their emotional state, we included the 
Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT) (Quirin, Kazen, & Kuhl, 2009).  
The IPANAT indirectly measures affect by asking participants to rate how much an 
artificial word reflects a mood word. Six artificial words (SAFME, VIKES, TUNBA, 
TALEP, BELNI, SUKOV) are presented along with each of three positive (happy, 
cheerful, energetic) and three negative (helpless, tense, inhibited) mood words (e.g., 
BELNI-Happy, BELNI-Helpless or VIKES-Tense). The IPANAT has been shown to 
have good internal consistency (α = .81) for implicit positive and negative affect. Test-
retest reliability over a week was also good for positive affect (α = .72) and negative 
affect (α = .76) (Quirin, Kazen, & Kuhl, 2009). To our knowledge, the IPANAT has 
never been administered to patients with FND. 
4.3.2.3.3. Habitual use of expressive suppression. The Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ) is designed to measure how individuals regulate their emotions 
in daily life, using either cognitive reappraisal or expressive suppression (Gross & 
John, 2003) (Appendix 7). It consists of 10 items which the participant responds to on 
a 1-7 Likert scale indicating whether or not they use each strategy. The ERQ subscales 
have good internal consistency; α = .73 for reappraisal and α = .69 for suppression.  
The ERQ has previously been administered to patients with NEAD (Gul & Ahmad, 
2014). 
4.3.2.3.4. The Emotional Processing Scale - 25.  See section 3.2.3.2. 
4.3.2.4. Design  
This was a mixed design study with ‘emotion regulation’ (passive or regulate) 
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as the within-subjects factor, and ‘group’ (healthy control or patient) as the between-
subjects factor. The dependent variables were expressive behaviour (normalised facial 
EMG of the corrugator supercilii), emotional experience (explicit affect ratings and 
IPANAT scores), and self-reported use of expressive suppression / cognitive 
reappraisal (ERQ). Responses on the EPS-25 were also included in an exploratory 
correlational analyses. 
4.3.2.5. Expressive suppression paradigm  
The present study was a picture-viewing paradigm with an emotion regulation 
manipulation. It was adapted from a previous study which investigated emotional 
experiences and expression when healthy participants were instructed to passively 
attend, and accept or suppress their emotional responses when viewing pictures (Dan-
Glauser & Gross, 2015). However, due to time constraints the present experiment 
included ‘passively attend’ and ‘suppress’ conditions only. 
4.3.2.6. Procedure 
 Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor. Facial EMG electrodes 
were then applied (ECG electrodes had already been applied during for the HRV study 
(section 4.4)), and participants were instructed to follow the on-screen instructions. 
Participants completed one practice block to familiarise themselves with the 
procedure. The following instructions, taken and adapted from Dan-Glauser and Gross 
(2015), were then presented for each condition: 
Passive: 
“We would like you to simply view the pictures and let any emotions you feel 
come and go naturally, as you did during the practice training. We want you 
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to respond as you would if you encountered this picture during your daily 
life. Do whatever you would normally do.” 
Suppress: 
“In this part of the study, when you see the aversive pictures your task is to 
try your best to strongly decrease any bodily and facial reactions you might 
have in response to the images. Even if you feel emotion, try to act as if there 
is no emotion present, so that no-one watching your responses or your face 
would know what you are feeling.” 
Each block consisted of six trials (Figure 11). During each trial, the participant 
viewed a fixation cross (presented for one second) which preceded a disgusting image 
(presented for three seconds).  The participant then performed one IPANAT trial (i.e. 
one fictional word presented with six mood words sequentially in a pseudorandom 
order). The fixation cross – picture – IPANAT trial procedure was repeated six times 
in each block, with different pictures and fictional words each trial (order 
pseudorandomised). At the end the blocks, participants were asked to explicitly 
indicate how positive or negative they were feeling (Figure 11). At the end of the 
study, participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 
2003).  
4.3.2.7. Data analysis / reduction 
4.3.2.7.1. Expressive behaviour. The EMG signal recorded was checked for 
artefacts (e.g., due to movement) and noise. To that end, the EMG signal was subjected 
to a FIR bandpass filters offline (low frequency fixed at 20Hz, high frequency fixed 
at 400Hz, no of coefficients = 400) (Biopac Systems, 2014; van Boxtel, 2001) to 
remove noise and recording-associated artefacts. The resulting signal was saved as a 
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.txt file and exported to MATLAB for pre-processing. A specifically coded MATLAB 
script rectified and normalised the signal (divided trial activity by mean activity in the 
final 500 msecs of the fixation period) to correct for any non-task-related potentials. 
The same script also averaged the data and split it into three different post-stimulus 
one-second epochs to allow for statistical analysis of changes in muscle activity over 
time. 
4.3.2.7.2. Emotional experience. 
Implicit affect.  Scores for single mood words were calculated with the average 
of all six artificial word judgments that refer to the respective mood word (e.g., average 
ratings of ‘helpless’ presented alongside ratings of SAFME, VIKES, TUNBA, 
TALEP, BELNI, & SUKOV). Then, scale scores for positive and negative affect were 
calculated by averaging mood word scores taken from positively valenced mood 
words and negatively valenced mood words, respectively.  
Explicit affect.  Mean positive and negative affect scores were calculated from 
participant’s responses to the explicit affect questions.  
4.3.2.8. Statistical analysis 
For all analyses, alpha was set at p =.05, unless otherwise stated. Post-hoc 
Bonferroni corrections were used to correct for the inflated risk of type I error 
associated with multiple comparisons. Parametric analyses are bootstrapped as 
appropriate. 
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4.3.2.8.1. Expressive behaviour.  EMG values were found to be non-normally 
distributed (Shapiro-Wilk p = <.05).  One univariate outlier was identified (3 z scores 
> 3) but was retained in the analysis to preserve statistical power.  The assumption of 
equality of variances for the first and second epochs in both conditions was violated 
(Levenes’s p <.05). The assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices was also 
Figure 11. Expressive suppression paradigm trial structure. Blocks began with the 
instruction to either passively attend to the pictures or suppress emotional responses (order 
counterbalanced between participants). One trial consisted of one picture and six IPANAT 
judgements. There were six trials per block. At the end of each block, participants gave 
an explicit positive and negative affect rating. 
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violated (Box’s M p <.05). There was a linear relationship between the covariate and 
all levels of the dependent variable as assessed by scatterplots.  The assumption of 
sphericity was not violated (Mauchley’s test p >.05). No non-parametric test would 
allow for as fine-grained analysis controlling for age difference as an ANCOVA, and 
ANOVA models are considered robust to violations of normality with equal group 
sizes (Tabachnick, 2001). We therefore continued to analyse the data with the planned 
mixed ANCOVA with group as the between-subjects factor, two within-subjects 
factors (condition and post-stimulus epoch), age as the covariate, and normalised 
facial EMG activity as the dependent variable.  
4.3.2.8.2. Emotional experience.  
Implicit.  IPANAT scores for each condition were normally distributed apart 
from patients’ responses to positive words (Shapiro-Wilk p <.05), which were 
positively skewed (as assessed by inspection of histogram). These values were not 
transformed as this may have represented a ‘floor effect’ and the remaining values 
were normally distributed. No outliers were identified in boxplots. There was an 
approximately linear relationship between the covariate and each level of the 
dependent variable as assessed by scatterplots. The assumption of equal covariance 
matrices was met for both valences of affect (Box’s M p >.05). The assumption of 
equal error variances was also met for both valences of affect (Levene’s p > .05). The 
data were therefore analysed with two mixed ANCOVAs; one for positive and one for 
negative affect with group as the between-subjects factor, condition as the within-
subjects factor, and age as the covariate. 
Explicit affect. Positive and negative explicit affect scores were non-normally 
distributed in both conditions (Shapiro-Wilk p <.05). There was a linear relationship 
between covariates and levels of the dependent variables as assessed by visual 
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inspection of scatterplots. There were no outliers, as assessed by boxplots.  The 
assumption of equal covariance matrices was met for both valences of affect (Box’s 
M p >.05). The assumption of equal error variances was also met for both valences of 
affect (Levene’s p > .05). The data were therefore analysed with a mixed ANCOVA 
with group as the between-subjects factor, condition as the within-subjects factor, and 
age as the covariate. 
4.3.2.8.3. Habitual use of expressive suppression. Expressive suppression 
and cognitive reappraisal subscale scores were normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk p 
>.05). There was equality of error variances (Levene’s p >.05) and equality of 
covariance matrices (Box’s M p >.05). The relationships between dependent variables 
and covariates were approximately linear as assessed by scatterplots. There was 
homogeneity of regression slopes as assessed by the interaction term (p >.05). There 
were no multivariate outliers as assessed by Mahalanobis distances (cut-off = 13.82). 
Therefore responses on the ERQ were analysed with a between-subjects MANCOVA 
with cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression subscale scores as the 
dependent variables, group as the independent variables, and age as the covariate.  
4.3.3. Results 
4.3.3.1. Manipulation check  
To check that participants adhered to the task instruction and suppressed their 
facial expression when asked to do so, normalised EMG activity in the passive and 
regulate conditions (averaged all three epochs) was compared with a within-subjects 
bootstrapped t-test. Mean normalised EMG activity was significantly lower in the 
suppress condition (M = .92, SD = .05) than the passive condition (M = 1.06, SD = 
.15); t (51) = 3.38, p = .04, cohen’s d = .28, 95% CI [.03, .10]. These results suggest 
that participants adhered to the instructions.  
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4.3.3.2. Expressive behaviour  
To test for group differences in facial emotional expression across the three 
one-second post-stimulus epochs, a mixed ANCOVA with group (patient or control) 
as the between-subjects factor, instruction (passive or regulate) and post-stimulus 
epoch (1st second, 2nd second, and 3rd second) as the within subjects factors, and age 
as the covariate was conducted on normalised facial EMG activity. There was no 
significant main effect of instruction; F(1,49) = .00, p = .96, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .00, or epoch; F(2,98) 
= .91, p = .41, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .02. There was also no significant between-groups difference; 
F(1,49) = .06, p = .80, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .01. However, there was a significant three-way interaction 
between epoch, instruction, and group; F(2,98) = 3.99, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .08.   
To explore this interaction further, a series of post-hoc bootstrapped within-
subjects ANCOVAs were conducted to compare normalised facial EMG activity in 
the regulate and passive conditions during each epoch for each group in both 
conditions. Regarding the passive condition, group-differences on normalised facial 
EMG activity were non-significant in the first epoch; F(1,49) = 1.52, p = .22, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .03, 
95% CI [ -.03, 12], second epoch; F(1,49) = 1.67,  p = .20, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .03 95% CI [-.04, .27],  
and third epoch; F(1,49) = .01, p = .95, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .00, 95% CI[-.11, .09]. Regarding the 
suppress condition, between-group differences were non-significant for the first 
epoch; F(1,49) = .61, p = .44, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .01, 95% CI[-.01, .03]. However, between-group 
differences were significant for the second epoch; F(1,49) = 6.27, p = .016, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .11, 
95% CI [-.07, -.008], and the third epoch; F(1,49) = 3.52, p = .044, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .07, 95% CI 
[-.08, -.01]. These differences retained significance after controlling for multiple 
comparisons with the Benjamnini-Hochberg procedure (FDR = .1).  Inspection of 
descriptive statistics (Table 16) shows greater activity in the corrugator supercilii 
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muscle in patients than controls during the second and third post-stimulus presentation 
epoch in the suppress condition. Therefore, the three-way interaction between epoch, 
instruction and group, can be explained by patients suppressing their facial expression 
less than healthy controls during the second and third seconds following the disgust 
image in the suppress condition.  
4.3.3.3. Emotional experience 
To assess for differences in emotional experience between groups and across 
conditions, two mixed ANCOVAs were conducted on explicit negative and positive 
affect scores with group as the between-subjects factor (healthy control vs. patient) 
and condition (passive vs. suppress) as the within-subjects factor. The same process 
was repeated for the implicit measure. 
Regarding the explicit measure of negative affect, there was a significant main 
effect of instruction; F(1,49) = 5.08, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .09, whereby participants reported 
feeling more negative affect in the suppress condition. However, the was no significant 
main effect of group; F(1,49) = .53, p = .47, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .01, and the group*instruction 
interaction was also non-significant; F(1,49) = .89, p = .35, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .02.  With respect to 
Figure 12. Adjusted Mean normalised EMG activity over the corrugator 
supercilii during the Passive and Suppress conditions. Error bars represent 
Standard Error of the adjusted mean. * = p <. 05 
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the implicit measure of negative affect, there was no significant effect of condition; 
F(1,49) = 3.05, p = .08, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .06. There was also no significant effect of group; F(1,49) 
= 1.43, p = .24, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .03. The interaction effect was non-significant; F(1,49) = .11, p 
= .74, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .00. A Bonferroni post-hoc adjustment was applied to control for the 
increased risk of a Type 1 error associated with multiple comparisons, such that p < 
.008 would be considered statistically significant. Following this adjustment, negative 
affect (explicit or implicit) did not differ between groups and was not affected by the 
task. 
Regarding the explicit measure of positive affect, there was no significant main 
effect of instruction; F(1,49) = 1.11, p = .29, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .04, or group; F(1,49) = 2.37, p = 
.13, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .05. In addition, the interaction between group and instruction was also non-
significant; F(1,49) = 1.04, p = .31, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .02. With respect to the implicit measure of 
positive affect, there was also no significant effect of condition; F(1,49) = 3.13, p = 
.08, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .06, and the interaction effect was non-significant; F(1,29) = .52, p = .47, 𝜂𝑝
²  
= .01. There was however, a significant effect of group; F(1,29) = 10.18, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
²  
= .17.  A Bonferroni post-hoc adjustment was applied to control for the increased risk 
of a Type 1 error associated with multiple comparisons, such that p < .008 would be 
considered statistically significant. The difference in implicit positive affect retained 
significance. These responses suggest that patients felt less positive (implicitly) than 
healthy controls (Table 18), but there were no between- or within-subjects differences 
in explicit affect (Table 17). 
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Table 16 - Normalised facial EMG activity in the three stimulus presentation epochs across passive and suppress conditions in healthy controls 
(n = 26) and patients (n = 26). 
 Passive condition Suppress condition 
Epoch Group M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE 
1 Healthy control 1.06 .13 1.06 .02 1.00 .05 1.00 .01 
 Patient 1.03 .05 1.02 .02 .99 .02 .99 .01 
2 Healthy control 1.09 .30 1.11 .04 .96 .07 .96 .01 
 Patient 1.04 .06 1.03 .04 1.01 .04 1.01 .01 
3 Healthy control 1.05 .19 1.05 .03 .97 .07 .97 .02 
 Patient 1.06 .11 1.06 .03 1.02 .07 1.01 .02 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Madj = Adjusted Mean, SE = Standard Error of adjusted mean. 
 
Table 17 - Explicit positive and negative affect scores for healthy controls and patients in both passive and suppress conditions. 
  Passive condition Suppress condition 
  Negative Positive Negative Positive 
 n M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE 
Healthy control 27 2.14 1.29 2.12 .24 3.07 1.14 3.16 .19 2.15 1.13 2.02 .19 2.85 1.19 2.89 .21 
Patient 25 2.16 1.07 2.19 .25 2.72 .79 2.63 .19 2.24 1.01 2.37 .21 2.64 .91 2.60 .22 
Total 52 2.15 1.18 2.16 .17 2.90 .99 2.89 .13 2.19 1.07 2.19 .14 2.75 1.06 2.75 .15 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Madj = Adjusted Mean, SE = Standard Error of adjusted mean.  
 
Table 18 - Implicit Positive and Negative Affect test scores for healthy controls and patients in both passive and suppress conditions. 
  Passive condition Suppress condition 
  Negative Positive Negative Positive 
 n M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE 
Healthy control 27 1.84 .46 1.81 .08 2.14 .49 2.14 .11 1.87 .48 1.84 .09 2.13 .51 2.14 .12 
Patient 25 1.63 .39 1.66 .09 1.64 .61 1.63 .11 1.66 .42 1.69 .09 1.62 .65 1.59 .12 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Madj = Adjusted Mean, SE = Standard Error of adjusted mean.
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4.3.3.4. Habitual use of expressive suppression 
To assess for group differences in the self-reported habitual use of expressive 
suppression and cognitive re-appraisal, a between-subjects MANCOVA was 
conducted on ERQ expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal subscale scores, 
with group (healthy control or patient) as the between-subjects factor and age as the 
covariate. There was a significant main effect of group; F(2,48) = 8.35, p = .001, 
Wilks’s Λ = .74, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .26 . Follow up univariate ANCOVAS were performed. A 
Bonferroni adjustment was made such that statistical significance was accepted when 
p <.025.  Patients reported significantly greater use of expressive suppression than 
healthy controls; F(1,49) = 8.55, p = .005, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .15 (Table 19). Conversely, patients 
reported using cognitive reappraisal less than healthy controls; F(1,49) = 12.96, p = 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .21 (Table 19). 
Table 19 - Descriptive statistics for expressive suppression and cognitive 
reappraisal subscale scores of the ERQ in healthy controls and patients. 
 Expressive suppression Cognitive reappraisal 
 M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE 
Healthy control 12.5 5.1 12.6 16.7 32.9 5.7 33.0 1.4 
Patient 16.8 4.5 16.7 1.0 25.7 8.1 25.7 1.5 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, Madj = Adjusted Mean, SE = Standard Error of 
adjusted mean.  
 
4.3.3.5. Exploratory correlational analyses. 
To explore the relationship between the habitual use of cognitive reappraisal 
and expressive suppression as emotion regulation strategies and their relationship to 
other forms of emotion dysregulation in all participants, a series of bootstrapped 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted on expressive suppression, EPS-25 total and 
subscores. The same process was repeated for cognitive reappraisal. A Benjamini-
Hochberg correction was applied to control for False Discovery Rate (set at .1). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a moderate positive correlation was observed between 
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expressive suppression as measured by the ERQ and the suppression subscale of the 
EPS-25; r(50) = .43, p = .002, 95% CI [.18, .62]. A small-to-medium positive 
correlation was also observed between the Total EPS-25 score and expressive 
suppression as measured by the ERQ; r(50) = .31, p = .03, 95% CI [.08, .51]. There 
were significant small-to-medium correlations between the cognitive reappraisal 
subscale of the ERQ and the unprocessed subscale r(50) = -.29, p =.04 95% CI [-.49, 
-.06], unregulated subscale r(50) = -.32, p = .02 95% CI [-.51, -.07], and the avoidance 
subscale of the EPS-25 r(50) = -.31, p = .03 95% CI [-.09, -.49]. There were also 
significant moderate correlations between cognitive reappraisal as measured by the 
ERQ and the EPS-25 total score, r(50) = -.48, p = <.001 95% CI [-.62,-.29], the 
suppression subscale r(50) = -.46, p = .001, 95% CI [-.63, -.27]. Finally, there was a 
strong significant negative correlation between the cognitive reappraisal and the 
impoverished emotional experience subscale of the EPS-25; r(50) = -.54, p = <.001 
95% CI [-.71,-.38]. 
Table 20 – Exploratory Spearman’s rank correlational analyses between the ERQ 
subscales and EPS-25 total score and subscale scores in healthy controls and patients.  
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Expressive suppression .42* .23 .17 .25 .18 .31* 
Cognitive reappraisal -.46* -.29* -.32* -.31* -.54* -.47* 
Note. *p <.008. N = 52. 
4.3.4. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to employ a combination of self-report, 
physiological, and behavioural measures to experimentally test the hypothesis that 
patients with FND have an increased tendency to select and implement expressive 
suppression as an emotion regulation strategy relative to healthy controls. In line with 
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our hypothesis, patients self-reported a greater use of expressive suppression and 
decreased use of cognitive reappraisal in their daily lives than healthy controls on the 
ERQ; this suggests that patients with FND perceive themselves to be habitual 
suppressors. With regards to emotional experience, we predicted that there would be 
no between-groups differences in the experience of negative affect, but consistent with 
the habitual tendency to select and implement expressive suppression, patients would 
experience less positive affect than healthy controls. In line with our hypothesis, the 
implicit measure of affect suggested that patients experienced less positive emotion 
than healthy controls with no difference in negative emotion. Additionally, no task-
related or between-groups differences were observed in negative affect. In contrast to 
the above findings, patients’ self-reported relative tendency to select expressive 
suppression as a regulatory strategy was not reflected in the facial EMG responses 
elicited during the experiment. This was the case both when instructed to respond to 
negative affective stimuli as they ‘normally would’ (no difference significant 
difference between patients and controls), or when instructed to suppress their facial 
responses (increased facial muscle activity relative to healthy controls). Contrary to 
our hypothesis, these data suggest that patients express their emotions facially more 
than healthy controls in response to negative affective stimuli when instructed to 
suppress. Hence, these results give mixed support to the hypothesis that patients with 
FND are ‘habitual suppressors’ of their emotions.  
The self-report findings on the ERQ are consistent with other studies in 
patients with FND, which have also shown an increased tendency to conceal one’s 
emotions rather than try to change them by thinking about them differently (Gul & 
Ahmad, 2014; Urbanek et al., 2014). Why might patients tend to ‘select’ an arguably 
more maladaptive emotion regulation strategy? One possible explanation is that the 
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ability to implement cognitive reappraisal relies on the correct identification of one’s 
emotional state in the first instance (Moyal, Henik, & Anholt, 2013). In chapter three 
we have demonstrated that patients with FND display a deficit in the identification of 
their own emotional states. Moreover, the strong negative correlation between the 
cognitive reappraisal subscale of the ERQ and the impoverished emotional experience 
subscale of the EPS-25 identified in this chapter (Table 20), suggests that individuals 
with more alexithymic traits are also less likely to use cognitive reappraisal. 
Conversely, the significant positive correlation between the expressive suppression 
subscale of the ERQ and the suppression subscale of the EPS-25, suggests that 
individuals who tend to use expressive suppression also exert excessive control over 
their emotional experience and expression. In the event that patients are unable to 
detect or make sense of their emotions, they may be forced to select and implement 
other (albeit less effective) regulatory strategies which do not require a good 
understanding of or flexible control of their emotions, such as expressive suppression 
(or indeed emotion-focussed coping, dissociation, or avoidance (See section 2.5)).  
The finding of significantly increased corrugator supercilii activity in patients 
relative to controls seems to contradict the self-report findings, which suggest a 
habitual tendency to suppress emotional expression. Instead, these data suggest that 
patients with FND exhibit greater emotional expressive behaviour as measured by 
facial electromyography in response to negative affective stimuli than healthy controls 
(and therefore implement less expressive suppression). There are several potential 
explanations for this finding.  
 Firstly, reduced facial expressive suppression may reflect increased ‘physical’ 
reactivity to affective stimuli, which has previously been observed in patients with 
FMD who exhibited a potentiated startle response to positive emotional stimuli 
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(Seignourel et al., 2007). However, this would not explain why patients did not also 
exhibit greater facial muscle activity in the passive condition.  
 Secondly, it is possible that patients with FND are less able to follow 
instruction or implement the emotion regulation strategy when instructed to do – even 
if it is considered maladaptive. However, the manipulation check did suggest that, 
overall, participants followed the instruction to suppress.  
A final potential explanation for the discrepancy between ERQ responses and 
facial EMG findings is that these measures may be capturing different aspects of 
expressive suppression. Items in the ERQ ask about emotional expression in a general 
sense and do not specify whether the expression takes on a behavioural, physiological, 
or verbal form (e.g., Item 9.  “When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not 
to express them.”). On the other hand, facial EMG of the corrugator supercilii is a 
specific physiological measure of acute voluntary facial emotional expressive 
suppression. It is possible that when patients self-report an increased tendency to 
expressive suppression on the ERQ, they are referring to verbal or other forms of 
expression. Indeed, when investigating the social consequences of habitual 
suppression in a sample of college students, Gross and John (2003) observed a 
negative correlation between scores on the suppression subscale of the ERQ and 
‘social sharing with others’, which was defined as, “…when you talk about your 
feelings with others in order to change how you are feeling. An example of sharing 
feelings is telling your partner how irritated you are at someone else to calm yourself 
down.” One could avoid talking about their emotions with others without suppressing 
their facial emotional reactions. Therefore, the present observed discrepancy between 
facial muscle activity when instructed to suppress and responses to the suppression 
subscale score on the ERQ, might suggest that with patients with FND perceive 
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themselves to be habitual suppressors because they don’t talk about their feelings with 
others, but they are relatively poor at suppressing acute facial emotional expression. 
The lack of awareness around acute changes in facial expression might be explained 
by general deficits in interoceptive sensitivity throughout the body, which is not 
restricted to detection of heart beat (as demonstrated in Chapter 4.2), and extends to 
facial muscles. Indeed, somatic symptoms and Conversion Disorder have been 
conceptualised as the physical expression of psychological distress (Hurwitz, 2004), 
and patients with FND have repeatedly been shown to endorse more severe somatic 
symptomology than patients with “medically-explained” “equivalent” conditions 
(e.g., Brown & Reuber, 2016a; Defazio et al., 2017). To investigate this potential cause 
of a discrepancy between self-reported and physiological measures of emotional 
expression further, an experimental paradigm and self-report measure of expressive 
suppression might be designed to capture all modalities of emotional expression. 
How do our findings on emotional experience fit with the literature? With 
respect to the explicit measures of affect, our findings are consistent with Roberts et 
al. (2012), who also found no difference between NEAD patients’ and seizure-free 
controls’ negative response to negative pictures. However, Roberts et al. (2012) did 
not examine patients’ positive responses to negative pictures, so our positive explicit 
data cannot be compared. According to the wider expressive suppression literature, 
the task-related or habitual implementation of expressive suppression should have no 
influence on negative affect, but result in diminished positive affect (Cutuli, 2014). In 
line with this, we did not observe any task-induced changes to measures of explicit or 
implicit negative affect. We also did not observe a task-related reduction in implicit 
or explicit positive affect, however there was a significant between-groups difference 
in implicit positive affect. Reduced implicit positive affect in patients aligns with the 
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broader theory that habitual suppressors tend to experience less positive affect (Gross 
& John, 2003). The observed lack of difference in implicitly-measured negative affect 
between patients with FND and controls without FND, is also consistent with the 
similar levels of implicit anxiety and implicit self-esteem reported between patients 
with NEAD and epilepsy (Dimaro et al., 2014; Dimaro et al., 2015).  As the present 
study represents a novel design (emotion regulation manipulation with implicit and 
explicit measures of emotional experience), it is difficult to draw clear comparisons 
with the rest of the literature. However, trait-reduced implicit positive affect in patients 
compared to healthy controls does seem to fit with the theory that patients with FND 
habitually suppress their emotions.   
It is not possible to know whether the habitual selection and implementation 
of expressive suppression is a cause or consequence of reduced positive affect or 
alexithymia. However, increasing the repertoire of available adaptive emotion 
regulatory strategies for patients to select from and training them in successful 
implementation may constitute a useful therapeutic strategy. Approaches such as 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy and Cognitive Analytic Therapy which help patients 
learn how to label and re-appraise their emotions, and therefore regulate them in such 
a way that would minimise psychological distress, might therefore be effective. 
Indeed, there is emerging evidence that Cognitive Behavioural Therapy alongside 
standard medical care is more effective in reducing nonepileptic seizure frequency 
than standard medical care alone (Goldstein et al., 2015). Expressive suppression and 
cognitive reappraisal therefore warrant further investigation as psychotherapeutic 
targets.   
4.3.4.1. Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to this study which the results need to be 
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considered in light of. Firstly, the EMG data were very noisy, which meant that a 
number of parametric assumptions were violated. Unfortunately, these issues could 
not be corrected without loss of statistical power, and no other statistical test would 
have allowed for a mixed-design comparison over multiple epochs while controlling 
for the between-groups difference in age. As a result, the results of the EMG analysis 
should be interpreted with some caution. Relatedly, a number of analyses were 
conducted on a relatively small sample size - even though Bonferroni corrections were 
applied as appropriate, our findings are at risk of a type I error. The small sample size 
may have also concealed subgroups of patients with FND with opposing emotion 
regulatory profiles who are likely to exist (Uliaszek et al., 2012). In addition, the 
generalizability of these findings may also be questioned due to low ecological 
validity, as the testing scenario was artificial and the presence of facial electrodes may 
have unduly influenced participants’ responses. Future studies can address this by 
videoing participants’ facial expressions and later coding them (c.f. Roberts et al., 
2012) – although this approach is also at risk of bias from the experimenters’ 
interpretation of facial expression. In addition, our measure of explicit affect was 
developed purely for the purposes of this study and, as such, has not been validated 
elsewhere. We also did not check that the participants perceived the pictures as 
negative – although the perceived valence of images has been validated in a student 
sample (Walsh, 2012). A more theoretical criticism is that, although a self-report 
measure of the tendency to select expressive suppression and a physiological measure 
of participants’ ability to implement expressive suppression was included in this 
paradigm, the study design does not clearly isolate and manipulate the selection stage 
independently from the implementation stage of the EPM. Furthermore, the inclusion 
of a cognitive reappraisal manipulation as well as positive affective stimuli in the 
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paradigm would have allowed for a more complete comparison with the rest of the 
emotion regulation and FND literature.  
4.3.5. Conclusion 
This study aimed to test the hypothesis that emotion dysregulation in patients 
with FND is characterised by a tendency to select and implement a maladaptive 
emotion regulatory strategy – expressive suppression.  Self-report responses on the 
ERQ suggested that patients do tend to select expressive suppression instead of 
cognitive reappraisal as a regulatory strategy in their daily lives, and that this tendency 
may be related to a tightly controlled regulatory style as well as alexithymic traits. 
Consistent with endorsed habitual suppression, patients exhibited less positive 
emotional experience during the study. However, the self-reported tendency to conceal 
emotions was not reflected in facial EMG responses, which were potentiated relative 
to controls when participants with FND were instructed to implement expressive 
suppression.  
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4.4. Resting Heart Rate Variability in patients with 
Functional Neurological Disorder (Study 4) 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters in this thesis have found evidence of emotion 
dysregulation in patients with FND with and without impairments of consciousness 
(Chapter 3), which is characterised by deficits in the identification of their emotional 
states (Chapter 4.2) and a self-reported tendency to select / implement maladaptive 
emotion regulatory strategies (Chapter 4.3). The aim of the research presented in this 
chapter is to explore if the emotion dysregulation identified through self-report and 
behavioural measures is also reflected in patients’ baseline level of autonomic arousal 
as captured by resting Heart Rate Variability.  
Heart Rate Variability (HRV) is a physiological measure that has been 
extensively applied in emotion regulation research. HRV can be defined as the 
oscillation in time interval between consecutive normal heart beats (RR intervals, 
originating from depolarisation of the sino-atrial node) (Task Force of the European 
Society of Cardiology and the North American Society of Pacing and 
Electrophysiology, 1996).  The heart - like all internal organs in the human body - is 
innervated by the autonomic nervous system (ANS). The ANS has two branches; the 
sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and the parasympathetic nervous system (PNS), 
which stimulate or inhibit heart function respectively, working antagonistically to 
control heart rate and therefore also influencing the variation in time between 
successive RR intervals (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991). Regarding 
sympathetic influence on heart function, sympathetic nerves leave the medulla of the 
brainstem and project down the spinal cord to synapse with preganglionic fibres. These 
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in turn exit the spinal cord and project to the sinoatrial node (the heart’s pacemaker) 
via sympathetic ganglia. Sympathetic influences on heart rate are mediated by 
norepinephrine and manifest relatively slowly – reaching a peak after approximately 
four seconds and returning to baseline 20 seconds from onset. The vagal nerve is 
responsible for parasympathetic control of heart rate. Efferent fibres of the vagal nerve 
originate from the nucleus ambiguus and dorsal nucleus in the brainstem. These nuclei 
exert tonic inhibitory control over heart rate by rapidly inhibiting or disinhibiting the 
sino-atrial node. Increasing vagal influence on the sinoatrial node causes the RR 
interval to become longer (slower heart rate) and is also associated with higher HRV. 
Conversely, reducing vagal influence causes the RR interval to become shorter 
(quicker heart rate) and is associated with lower HRV (Porges, 2007). In contrast to 
the relatively slow-acting sympathetic influence on heart rate, parasympathetic 
influences are mediated by acetylcholine and act quickly, reaching peak at 0.5 seconds 
from onset and returning to baseline after one second. The short latency of vagal heart 
rate control permits rapid and flexible physiological responses to changing 
environmental demands (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006) and introduces high-frequency 
variability to heart rate. It also means that the PNS is considered the most prominent 
influence over cardiac autonomic flexibility - and therefore HRV (Dyavanapalli, 
Dergacheva, Wang, & Mendelowitz, 2016).  
There are two main complementary theories relating to autonomic adjustment 
to emotional experience and arousal as measured by HRV; the Polyvagal Theory 
(Porges, 2003) and the Theory of Neurovisceral Integration (Thayer & Lane, 2000). 
Both theories emphasise the significance of vagal influences on HRV and the 
overlapping or interconnected neural control of emotion and HRV. However, both 
theories approach emotion and autonomic control from different perspectives. 
 
 
156 
 
Porges’ Polyvagal Theory (Porges, 2003) originates from an evolutionary 
perspective and  proposes that autonomic control of the heart results in physiological 
states that support different types of behaviour in response to environmental demands. 
The Polyvagal Theory asserts that the human ANS evolved in three stages, each stage 
representing the acquisition of a new branch of the vagal nerve with a specific role in 
social processes (i.e. freezing, ‘fight or flight’, and then social engagement). Porges 
refers to vagal inhibitory control of the heart as the ‘vagal brake’, which is constantly 
being increased or decreased according to changing environmental demands (Kemp 
& Quintana, 2013). For example, when the vagal brake is activated, heart rate 
decreases and the body is placed in a more relaxed physiological state which would 
support social engagement behaviours. Conversely, when the vagal brake is 
withdrawn, heart rate increases and the body is physiologically prepared for the 
mobilisation behaviours of ‘fight or flight’. Therefore, lower ‘vagal tone’ is considered 
a physiological index of stress and stress vulnerability because the body is prepared 
for ‘fight or flight’ (Porges, 1995). The relationship between vagal tone and social 
engagement behaviours is physiologically mediated via afferent connections between 
the nucleus ambiguus and nuclei of facial and trigeminal nerves, which also facilitate 
socially relevant behaviours such as facial expression and vocalisation.  As part of the 
Polyvagal Theory, Porges also proposed a mechanism called ‘neuroception’ (Porges, 
2003), which acts outside of conscious awareness to determine whether an 
environment is safe by ‘deciding’ if environmental features should elicit mobilisation 
or social-engagement behaviours. A brain network supporting neuroception would 
include regions of the temporal cortex which decode biological movement and the 
intentions of others during social interactions (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  
According to the Polyvagal Theory then, fluctuations in vagal tone are intimately 
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related to behaviour and motivation.  
The Theory of Neurovisceral Integration (Thayer & Lane, 2009) is grounded 
in dynamical systems perspective, and also proposes a relationship between autonomic 
control and emotion. According to this theory, conscious emotional experience relies 
on the transmission of affective information from subcortical to cortical brain regions, 
the latter exerting top-down influence on subjective emotional experience. Regions of 
the insula as well as prefrontal and cingulate cortices hold the amygdala under tonic 
inhibition. When the central nucleus of the amygdala is disinhibited, there is further 
downstream disinhibition of sympathetic neurons (rostral ventrolateral medulla) and 
increased inhibition of neurons in the nucleus ambiguus and dorsal vagal motor 
nucleus which control the parasympathetic system. This results in increased heart rate 
and therefore lower HRV. The activity of this network is associated with emotional 
arousal.  For example, Lane et al. (2009) showed that regional cerebral bloodflow 
(rCBF) in the right superior prefrontal cortex, left rostral anterior cingulate cortex, 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and right parietal cortex positively correlated with 
vagally-mediated HRV during an emotion induction paradigm. Importantly, self-
reported emotional arousal was negatively associated with HRV and rCBF in these 
regions. Therefore, during conditions of emotional arousal, cortical regions are 
deactivated resulting in a cascade of autonomic changes that lower HRV by increasing 
heart rate (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). As such, brain networks that control HRV 
and emotional experience are anatomically and functionally integrated and HRV can 
serve as a proxy of emotional arousal.  
Both the Polyvagal Theory and the Theory of Neurovisceral Integration argue 
that low HRV / vagal tone is indicative of high emotional arousal. If this is the case, 
then low vagal tone could also be an indicator of emotional dysregulation. Indeed, 
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several studies have associated lower resting vagal tone with trait emotional 
dysregulation, for instance in patients with panic disorder (Friedman & Thayer, 1998), 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Thayer, Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996), Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (Meyer et al., 2016), Borderline (emotionally unstable) 
Personality Disorder (Koenig, Kemp, Feeling, Thayer, & Kaess, 2016), and trait-
negative affect (elevated levels of self-reported depression and anxiety) (Bleil, 
Gianaros, Jennings, Flory, & Manuck, 2008). Lower vagal tone has also been 
positively associated with emotion dysregulation as measured by the DERS in both 
resting HRV and 24 hour ambulatory HRV data from healthy participants. 
Specifically, the inability to accept negative emotions (DERS subscale) showed the 
strongest negative association with vagally mediated HRV (vmHRV)  in a student 
sample (Visted et al., 2017). Another study also found a negative association between 
vmHRV and DERS subscale scores, namely ‘emotional clarity’ and ‘impulse control’, 
in healthy volunteers (Williams et al., 2015).  Although the direction of effect has 
varied in different studies, HRV can also be measured as a state variable during 
emotion regulation tasks. For example, vmHRV in students has been demonstrated to 
decrease prior to an exam versus rest, with simultaneous increases in state anxiety as 
measured by the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Dimitriev, Saperova, & Dimitriev, 
2016). State HRV reactivity can also interact with trait emotional characteristics. For 
example, healthy subjects were categorised into high or low neuroticism groups and 
performed an emotion regulation task where participants were instructed to down-
regulate negative affect. The more neurotic group presented with lower vmHRV 
during down-regulation of negative affect than participants rated as low in neuroticism 
(Di Simplicio et al., 2012). The results from these studies therefore support the idea 
that reduced vagal tone as measured by HRV is a considered a universal measure of 
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emotion dysregulation.  
Whether reduced vagal tone is a cause or consequence of emotion 
dysregulation is unclear. However, there is a strong body of evidence suggesting that 
reduced resting vagal tone may predispose an individual to maladaptive perceptual 
processing of emotional information. Park, Van Bavel, Vasey, and Thayer (2012) 
demonstrated that healthy participants with low (versus high) resting vmHRV were 
less able to disengage from images of fearful faces in order to perform a novelty search 
during an Inhibition of Return paradigm. Healthy participants with lower resting 
vmHRV have also been shown to exhibit faster attentional engagement to fearful faces 
than those with higher resting HRV (Park et al., 2013), reflecting an attentional bias 
to negative emotional information in individuals with reduced vagal tone.  Park, 
Vasey, Van Bavel, and Thayer (2014) have also suggested that lower resting HRV 
may render an individual susceptible to inappropriate stress responses. Healthy 
participants performed a letter detection task with fearful distractors (images of faces) 
under lower and higher load conditions. During the low-load condition, participants 
with higher resting HRV showed phasic enhancement of HRV in response to fearful 
distractors during a letter detection task – suggesting a self-regulatory effort. 
Conversely, participants with lower resting HRV showed further, phasic suppression 
of HRV during the low-load condition. During the high-load condition, there was no 
significant change in phasic HRV for participants with high resting HRV (suggesting 
that participants redirected all of their attention away from the emotion-eliciting 
stimulus and towards the task-relevant stimuli). However participants with low-resting 
HRV still exhibited phasic suppression in response to the fearful faces, meaning that 
these participants continued to process the affective stimulus at the expense of task-
performance. These results suggest that individuals with lower resting HRV are prone 
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to a potentiated autonomic stress response, even when a stress reaction is not required 
or appropriate (as in the case of the low perceptual load condition) (Park et al., 2014). 
It is therefore conceivable that the afferent effects of low vagal tone may serve to 
enhance or sustain physiological arousal / psychological distress. As such, reduced 
vagal tone may constitute a cause or a consequence of emotion dysregulation. 
Given the putative role of emotion dysregulation in FND, researchers have 
begun to investigate HRV in patients with these symptoms. Patients with FMD have 
been shown to have lower resting vmHRV than healthy controls (Maurer et al., 2016). 
Likewise, patients with NEAD have been demonstrated to have lower resting vmHRV 
than healthy controls (Ponnusamy et al., 2011) or controls with low levels of Post-
Traumatic symptoms (Roberts et al., 2012). Sympathetic tone has been shown to 
increase in the five minutes preceding a nonepileptic attack, with a subsequent increase 
in vmHRV during and following the attack, supporting the hypothesis that 
nonepileptic attacks may function as an emotion regulation strategy ameliorating 
increased emotional arousal (van der Kruijs et al., 2016). Bakvis, Roelofs, et al. (2009) 
found lower vmHRV in a group of patients with NEAD at rest and during recovery 
from the Trier Social Stress Test than in healthy controls. What remains to be seen, is 
whether vmHRV correlates with emotion dysregulation (for instance measured by the 
EPS-25) and with particular manifestations of comorbid psychopathology in patients 
with FND. 
The aim of the present study was therefore to compare HRV in patients 
diagnosed with FND against healthy controls, and to explore whether HRV measures 
were associated with measures of emotion dysregulation and psychopathology in 
patients and controls. We hypothesised that patients with FND would have lower 
vmHRV than healthy controls, but that vmHRV would be significantly associated with 
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measures of emotion regulation and psychopathology in all participants. 
4.4.2. Methods 
4.4.2.1. Participants 
Twenty six patients with FND and 28 healthy controls participated in this 
study. For demographic and clinical details see Table 10. 
4.4.2.2. Materials / Apparatus 
4.4.2.2.1. ECG recording. See section 4.2.2.2.2.  
4.4.2.3. Measures 
4.4.2.3.1. Heart Rate Variability. HRV is operationalised through various 
measures resulting from analyses of RR intervals and there are several different 
methods for measuring HRV: time domain, frequency domain, and non-linear 
methods. Power spectral density analysis of RR interval time yields two main 
frequency components; high (.15 - .40Hz) and low (.01 – .15Hz) frequency 
components which reflect vagal tone, and both sympathetic influence and vagal tone 
respectively. These metrics are referred to as frequency domain measures. 
Alternatively, time domain measures employ different statistical or geometric 
techniques to express the variance of successive RR intervals, which have been shown 
to reflect different combinations of ANS control of heart rate. Toichi, Sugiura, Murai, 
and Sengoku (1997) developed a non-linear technique for assessing cardiac autonomic 
function, which they suggested was more reliable than time or frequency domain 
measures. This method is based on the construction of a Lorenz plot, in which the 
variation in consecutive RR intervals is represented on a two-dimensional plane with 
two axes; the longitudinal axis (L) which is parallel to the plane, and the transverse 
axis (T) which is vertical to the plane. A measure of sympathetic tone, the 
Cardiosympathetic Index (CSI), is calculated as L/T. Conversely, a measure of 
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parasympathetic tone, the Cardiovagal Index (CVI), is calculated as log10 (T x L). 
Although there are many different measures of HRV, each with their respective 
advantages and disadvantages (Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and 
the North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996), to avoid the 
increased risk of Type 1 error associated with multiple comparisons, and owing to 
their proposed increased reliability as compared to time and frequency domain 
measures (Toichi et al., 1997), we selected CVI and CSI as the dependent measures 
for the present study. 
4.4.2.3.2. Emotion regulation measures.  
The Emotional Processing Scale. See section 3.2.3.2. 
Interoceptive Sensitivity. The IS scores generated in Chapter 4.2 were included 
in the exploratory analysis. 
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.  See section 4.3.2.3.3. 
4.4.2.3.3. Psychopathology symptom measures. 
The Patient Health Questionnaire – 9. See section 3.2.3.3. 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder – 7. See section 3.2.3.4. 
The Patient Health Questionnaire – 15.See section 3.2.3.5. 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist – 5.See section 3.2.3.6. 
4.4.2.4. Design 
A between-subjects design was used. The independent variable was group 
(Patient versus Healthy Control) and the dependent variables were CSI and CVI, self-
reported emotion dysregulation (EPS-25), interoceptive sensitivity pre- and post-Cold 
Pressor Test (ISpre and ISpost) symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder (PHQ-9), 
symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7), frequency and severity of 
somatic symptoms (PHQ-15), and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms (PCL-
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5).  
4.4.2.5. Procedure 
Participants were seated in a chair with their feet placed on the floor and their 
arms uncrossed. They were positioned in front of a computer monitor (approximately 
60cm away) running an E-Prime 2.0 script (Psychology Software Tools, 2012), which 
presented the following onscreen instructions:  
“We would like you to sit and relax for five minutes. During this time, we will 
be recording your heart beat. Nothing else will happen. Please get comfortable, with 
your hands resting on the desk in front of you and your legs uncrossed. Try to 
remain like this during the recording. When you are ready to begin, press any key to 
continue.” 
The E-Prime script also informed participants when recording started and 
stopped. A privacy screen separated the experimenter and the recording equipment 
from the participant. Participants were seated for several minutes before recording 
began.  
4.4.2.6. Data analysis 
Triggers sent from the E-prime 2.0 script running on the participant’s computer 
marked the start and finish of five minutes in the ECG trace. These five minute 
sections of the ECG recording were then selected and exported to Kubios HRV 
Software for Windows (Tarvainen, Niskanen, Lipponen, Ranta-Aho, & Karjalainen, 
2014) for pre-processing and analysis.  
4.4.2.6.1. Pre-processing. Kubios (Tarvainen et al., 2014) is Matlab-based 
software which uses a QRS detection algorithm to calculate time domain, frequency 
domain, and non-linear HRV parameters from ECG recordings (Figure 13). Recordings 
were visually inspected for technical and physiological artefacts, and slow linear 
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trends – all of which may interfere with HRV analysis. A threshold for rejection of 
recordings from the final analysis was set at 5% of beats, however no traces contained 
more than 5% artefacts. We identified ectopic beats (physiological artefacts) in five 
recordings, which were reduced by applying the lowest possible level of artefact 
correction to the RR series. Slow baseline fluctuations in the RR series trend were 
corrected with the smoothness priors method (lower bound of LF band = <.04Hz, 
Lambda = 500). These pre-processing steps are recommended by Kubios (Tarvainen, 
Ranta-Aho, & Karjalainen, 2002). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2.7. Statistical analysis 
 Data were screened for normality in SPSS. CVI and CSI and Heart Rate scores 
were found to be normally distributed (Levene’s p > .05). There was a linear 
relationship between CVI and CSI and all other dependent measures as assessed by 
visual inspection of a scatterplot. There was homogeneity of regression slopes, as 
assessed by the interaction term between age and group, F(2,48) = .78, p = .46. There 
was homogeneity of covariances, as assessed by Box’s M test (p = >.05). There were 
Figure 13. Screenshot of the Kubios HRV interface. 
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no multivariate outliers as assessed by Mahalanobis distance (critical value = < 13.82). 
Therefore, HRV was analysed with a MANCOVA. PHQ-9, GAD-7, PHQ-15, and 
PCL-5 responses were found to be non-normally distributed (Levene’s p > .05). 
However, inspection of scatterplots revealed a monotonic relationship between all 
variables. Therefore a series of Spearman’s correlation coefficients were used to 
analyse the relationship between HRV and self-report measures of emotion 
dysregulation and psychopathology.  
4.4.3. Results 
4.4.3.1.Heart Rate Variability 
To assess for group differences in HRV, a MANCOVA with group (healthy 
control versus patient) as the between-subjects variable was conducted on CSI and 
CVI as the dependent variables. Means and adjusted means are presented in Table 21. 
Measures of HRV appear to be lower in the patient group than the healthy control 
group. Selected Lorenz plots depicting the balance between sympathetic and 
parasympathetic tone in one patient and one healthy control are displayed in Figure 
14. These plots suggest an imbalance in vagal and sympathetic tone in patients but not 
healthy controls.  
 
Table 21 - Means, Adjusted Means, Standard Deviations, and Standard Errors for 
Cardiovagal Index and Cardiosympathetic Index in patients and healthy controls. 
 HRV 
 CSI CVI 
Group M SD Madj SE M SD Madj SE 
Healthy 
control 
2.38 .60 2.44 .12 2.97 .38 2.92 .09 
Patient 2.12 .60 2.05 .13 2.49 .66 2.56 .10 
Note. CSI = Cardiosympathetic Index, CVI = Cardiovagal Index, M = mean, SD = Standard 
Deviation, Madj = Adjusted Mean, SE = Standard Error of the Adjusted Mean. 
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Figure 14.  Lorenz plot generating a cardiac vagal index (CVI) and cardiac sympathetic index (CSI) in a healthy control 
and patient participant. The increased spread of points in the healthy control graph indicates greater variability in time 
between consecutive RR intervals. The more elliptical shape in the healthy control graph indicate a normal balance 
between sympathetic and parasympathetic tone. The spread of points in the patient scatterplot are tightly bunched around 
the longitudinal access indicating low parasympathetic tone.   
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The one-way MANCOVA showed that there was a statistically significant 
difference in HRV between-groups after controlling for age; F(2,50) = 7.61, p < .001, 
Wilks’ Λ = .77, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .23. Follow up univariate one-way ANCOVAs were performed. 
A bonferroni adjustment was made such that statistical significance was accepted 
when p < .025. There were statistically significant differences in the adjusted mean for 
CVI; F(1,51) = 6.08, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .11,but not for CSI; F(1,51) = 4.93, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝
²  = 
.09 (Figure 15).  Inspection of the descriptive statistics reveals that CVI was lower in 
the patient group than the healthy control group. Heart rate did not differ significantly 
between-groups; t(52) = -1.06, p = .29 [95% CI, -11.47 to 3.55], and so could not 
account for this discrepancy. Therefore, the significantly lower HRV in patients 
relative to controls was driven by reduced vagal tone.  
Figure 15. CVI and CSI scores for patients and healthy controls. Error bars represent Standard 
Error of the mean. 
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4.4.3.2.The effect of cardioactive medication and ECG artefacts on HRV 
Eight patients reported being prescribed and taking medication that have been 
associated with altered HRV (e.g., Tricyclic anti-depressants (Kemp et al., 2010), 
Benzodiazepines (Agelink, Majewski, Andrich, & Mueck-Weymann, 2002)). To 
investigate the possibility that decreased HRV in patients was caused by these 
medications, the MANCOVA was repeated with these patients’ data removed. While 
the effect size was slightly reduced, the between-subjects difference in HRV retained 
significance; F(1,43) = 5.28, p < .01, Wilks Λ = .79,  𝜂𝑝
²  = .20, suggesting that reduced 
HRV in patients was not chiefly explained by the effect of cardioactive medication.  
ECG recordings from six participants required correction for artefacts (e.g., 
ectopic beats). Given the sensitivity of HRV analysis to the presence of artefacts or 
their correction, the MANCOVA was repeated again with these traces excluded. The 
model remained significant; F(2,45) = 6.91, p < .01, Wilks Λ = .26, 𝜂𝑝
²  = .24, 
suggesting that inclusion of corrected ECG traces did not confound the analysis. 
4.4.3.3.Exploratory correlational analyses  
 To explore for potential relationships between HRV, emotion dysregulation, 
and psychopathology a series of Spearman’s rank order correlations were conducted 
on CSI, CVI and EPS-25, PHQ-9, GAD-7, PHQ-15, PCL-5 scores, and ERQ subscale 
scores (Table 22). CSI did not correlate significantly with any of the self-report 
measures. However, there was a small-to-moderate negative correlation between CVI 
and the EPS-25; rs(52)  = -.27, p = .049. There was also a small-to-moderate 
correlation between CVI and the PCL-5 scores; rs(52) = -.31, p = .02. Significant 
positive correlations were also observed between CVI and interoceptive sensitivity 
pre-CPT; rs(52) =.39, p < .01, and interoceptive sensitivity post-CPT; rs(52) = .36, p 
< .01. These correlations indicate that participants with lower vagal tone reported 
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greater emotion dysregulation and PTSD symptoms. Conversely, participants with 
higher vagal tone exhibited greater interoceptive sensitivity pre- and post- CPT. All 
CVI correlations retained significance after controlling for the False Discovery Rate 
(set at 0.1) with a Benjamini-Hochberg correction.  
Table 22 - Spearman's Rank Order correlation coefficients between HRV scores and 
measures of emotion dysregulation and psychopathology. 
 HRV 
Measure CSI CVI 
EPS-25 -.02 -.27* 
PHQ-9 -.03 -.21 
GAD-7 -.15 -.15 
PHQ-15 -.19 -.11 
PCL-5 -.08 -.31* 
IS pre -.03 .39* 
IS post -.07 .36* 
Cognitive Reappraisal .24 .14 
Expressive Suppression -.20 -.24 
Note. EPS-25 = Emotional Processing Scale, PHQ – 9 = Patient Health Questionnaire-9, 
GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7, PHQ-15 = Patient Health Questionnaire-15, PCL-
5 = PTSD Checklist for DSM-V. IS pre = Interoceptive Sensitivity pre-stress induction. IS 
post = Interoceptive Sensitivity post-stress induction, Cognitive reappraisal = Cognitive 
Reappraisal subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, Expressive Suppression = 
Expressive Suppression subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.  * = statistically 
significant correlation 
4.4.4. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that patients with FND would 
have lower resting HRV than healthy controls, and that reduced HRV (in particular 
vagal tone) is related to emotion dysregulation and psychopathology. Lower vagal 
tone was observed in patients relative to healthy controls, and reduced vagal tone was 
found to be associated with increased emotion dysregulation and symptoms of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Conversely, increased vagal tone was associated with 
greater interoceptive sensitivity. Sympathetic tone did not differ significantly 
between-groups and did not correlate with any self-report measures of emotion 
dysregulation or psychopathology. These results suggest that patients with FND 
experience chronic autonomic arousal and support the view that vagal tone is related 
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to emotion regulation and psychological health. They also raise the possibility that 
reduced vmHRV may be a potential biomarker of emotion dysregulation in FND.  
A few other studies have compared vagal tone in patients with FND against 
healthy controls. In line with our findings of reduced vagal tone in patients with FMD 
relative to healthy controls, Ponnusamy et al. (2011) also observed lower CVI in 52 
patients with NEAD admitted to a video telemetry unit, as compared to 35 healthy 
controls. However, unlike Ponnusamy et al. (2011), we did not observe significantly 
higher sympathetic tone in patients. Potential explanations for this are differences in 
sample size and the testing scenario – in the Ponnusamy et al. (2011) study, patients 
were tested under arguably more stressful conditions (video telemetry unit) than the 
present setting, which may have led to a greater discrepancy between vagal and 
sympathetic tone. However, our results are consistent with studies of vagal tone in 
patients with FND as assessed by other HRV metrics. Maurer et al. (2016), found 
decreased resting vagal tone in patients with FMD, as measured by time (RMSSD, 
NN50, pNN50) and frequency (HF, LF/HF) parasympathetic components. Lower 
RMSSD and lower RSA (both measures of vagal tone) have also been reported in 
patients with NEAD relative to healthy controls (Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009; Roberts 
et al., 2012). Therefore, our data are consistent with other findings that vagal tone is 
reduced in patients with FND. According to the Theory of Neurovisceral Integration 
and Polyvagal Theory, this would mean that patients with FND exhibit a biomarker of 
stress-vulnerability. Indeed, other studies have demonstrated increased sensitivity to 
affective information suggestive of greater stress-vulnerability in patients with FND. 
For example, Voon et al. (2010) demonstrated impaired amygdala habituation and 
altered functional connectivity between the right amygdala and the right 
supplementary motor when patients with Conversion Disorder viewed emotional 
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stimuli. Similarly, Seignourel et al. (2007) demonstrated that patients with FMD 
exhibited an atypical pattern of potentiated startle response to both positive and 
negative pictures (healthy controls exhibit a slight inhibition in response to positive 
pictures). Taken together, these studies suggest that patients with FND exhibit chronic 
emotion dysregulation and autonomic arousal consistent with an increased 
susceptibility to stress. 
To our knowledge, no other studies have reported significant correlations 
between vmHRV and measures of emotion regulation or psychopathology in patients 
with FND. However, the present observation that impaired vagal tone is associated 
emotion dysregulation, impaired interoceptive sensitivity, and PTSD symptomology 
is consistent with theory and work conducted in other clinical populations, which will 
now be discussed.  
The observed relationship between emotion dysregulation as measured by the 
EPS-25 and vagal tone in participants supports the Neurovisceral Integration Theory 
– which proposes that successful emotion regulation (i.e., the ability to flexibly up- or 
down-regulate positive / negative affect appropriately in response to changing 
contexts) requires a flexible autonomic nervous system to effect the response. As 
decreased HRV is considered a marker of inflexible autonomic control, individuals 
with lower resting HRV are less able to produce adaptive regulatory responses 
(Thayer, Ahs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012) and are more vulnerable to stress 
(Porges, 1995). Indeed, patients’ difficulty in the implementation of adaptive 
regulatory responses is evidenced in the current study by elevated scores on the EPS-
25 (which captures the use of avoidance, suppression, and presence of unregulated and 
unprocessed emotions).  
The  observed correlation between vagal tone and IS is also consistent with the 
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theory that flexible vagal modulation of heart rate and the production of adaptive 
regulatory responses is reliant on the ability to accurately perceive emotional arousal 
from interoceptive inputs (Porges, 2003). The correlation between CVI and 
interoceptive sensitivity both pre-and post-stress induction suggests that individuals 
with greater vagal tone are more able to accurately detect their emotional states. This 
would be advantageous for the adaptive selection and implementation of emotion 
regulatory strategies (Gross, 2015), and corroborates the link between vagal tone and 
emotion regulation – specifically the identification of emotional states.  
Consistent with the observed correlation between PTSD symptomology and 
CVI, Meyer et al. (2016) found a negative correlation between RMSSD (time-domain 
measure of parasympathetic control) and self-reported early-life maltreatment as 
measured by the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire in patients with PTSD or 
Borderline (emotionally unstable) Personality Disorder. Other studies have also 
reported negative correlations between PTSD symptom severity and resting vagal tone 
(e.g., Chang et al., 2013). These data raise the possibility of an aetiological overlap 
between PTSD and FND, which may represent components of a biopsychosocial 
account of FND (Reuber, 2009) in which low vagal tone confers a susceptibility to the 
genesis of symptoms in trauma-exposed individuals. Alternatively, reduced resting 
vagal tone could reflect a state of hypervigilance which would constitute an adaptive 
response to traumatic experiences. Interestingly, low vagal tone has been 
demonstrated to amplify the association between childhood trauma and internalizing 
psychopathology (e.g., depression and anxiety) in adolescents (McLaughlin, Rith-
Najarian, Dirks, & Sheridan, 2015) – a similar mechanism may be at work in patients 
with FND, although longitudinal data would be needed to confirm or disprove this 
possibility. Therefore, these results support the conclusion that vagal tone is more 
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specifically related to emotion dysregulation and trauma in patients with FND. 
Notably, however, we did not find any significant relationship between vagal 
tone and the self-reported used of expressive suppression / cognitive reappraisal as 
measured by the ERQ, and severity of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Major 
Depression, and Somatization Disorder symptomology – the reason for this is unclear, 
but given the number of correlations performed on a relatively small sample, it is 
possible that the significant correlations observed in this exploratory analysis represent 
a Type 1 error. The rate of False Discoveries was controlled for using a Benjamini-
Hochberg procedure, but a more highly powered, confirmatory analysis is required to 
investigate this possibility further.   
If reduced vagal tone is indeed a biomarker of emotion dysregulation in 
patients with FND, a natural question is whether or not vmHRV could be used to assist 
in the diagnostic process. Unfortunately, it is too soon for this question to be answered 
fully. Existing research comparing HRV in patients with FND against their 
neurological equivalents (e.g., NEAD versus epilepsy) has shown that resting vagal 
tone is lower in both groups and therefore not unique to FND (Ponnusamy et al., 2011). 
However, differences in changes between resting and ictal vagal tone has been 
observed between patients with NEAD and epilepsy (the change is less marked in 
NEAD) (Ponnusamy, Marques, & Reuber, 2012). Future work would be well-placed 
to compare HRV in relevant patient groups (e.g., those with ‘medically explained 
equivalents’ or similar psychiatric diagnoses) at different stages of symptom activity. 
This would allow for the generation of data which could potentially assist in the 
differential diagnostic procedure. Vagal tone could also conceivably be used as a 
biomarker when assessing the effect of psychological interventions for FND.  
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4.4.4.1.Limitations 
A potential limitation of this study is that vagal tone may have been influenced 
by cardioactive medications that the patients were taking (Laborde, Mosley, & Thayer, 
2017). We therefore repeated the analysis without patients who reported taking 
medication and the MANCOVA model retained significance, with a slightly reduced 
effect size. However, given that many patients were taking combination therapy it was 
not possible to examine the effects of individual medications on HRV in this sample. 
It is therefore possible that some of the group difference in vagal tone is attributable 
to the effects of medication.  
A further potential limitation of this study is the inclusion of ECG traces which 
were not artefact-free (n = 6). Even though HRV analysis is sensitive to artefacts, we 
decided to retain these cases to preserve statistical power and correct them using the 
recommended inbuilt algorithm in the Kubios software (Tarvainen et al., 2014). 
However, even the application of these corrections may have a biasing effect on HRV. 
Reassuringly, the MANCOVA model also remained significant with these cases 
removed. Therefore artefact correction did not seem to confound our results.  
With respect to the exploratory correlational analysis between HRV 
parameters and measures of interoception, emotion dysregulation and 
psychopathology, these correlations were relatively small (.27-.39). This indicates a 
fairly weak relationship between those variables with statistically significant 
correlations. Correlational analyses also do not inform us about the direction of 
association and the effect of other latent variables on the relationship cannot be ruled 
out. 
Owing to a lack of previous research in this area at the time of study design, it 
was not possible to perform an a-priori power analysis. However, a recent systematic 
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review by Quintana (2017)  suggested that in order to achieve 80% power, samples of 
233, 61, and 21 participants per group are required to detect small, medium, and large 
effect sizes respectively. Given the large effect size produced in this present study (𝜂𝑝
²  
=.23) and the group sizes (patients = 26, healthy controls = 28), we can be somewhat 
confident that the study was sufficiently powered to compare resting HRV between 
patients and healthy controls. However, the sample size was not large enough to allow 
for subgroup comparisons, which is important as FND is likely to be an aetiologically 
heterogeneous disorder.  
4.4.5. Conclusion 
The present findings suggest that patients with FND have lower resting vagal 
tone than healthy controls, and that reduced vagal tone is associated with emotion 
dysregulation, PTSD symptomology, and impaired interoceptive sensitivity. These 
observations support the suggestion that vagally mediated HRV serves as a potential 
biomarker of emotion dysregulation in patients with FND (Ponnusamy et al., 2011). 
Future comparative studies of HRV in patients with FND and other patient groups 
would help to establish the utility of HRV in the diagnostic process and assessment of 
treatment response.  
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5. Changes in emotion processing following Brief 
Augmented Psychodynamic Interpersonal Therapy for 
Functional Neurological Symptoms (Study 5) 
The previous chapters in this thesis lend support to the commonly held 
assumption that patients with FND experience pathological emotion dysregulation. 
The putative view that emotional dysregulation is pertinent to the aetiology and 
maintenance of FND means that in spite of the relative lack of research demonstrating 
the efficacy of psychotherapeutic interventions, the mainstay of treatment for FND has 
been psychotherapy (Carson et al., 2012). Lately, the number of studies investigating 
the efficacy of psychological investigations for FND has increased.  A recent meta-
analysis of 13 studies investigating the effectiveness of psychological intervention for 
NEAD revealed that 47% of patients were seizure-free upon completion of therapy 
(Carlson & Nicholson Perry, 2017). There is also some evidence that psychological 
interventions can help patients with other FNS such as FMD (Reuber, Burness, et al., 
2007) (although evidence is mounting that multi-disciplinary interventions including 
physiotherapy and occupational therapy are also effective for FND (Demartini, Batla, 
et al., 2014; Gardiner, MacGregor, Carson, & Stone, 2017; Nielsen et al., 2015)). 
However, open questions remain about how emotion dysregulation might best be 
measured during the course of psychotherapeutic intervention. The aim of the work in 
this chapter was to assess whether a newly developed self-report measure called the 
Emotional Processing Scale (EPS-25) (Baker et al., 2015) might be a useful tool to 
track changes in emotion dysregulation and psychopathology following a 
psychotherapeutic intervention. Emotional processing as defined by Baker et al. 
(2015), bears similarities to the model of emotion regulation proposed by Gross 
(2015). The Emotional Processing Model describes a process in which an emotional 
 177 
 
event is detected and appraised (c.f. the identification stage of the EPM), and the 
resulting emotional experience is expressed or controlled (c.f. the selection and 
implementation stages of the EPM).  Therefore, both models conceptualise emotion 
regulation / processing as a multi-faceted and iterative process. The remainder of the 
work in this chapter is presented as it was accepted to the Journal of Behavioural and 
Cognitive Psychotherapy (with permission from the publisher, Cambridge University 
Press).   
5.1. Abstract 
Background: Functional Neurological Symptoms (FNS) are considered non-
volitional and often very disabling, but are not explainable by neurological disease or 
structural abnormalities. Brief Augmented Psychodynamic Interpersonal Therapy 
(BAPIT), was adapted to treat the putative emotion processing deficits thought to be 
central to FNS aetiology and maintenance. BAPIT for FNS has previously been shown 
to improve levels of distress and functioning, but it is unknown whether improvements 
on such measures correlate with changes in emotion processing - which this treatment 
focuses on.  
Aim  
To determine a) whether the recently developed Emotional Processing Scale-
25 can be used to demonstrate BAPIT-associated changes in patients with FNS, and 
b) whether changes in the EPS-25 are associated with changes in previously validated 
outcome measures. 
Method 
 44 patients with FNS completed questionnaires including the EPS-25 and 
measures of clinical symptomology (health-related quality of life (SF-36), somatic 
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symptoms (PHQ-15), psychological distress (CORE-10), illness understanding 
(BIPQ)) pre- and post-therapy.  
Results 
At group level emotion processing improved following therapy (p = .049). 
Some measures of clinical symptomology also improved, namely health-related 
quality of life (p = 0.02) and illness understanding (p = 0.01). Improvements in the 
EPS-25 correlated with improvements in mental health-related quality of life and 
psychological distress. 
Conclusion 
 Emotion processing and some measures of clinical symptomology improved 
in patients with FNS following BAPIT. The EPS-25 demonstrated changes which 
correlated with previously validated outcome measures. The EPS-25 is a suitable 
measure of psychotherapy-associated change in the FNS patient population. 
Keywords: Functional Neurological Symptoms, Emotion processing, 
Psychopathology, Quality of life 
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5.2. Introduction 
Functional Neurological Symptoms (FNS) are manifestations of altered motor 
or sensory functions not caused by readily identifiable structural or pathophysiological 
changes in the nervous system (Carson et al., 2012)The DSM-V refers to FNS as 
‘Conversion Disorder’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the ICD-10 as 
‘Somatoform Disorder’ (World Health Organization, 2016). In both nosologies FNS 
should not be better explained by other known diagnoses. FNS may present as 
movement disorders, including weakness and tremor. FNS may also affect sensory 
processing and include symptoms such as anaesthesia or visual deficits. Nonepileptic 
Attack Disorder (NEAD), is a paroxysmal FNS involving episodes of altered 
consciousness. Approximately one third of neurology outpatients present with FNS 
(Stone, 2013). The long-term prognosis is variable but often poor, as FNS are 
associated with as much or more significant disability, distress, and unemployment as 
other “medically explained” conditions presenting to neurologists (Carson et al., 
2011).  
 The existing categorization of FNS as a ‘Conversion Disorder’ reflects the on-
going assumption that psychological difficulties may contribute to their aetiology 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Indeed, an interaction between pre-
disposing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors linked to abnormal emotion 
processing has been proposed as mechanistic in FNS aetiology (Carson et al., 2012) . 
‘Emotion processing’ describes the process by which, “emotional disturbances are 
absorbed, and decline to the extent that other experiences and behaviours can proceed 
without disruption.” (p.51) (Rachman, 1980). According to this model, abnormal 
emotion processing occurs when emotional disturbances are not satisfactorily 
absorbed by an individual. Disrupted emotion processing may be evident through 
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direct signs, including intrusive thoughts, irritability, or inappropriate expressions of 
emotion. Rachman argues that there are also ‘indirect’ signs of unsatisfactory emotion 
processing, including fatigue, insomnia, and anorexia (Rachman, 1980).  Abnormal 
emotion processing theoretically contributes to the symptomatology of multiple 
mental health difficulties and personality disorders, including anxiety and emotionally 
unstable (borderline) personality disorder (Kret & Ploeger, 2015).  
Emotion processing is a multi-faceted concept; consequently there are multiple 
instruments measuring different aspects of emotion processing, such as the Difficulties 
in Emotion Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (Bagby et al., 1994). The Emotional Processing Scale (EPS-38)(Baker, Thomas, 
Thomas, & Owens, 2007) was developed to create one unified, psychometrically 
sound measurement of emotion processing (Baker et al., 2007). It has been used to 
demonstrate improvements in emotion processing and sensitivity to changes in 
alexithymia as well as psychiatric symptom severity following Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (Baker et al., 2012).  The Emotional Processing Scale (EPS-25) (Baker et al., 
2015) was later created as a shortened version of the EPS-38, with subscales 
measuring five key variants of abnormal emotion processing; namely suppression, 
signs of unprocessed emotion, unregulated emotion, avoidance, and impoverished 
emotional experience.  
Several self-report and experimental studies have provided evidence of 
abnormal emotion processing in patients with FNS. This research has primarily 
focused on NEAD (Roberts & Reuber, 2014). In a study by Novakova et al. (Novakova 
et al., 2015) patients with NEAD exhibited greater impairments in emotion processing 
on the EPS-25 than healthy controls. Impairments in emotion processing correlated 
with more severe somatic symptoms, greater psychological distress, and a poorer 
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illness understanding, supporting the validity of this measure of emotion processing 
in a patient group with paroxysmal functional neurological symptoms.  Another study 
demonstrated that patients with NEAD have greater difficulty in describing and 
identifying their emotions as well as possessing more negative beliefs about emotions 
than healthy controls (Urbanek et al., 2014). Abnormal attentional biases to emotional 
information and altered physiological markers of autonomic arousal are also evident 
in this population (Bakvis, Roelofs, et al., 2009). Likewise, disrupted emotion 
processing is evident in patients with functional motor symptoms. Using event-related 
fMRI, Aybek et al. demonstrated an increased amygdala response amplitude to fearful 
imagery, suggesting altered emotion regulation (Aybek et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
patients with such symptoms have greater difficulty in identifying and describing 
emotions than controls (Demartini, Petrochilos, et al., 2014). Patients with functional 
motor symptoms also have lower interoceptive accuracy than healthy controls, 
elucidating a mechanism by which difficulties in emotion identification and 
processing could manifest (Ricciardi et al., 2016). Given the multiple forms of emotion 
processing impairments that have been identified in the FNS population, the 
administration of a single questionnaire in clinical or research settings may therefore 
be an efficient approach to capturing the range of emotional difficulties in this 
population.  
The putative links between abnormal emotion processing and FNS suggest that 
patients could benefit from psychotherapeutic interventions aiming to improve 
emotion processing. Indeed, there is some evidence that Psychodynamic Interpersonal 
Therapy (PIT) can help patients with FNS; a brief course of PIT was effective in a 
randomised control trial of patients with ‘multisomatoform disorder’ which included 
at least one FNS (Sattel et al., 2012). Brief Augmented Psychodynamic Interpersonal 
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Therapy (BAPIT), is an augmented version of traditional PIT, with elements of 
somatic trauma therapy. BAPIT was adapted specifically to address FNS (Howlett & 
Reuber, 2009; Sattel et al., 2012) and assumes that psychological difficulties result 
from interpersonal conflicts in early life.  Deep-rooted and commonly occurring issues 
in this population, such as childhood trauma or neglect are addressed (Reuber, 
Howlett, et al., 2007). The therapeutic targets of BAPIT include deficits in emotion 
processing (including the naming, tolerance, and expression of emotions) thought to 
play a role in FNS aetiology. BAPIT has been associated with significant 
improvements in psychological distress, mental health, physical health, and healthcare 
utilization in patients with FNS (Reuber, Burness, et al., 2007).  In patients with 
NEAD, BAPIT has also been associated with sustained improvements in seizure 
control and healthcare utilisation (Mayor et al., 2010). However, whilst BAPIT aims 
to improve emotion processing, it has not yet been examined whether the treatment-
associated improvements in outcome measures are associated with similar 
improvements in emotion processing. What is more, the EPS-25 is a novel 
questionnaire, and it has not yet been demonstrated whether it is sensitive to therapy-
associated changes in emotion processing in the FNS population.  
The aim of the present study was therefore to explore whether BAPIT 
associated changes in emotion processing can be picked up the EPS-25.  We also 
aimed to see whether changes seen in health-related quality of life (HRQoL) and some 
measures of relevant clinical symptomology (psychological distress, illness 
understanding, and somatic symptoms) correlated with changes in the EPS-25 scores. 
Finally, we aimed to see whether EPS-25 change scores were sensitive to changes in 
the measures of clinical symptomology used in this study. Given the theorised causal 
links between abnormal emotion processing and FNS, we predicted that patients 
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would experience therapy-associated improvements in emotion processing, HRQoL, 
and clinical symptomology. We also predicted that changes in EPS-25 scores would 
correlate with changes in measures of HRQoL and measures of clinical 
symptomology.  
5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Regulatory approvals 
This study was granted ethical approval by the Sheffield Local Research Ethics 
Committee (REC 09/H1308/2; 01/05/2009). Research governance approval was given 
by the research departments of the Sheffield Teaching Hospitals Foundation Trust and 
the Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. 
5.3.2. Participants 
Patients with FNS were recruited consecutively from referrals to Neurology 
Psychotherapy Services at the Barnsley Hospital and the Royal Hallamshire Hospital 
between January 2010 and September 2012. The FNS diagnosis was formulated by 
Consultant Neurologists on the basis of all available clinical information. Neurologists 
were sufficiently certain about this diagnosis to recommend psychological treatment 
and withdraw treatment for alternative neurological diagnoses (e.g., antiepileptic 
drugs). All patients provided written informed consent. 
5.3.3. Treatment 
BAPIT is based on an adapted version of PIT (Hobson, 1985), which assumes 
that dysfunctional interpersonal patterns originating from childhood are mechanistic 
in the development of abnormal emotion processing. We have described this approach 
in greater detail elsewhere (Howlett & Reuber, 2009). BAPIT is intended to improve 
emotion processing, increase symptom control, change illness perceptions, and 
improve quality of life through increasing independence and encouraging self-care.  In 
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view of the heterogeneous pre-disposing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors 
contributing to the aetiology of FNS, BAPIT is based on a personalised assessment of 
each patient and can also include elements traditionally associated with Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy such as goal-setting, exposure, and relaxation. If the patient has 
problems with hyper- or hypo-arousal (often occurring in the context of a trauma 
history), elements of Somatic Trauma Therapy, designed to allow patients to control 
autonomic arousal, identify personal triggers, and process traumatic memories, are 
incorporated (Rothschild, 2000). Help from carers may be recruited if appropriate 
(Howlett & Reuber, 2009). 
In practice, therapists employ ‘here and now’ techniques to help the patient 
notice, tolerate, and understand emotions arising in the session. The patient is 
encouraged to stay with emotions as they manifest, notice their location in the body, 
and describe what they feel as a way of linking the emotion to associated physical 
symptoms / sensations e.g., “I wonder where you can feel that anger in your body right 
now?” Linking hypotheses are used to connect between current and other feelings both 
inside and outside the therapy room e.g., “You say you’re feeling angry and frustrated 
now. I wonder if that’s a bit like you used to feel as a child when that teacher showed 
you up in front of the class?” 
A single psychotherapist delivered therapy. Psychotherapy duration was 
tailored to the patients’ needs but was intended to be brief (with a notional maximum 
number of 20 sessions). The initial session lasted two hours. All remaining sessions 
lasted 50 minutes. Progress was reviewed after six-eight sessions. Further sessions 
were offered if the patient was considered to have engaged with therapy and if there 
was a therapeutic need for further sessions agreed upon by both the patient and the 
therapist. The end of therapy was agreed upon between the two parties when the 20-
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session limit was reached or when both parties agreed that therapy was complete (in 
four cases, the therapy was extended beyond 20 sessions because of individual 
patients’ particular needs and circumstances). 
5.3.4. Design and procedure 
This was a prospective, uncontrolled study with a within-subjects design. 
Study information was sent to patients along with their first psychotherapy assessment 
appointment letter. FNS diagnosis was re-explained at assessment. Patients were 
screened for factors suggesting they should be excluded from outpatient 
psychotherapy at this point (including risk of suicide, serious psychiatric conditions 
or current addictions). Patients were then given a range of symptom-appropriate self-
help strategies, a relaxation CD, and self-help literature. Patients were telephoned to 
check whether their symptoms persisted and to arrange regular therapy sessions two 
months from assessment. Pre-intervention questionnaires were posted along with the 
appointment letter to those who agreed to further sessions. Patients were asked to 
return the questionnaire battery in a pre-paid envelope.  Patients failing to do so were 
given an opportunity to complete the pre-intervention questionnaires immediately 
before the first therapy session. The first therapy session took place approximately 
three months after the initial assessment visit. 
Immediately after discharge (either planned or following a failure to attend and 
contact), participants were sent a post-intervention self-report questionnaire battery to 
complete and return using a pre-paid envelope. To reduce attrition, participants were 
mailed another copy of the questionnaires if they had failed to return the initial post-
intervention questionnaires. Pre- and post-intervention data were collected by an 
assistant who had not been involved in the administration of psychotherapy. Patients 
who did not complete and return the post-intervention questionnaire pack were 
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classified as ‘study non-completers’ and excluded from the analysis. 
5.3.5. Measures 
5.3.5.1. Demographic, referral and psychotherapy questionnaires. 
Demographic and clinical information was provided by patients, referring 
neurologists, and the psychotherapist. Information regarding the FNS diagnosis was 
provided by the neurologist. Personal information was provided by the participant. An 
‘end of therapy summary’ including information about the number of sessions, reason 
for the end of therapy, and the issues tackled in therapy was provided by the 
psychotherapist.  
5.3.5.2. The Emotional Processing Scale (EPS-25). The EPS-25 is a 
standardised 25-item self-report scale measuring emotion processing styles and 
deficits. There are five subscales: suppression, signs of unprocessed emotions, 
unregulated emotion, avoidance, and impoverished emotional experience (Baker et al., 
2009). The EPS-25 has been used in patients with lower back pain (Esteves et al., 
2013), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Compare et al., 2012), and patients with 
NEAD (Novakova et al., 2015) but not in a sample of patients with mixed FNS. 
Responses are given on a 0-9 Likert scale. There are also three open-ended questions. 
Higher scores indicate greater difficulties with emotion processing. As per the 
administrator’s manual, single missing items were replaced by the mean of the 
subscale (Baker et al., 2015).   
5.3.5.3. The Short Form- 36 (SF-36). The SF-36 is a standardised 36-item 
self-report questionnaire that measures nine areas of Health Related Quality of Life 
(HRQoL): physical functioning, role limitation - physical, role limitation - 
emotional, general health, mental health, bodily pain, vitality, health transition, and 
social functioning. Responses are given on scales ranging from three to ten options. 
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Higher scores indicate a better HRQoL. Missing items were dealt with as 
recommended by the user manual (Ware, Kosinski, & Gandek, 2000). Remaining 
scores were recoded and standardised using norm-based scoring. Scores were 
combined into physical (PHS) and mental health (MHS) summary scales, as per the 
procedure detailed in the manual.  
5.3.5.4. Clinical Outcome in Routine Evaluations (CORE-10). The 
CORE-10, is a standardised ten-item self-report scale measuring global psychological 
distress, taken from the 34 item CORE-OM (Outcome Measure)(Connell & Barkham, 
2007). It has been used in studies of patients with FNS (Reuber, Burness, et al., 2007). 
On a Likert scale (0-4), higher responses indicate a higher level of psychological 
distress experienced over the last week. The CORE-10 is known to correlate strongly 
with the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Erbaugh, Ward, Mock, & Mendelsohn, 
1961; Connell & Barkham, 2007).   
5.3.5.5. Patient Health Questionnaires (PHQ-15). The PHQ-15 is a 
standardised 15-item self-report questionnaire designed to measure common somatic 
symptoms, for example, stomach pain or trouble sleeping (Kroenke, Spitzer, & 
Williams, 2002). Participants indicate how bothered they have been by a symptom 
over the past week, on a three-point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate that 
participants have been bothered more by a particular symptom. A pattern of missing 
items emerged, whereby items 4 and 11 were not responded to by 14 and 8 participants 
respectively. These items may not have been relevant to the participants and so were 
dropped from the analysis, replicating the procedure adopted in a previous paper 
(Novakova et al., 2015).  
5.3.5.6. Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire (BIPQ). The BIPQ is a 
standardised nine-item self-report scale measuring emotional and cognitive 
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representations of illness (Broadbent, Petrie, Main, & Weinman, 2006). For eight 
items, participants respond on a 0-10 Likert Scale. The 9th item is an open-ended 
question. The items represent nine dimensions of illness perception including 
consequences, personal control, treatment control, timeline, illness concern, 
coherence, identity, emotional representation, and causation. Responses were scored 
and missing items were dealt with as per the scoring instructions. 
5.3.6. Statistical analysis 
Given that this was an exploratory study and that there no previous studies 
using the EPS-25 have been undertaken in this patient group with this measure, no 
formal power calculation was undertaken. However, one similar prospective study 
using the EPS-38 (a longer and earlier version of the EPS-25) in patients with 
depression found an effect size of .74. On this basis a study involving a group of 44 
(our sample size) should be able to detect an effect size of .99 with power set at 0.8 
and a two-tailed alpha of 0.05. Data were analysed using SPSS Version 22.0 (IBM 
Corp, 2013). Prior to the use of inferential statistics, all scales scores were screened 
for normality. The EPS-25 and SF-36 scale scores were non-normally distributed. 
Therefore, all analyses of scale scores were bootstrapped using 95% confidence 
intervals based on 1000 samples to control for non-normality. The p value was set at 
p = 0.05 (two-tailed hypothesis). Otherwise, the inflated risk of Type 1 error associated 
with multiple comparisons was controlled for using the Holm-Bonferroni method to 
correct p values when more than one comparison or correlation was being made. 
Within-subjects t-tests and repeated measures ANOVAs with Bonferroni 
corrections were used to compare group mean and / or subscale scores on the EPS-25 
and SF-36 self-report scales pre- versus post-intervention. The ANOVA model is 
robust to violations of normality when group sizes are equal, as is the case in the 
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present study (Field, 2013).  Change scores were calculated such that positive values 
corresponded to improvements in functioning across all scales. Pearson’s product 
moment correlation coefficients were used to calculate the relationship between 
change scores on the EPS-25 and the other clinical variables. Partial correlation 
coefficients were used to explain the amount of variance shared between EPS-25 
change scores and any significantly correlated clinical symptomology / HRQoL 
scores. To complement our analysis of the EPS-25 we included a Reliable and 
Clinically Significant Change (RCSC) analysis (Jacobson, Roberts, Berns, & 
McGlinchey, 1999). This method was used to categorise patients according to whether 
or not changes on the EPS-25 could be considered both statistically reliable and 
clinically meaningful. We then compared patients who made RCSC against those who 
did not on the study outcome measures.  
5.3.6.1. Internal consistency of the Emotion Processing Scale- 25. 
Responses on the EPS-25 were combined into total scores for pre- and post-
intervention and assessed for internal consistency reliability. Internal consistency was 
excellent when administered both before (α = .962) and after (α = .967) intervention.  
5.4. Results 
5.4.1 Patient characteristics 
One hundred and eighteen patients consented to the study. Of this group, 72 
returned the pre- and 44 also the post-intervention questionnaire (Figure 16). The final 
sample therefore consisted of 44 patients. 77.3% (34) were female and the mean age 
was 41.5 years (SD = 13.5). 63% of the sample were economically inactive (defined 
as unemployed, in receipt of disability benefits, or being retired due to ill-health or old 
age). Mean symptom duration was 5.4 years (SD = 10.8).   The mean time between 
completion of the pre- and post-intervention questionnaires was 11.0 months. 
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 Patients had different main FNS. To explore the justification of analysing 
patients with different FNS together, we divided the total group into two subgroups 
(NEAD and ‘other FNS’). We compared these two groups on key demographic and 
therapy variables. There were no differences between the two groups on the mean 
number of sessions they completed, the number who completed therapy, economic 
activity, gender, and age at the start of therapy (Supplementary Table 1). Mean pre-
intervention total EPS-25 scores did not differ between these FNS groups; t(42) = .11, 
p = .91, 95% CI [-1.17, 1.49].  
The patient sample also included those who had completed therapy in the 
judgement of the therapist (n = 26) and those who had not (n = 17). Reasons for non-
completion of therapy included therapy was non-appropriate (n = 2), the patient was 
not progressing (n = 2), the patient improved after the initial session (n = 1), the patient 
dropped out (n = 9), and ‘other’ (n = 2). To explore the justification of including both 
patients who completed therapy and those who did not in the analysis, both groups of 
patients were compared on baseline emotion processing and clinical symptomology 
(Supplementary Table 2). There were no differences between the two groups on any 
of these measures.  
 On the basis that the remaining 44 patients with FNS did not differ 
significantly on baseline measures of emotion processing and clinical symptomology, 
irrespective of FNS semiology or therapy completion, we analysed the group as a 
whole. 
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5.4.2. Treatment-associated changes in emotion processing 
Patients’ pre-intervention EPS-25 scores indicated levels of emotion 
processing problems above normative healthy values for the UK, with the mean total 
EPS-25 scores of the FNS sample falling within the top 25th percentile of normative 
values, and well within pain and mental health norms (M = 4.96, SD = 2.26) (Baker et 
al., 2015). This indicates that emotion processing problems were common in this 
patient group before the intervention.  
The EPS-25 total score and subscale scores were lower post-intervention 
(Table 23). A within-subjects t-test on pre-versus post-intervention mean EPS-25 
Figure 16. Flowchart of patient attrition 
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scores confirmed the statistical significance of therapy associated change; t(43) = 2.02, 
p = .049, 95% CI [.043, 1.21], d = .31. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with 
time point (pre- and post-intervention) and EPS-25 subscale (suppression, 
unprocessed emotion, unregulated emotion, avoidance, and impoverished emotional 
experience) as the within-subjects factors showed that there was a significant main 
effect of time point; F(1,43) = 4.09, p = .049,  = .09, indicating that emotion 
processing improved significantly post-intervention. There was also a significant main 
effect of subscale; F(4,172) = 10.13, p  < .001, = .19, suggesting that the mean 
scores on each subscale differed from each other both pre- and post-intervention. 
There was no significant interaction between time point and subscale, indicating that 
the relationship between the mean subscale scores did not vary over time; F(4,172) = 
.923,  p = .45, = .02. Therefore, as measured by the EPS-25, emotion processing 
improved following BAPIT. 
Table 23- Pre- and post-intervention EPS-25 total and subscale scores. 
 Pre-
intervention 
Post-
intervention 
EPS-25 scores M SD M SD 
Suppression 5.43 2.58 4.69 2.83 
Unprocessed emotion 5.56 2.86 4.72 2.73 
Unregulated emotion 4.40 2.34 4.10 2.38 
Avoidance 5.07 2.29 4.53 2.28 
Impoverished emotional experience 4.33 2.64 3.64 2.55 
Total 4.96 2.26 4.33 2.31 
Note. EPS-25 = Emotional Processing Scale-25. N = 44. 
 
5.4.3. Treatment-associated changes in routine outcome measures 
HRQoL improved following intervention. The post-intervention PHS score (M 
= 38.10, SD = 11.95) was greater than the pre-intervention PHS score (M = 36.24, SD 
= 11.45). Likewise, the post-intervention MHS score (M = 42.31, SD = 11.12) was 
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greater than the pre-intervention MHS score (M = 40.10, SD = 10.11). A two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the SF-36 summary scales (PHS and MHS) 
with time point (pre- and post-intervention) as the within-subjects factors showed a 
significant main effect of time point, indicating that SF-36 scores were significantly 
higher (better quality of life) for both the MHS and PHS scores post-intervention; 
F(1,38) =  5.94, p = .02,  = .14. There was no significant main effect of SF-36 
summary scale; F(1,38) = 2.69, p = .11,  = .07. There was no significant interaction 
effect; F(1,38)  = .018,  p = .89, = .00.  
Post-intervention BIPQ scores (M = 48.83, SD = 15.79) were lower than pre-
intervention scores (M = 55.51, SD = 11.84). This improvement in illness 
understanding was significant; t(32) = 2.95, p = .01, 95% CI [2.57, 12.39] (critical p 
value = .016). While CORE-10 scores were also lower post-intervention (M = 17.05, 
SD = 10.43) than pre-intervention (M = 19.19, SD = 9.39), this reduction in 
psychological distress was not statistically significant; t(42) = 1.54, p = .13, 95% CI 
[-.69, 4.76] (critical p value = .05). Similarly, while PHQ-15 scores were lower post-
intervention (M = 12.14, SD = 6.32) than pre-intervention (M = 14.05, SD = 5.35), 
reductions in the number and severity of somatic symptoms only approached 
significance following Holm-Bonferroni correction; t(36) = 2.31, p = .03, 95% CI [.35, 
3.43] (critical p value = .025). 
5.4.4. Did treatment-associated changes on the EPS-25 correlate with changes 
in treatment outcome measures?  
To assess whether improvements on the EPS-25 were associated with 
improvements in the measures of clinical symptomology and HRQoL of life used in 
this study, a series of correlational analyses were conducted on the scale change scores 
(Table 24). There were moderate to strong positive correlations between EPS-25 
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change scores, CORE-10, and MHS scale change scores. However, there were no 
significant correlations between EPS-25 change scores, PHQ-15 scores, BIPQ scores 
or PHS change scores. This suggests that improvements in emotion processing were 
associated with improvements in psychological distress and the mental health domain 
of the SF-36, but not with a better understanding of symptoms, fewer somatic 
symptoms or improved scores on the physical health domain of the SF-36. EPS-25 
change scores did not significantly correlate with the number of sessions received, 
therefore improvements in emotion processing cannot be explained by contact-time 
with the therapist; r = .024, n = 43, p = .878, 95% CI [-.184, .289]. 
 
Table 24 - Bootstrapped Pearson’s Correlations (r - values) between pre- and post-
intervention questionnaire change scores. 
Measure EPS-25 PHQ-15 CORE-10 BIPQ MHS PHS 
EPS-25 -      
PHQ-15 .467 -     
CORE-10 .673* .282 -    
BIPQ .160 .199 .024 -   
MHS .634* .342 .331 .313 -  
PHS .167 .461 -.122 .307 -.010 - 
Note. *significant at adjusted p value (p < .008) using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. CORE-
10 = Core Outcome in Routine Evaluation-10, BIPQ= Brief Illness Perceptions Questionnaire, 
PHQ-15= Patient Health Questionnaire- 15, MHS= SF-36 Mental Health Summary Scale, 
PHS= SF-36 Physical Health Summary Scale. 
 
Partial correlation coefficients were calculated to elucidate the relationship 
between the CORE-10 / MHS total scores and the EPS-25 total score when either 
CORE-10 or MHS-specific variance was controlled for. After controlling for the MHS 
total difference score, the correlation between the EPS-25 total difference score and 
the CORE-10 total difference score was smaller, and the amount of shared variance 
decreased, but the correlation was still statistically significant [partial correlation = 
.57, r2 = .32, p < .001, 95% CI [.23, .83]]. Similarly, when controlling for the change 
in MHS scores, the correlation between the EPS-25 total difference scores and the 
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CORE-10 total difference score was reduced, and the amount of shared variance 
reduced, but the correlation remained significant [partial correlation = .56, r2 = .31, p 
< .001, 95% CI [.31, .84]. These results indicate that EPS-25 change scores accounted 
for 45% and 40% of variance in CORE-10 and MHS change scores respectively. 
In order to provide a more detailed picture of how patients’ emotion processing 
changed following therapy, we ran a RCSC analysis on EPS-25 scores (Jacobson et 
al., 1999). 22.7% made a clinically significant improvement, 29.5% made an 
improvement which was not clinically significant, 20.5% did not change, 18% 
deteriorated, and 10% experienced a clinically significant deterioration. There were 
no significant differences on any of the outcome measures between patients who 
achieved a RCSC and those who did not. 
5.4.5. Study non-completers 
Seventy-four patients consented for the intervention did not provide complete 
follow-up data (Figure 16). Therefore, to examine whether attrition biased the results 
as far as possible, study completers were compared against study non-completers on 
a series of key variables.  There were no associations between whether a patient 
completed the study and the demographic variables of gender, economic activity, and 
FNS type. However, study non-completers were younger (M = 34.2 years, SD = 11.6) 
than study completers (M = 41.4 years, SD = 13.5); t(75) = 2.48, p = .02, 95% CI [-
12.96, -1.87]. Study non-completers were also less likely to complete therapy (38.2% 
completed therapy, 61.8% did not complete therapy) in the judgement of the therapist; 
χ2(1) = 5.91, p = .02. However, the absence of clear differences between study 
completers and non-completers in terms of emotion processing and other baseline 
measures suggests that study completers were representative of the total consented 
sample on the available psychological parameters (Table 25).  
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Table 25 - Comparison of patients who completed the study and those who did not 
complete the study on baseline emotion processing and clinical symptomology 
measures. 
 Completers Non-completers    95% CI 
Measure M SD M SD df t p LL UL 
EPS-25 4.96 2.64 5.10 1.92 75 .18 .84 -.76 1.04 
PHS 36.24 11.45 37.25 10.84 68 .38 .71 -.43 6.10 
MHS 40.10 10.11 35.48 12.80 68 1.70 .31 -10.46 1.26 
CORE-10 19.20 9.40 19.50 10.40 75 .14 .09 -3.80 5.30 
PHQ-15 12.80 5.60 14.30 4.90 45 .96 .360 -1.52 4.49 
BIPQ 56.10 11.10 48.70 10.30 54 2.52 .02 -12.78 -.074 
Note. *significant at adjusted p - value (p <. 008) using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. 
Completers = patients who completed the study. Non-completers = patients who did not 
complete the study CI = Bootstrapped confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
EPS-25 = Emotion Processing Scale-25 Total Score, CORE-10 = Core Outcome in Routine 
Evaluation-10, BIPQ = Brief Illness Perceptions Questionnaire, PHQ-15 = Patient Health 
Questionnaire- 15, MHS = SF-36 Mental Health Summary Scale, PHS = SF-36 Physical 
Health Summary Scale. 
5.5. Discussion 
Abnormal emotion processing is an important target for psychotherapy in 
patients with FNS because it may contribute to FNS aetiology (Novakova et al., 2015), 
and appears to be related to a poorer quality of life and understanding of the disorder 
(Baker et al., 2007). Therefore, the aim of this study was investigate whether emotion 
processing improved in patients with FNS following a course of BAPIT. We also 
explored the extent to which changes in emotion processing correlated with treatment-
associated changes in HRQoL and other measures of clinical symptomology.  
As predicted, emotion processing improved post-intervention; the pre-
intervention total mean EPS-25 score (4.96) fell within mental health norms (4.0 – 
5.9), and was elevated above healthy norms (2.2 – 4.4). However, the post-intervention 
score (4.33) fell within healthy UK norms. In view of the chronicity and severity of 
FNS, this supports our interpretation that EPS-25 outcome data represent a clinically 
meaningful change for participants. This conclusion is also supported by the improved 
HRQoL and illness understanding following intervention. Although psychological 
distress and other somatic symptoms failed to improve significantly, change scores on 
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the EPS-25 correlated positively with change scores on the CORE-10 and MHS 
sharing 45% and 40% of variance respectively. This suggests that improvements 
captured by the EPS-25 are not simply of academic interest but clinically meaningful 
to patients.  
To our knowledge this the first study to examine therapy-associated changes 
in emotion processing in patients with FNS. The significant improvement in HRQoL 
observed in our patient group is consistent with our previous observations in this 
patient population (Reuber, Burness, et al., 2007). However, this time we did not 
observe significant improvements in somatic symptoms or psychological distress. This 
discrepancy could be due to the smaller sample size in the present study reducing 
statistical power. Illness understanding was not measured in the previous study but we 
did observe a significant improvement in the present patient cohort. One earlier study 
in a much larger sample showed that having a poor illness understanding of FNS as 
measured by the Illness Beliefs Questionnaire (including a non-attribution of 
functional symptoms to psychological factors), is a strong predictor of poor patient 
outcome on a ‘Clinical Global Improvement Scale’ at twelve month follow-up (Sharpe 
et al., 2010).  
The present pre-intervention EPS-25 scores support previous observations that 
many patients with FNS experience abnormal emotion processing. Group mean pre-
intervention total EPS-25 scores fell within the top 25th percentile for UK normative 
values and well within the range for mental health patients (Baker et al., 2007). When 
administered to patients with NEAD only, Novakova et al. observed similar 
abnormalities in emotion processing (Novakova et al., 2015). Here we extend this 
finding to include patients with other forms of FNS including functional motor and 
sensory symptoms.  
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The breadth of emotion processing styles assessed by the EPS-25 is a strength 
of this study.  It could be argued that other forms of emotion processing measurement 
fail to reflect the multi-faceted nature of emotion perception, regulation, and 
expression (Baker et al., 2007). Therefore, the EPS-25 is likely to be well-suited to 
detecting the heterogeneous abnormalities of emotion processing which other studies 
have found to be associated with FNS (Carson et al., 2012). The fact that the EPS-25 
was sensitive to changes scores in psychological distress and the mental health domain 
of the SF-36, corroborate the usefulness of this scale in clinical and research settings 
of patients with FNS.  
5.5.1. Limitations 
The high attrition rate is a regrettable limitation of this study. As is often the 
case with postal-questionnaire designs, a significant proportion of data were lost by 
patients’ failure to return the follow-up questionnaires. Another limitation is the lack 
of control group or a pre-treatment monitoring period demonstrating a lack of 
spontaneous improvements in emotion processing. Although spontaneous clinical 
improvements may be considered unlikely in view of the chronicity of the functional 
disorders treated in this study (mean duration of 5.8 years (SD = 10.8)), these 
limitations introduce the possibility that any improvements in emotion processing, 
HRQoL, and clinical symptomology could simply reflect regression to the mean. 
Furthermore, mechanism or direction of therapeutic change cannot be inferred.  
Although twice as many patients met the threshold of “reliable and clinically 
significant improvement” on the EPS-25 as self-reported “reliable and clinically 
significant deterioration”, at first sight, the results of the RCSC analysis are not 
particularly encouraging. However, it is important to point out that the EPS-25 was 
not designed or intended to be used here as an outcome measure. As stated above, 
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emotion processing deficits may be a core feature of FNS. Patients who habitually 
over-controlled their emotions may have become more aware of the emotional aspects 
of their disorder and distress through the process of psychotherapy, which may have 
led to an apparent deterioration of their total EPS-25 score. Interestingly (and in 
support of this interpretation), all four patients who reported reliable and clinically 
significant deteriorations on the EPS-25 also reported increases on the ‘unregulated’ 
subscale of the EPS-25 (there was no consistent pattern on the other subscales). These 
observations suggest that, given the wide range of emotion processing problems which 
the EPS-25 captures, it is likely to be important to look at change profiles rather than 
the total EPS-25 score to understand psychotherapy-associated changes at an 
individual patient level.  
Although we only found an age difference between the patient groups 
completing and not completing BAPIT, the generalizability of our study findings is 
diminished by the fact that older patients were more likely to complete treatment than 
younger ones. This age disparity in therapy completion resonates with earlier studies 
noting a greater probability of older patients engaging in specialist psychotherapy for 
FNS (Howlett et al., 2007). It is possible that older patients are better able to appreciate 
or tackle the relationship between emotions and functional symptoms. Alternatively, 
a younger presentation with FNS may be associated with greater levels of dysfunction 
and disability, creating additional barriers for the patient to complete treatment and 
return outcome data (Edlund et al., 2002). 
 In view of the lack of a control group and the relatively high attrition rates in 
this study, the influence of BAPIT on emotion processing requires further 
clarification. Furthermore, being practice-based evidence, the therapist’s adherence to 
BAPIT is uncertain. However, therapy was delivered by a single, highly-trained 
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therapist with extensive experience in this particular clinical field who has described 
her therapeutic approach in previous publications (SH) – a fact which should provide 
some assurance of uniformity of the intervention (Hobson, 1985; Howlett & Reuber, 
2009). The absence of treatment data generated by other therapists also limits the 
generalizability of the findings presented here.  
The fact that not all patients who contributed follow-up data had completed 
therapy and that these patients were retained in the analysis should be considered a 
strength of this study. The inclusion of these patients in our analysis should mean that 
the findings of our study come closer to the sort of effects on emotion processing 
BAPIT might achieve in real-life rather than research settings. 
We were also able to exclude some other biases. Patients with NEAD and those 
with other FNS were matched on key demographic variables irrespective of FNS 
semiology, minimising the risks of bias associated with analysing a small and 
heterogeneous population as whole. Consecutive recruitment of participants from two 
sites further reduced risk of bias introduced by patient selection. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this prospective, uncontrolled study of patients with FNS we provide 
preliminary evidence that emotion processing improves following a course of BAPIT, 
with simultaneous improvements in HRQoL and illness understanding. Improvements 
in emotion processing correlated with a reduction in psychological distress as well as 
improved scores on the mental health domain of the SF-36. We conclude that the EPS-
25 shows promise as a tool for the investigation of emotion processing deficits in 
patients with FNS. We are not proposing that, in patients with FNS, the EPS-25 be 
used as an outcome measure – however, our study demonstrates that the EPS-25 is a 
measure sensitive to therapy-associated changes in emotion processing. Future 
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research should aim to replicate these preliminary findings in controlled studies with 
larger sample sizes.  
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Supplementary Table 1 - Comparisons of demographic and therapy characteristics 
between patients with NEAD (n = 32) and patients with ‘other FNS’ (n = 12). 
Characteristics NEAD  Other FNS Statistic 
Female (%) 77.4 76.9 𝜒2(1) = .001, p= .979 
Mean age at start of therapy (SD) 40.42 (14.55) 44.32 (10.12) t(42)= -.-.853, p= .398 
Economically active (%) 67.7 53.8 𝜒2(1) = .764, p= .382 
Mean sessions (SD) 10.90 (11.05) 14.42 (10.48) t(41) = -.948, p = .349 
Completed therapy (%) 56.7 69.2 𝜒2(1) = .599, p= .439 
Note. NEAD = Nonepileptic Attack Disorder, Other FNS = hemiparesis, jerking, memory 
problems, dizziness. Mean sessions = number of sessions received by patients. 
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Supplementary Table 2 -Comparison of emotion processing and outcome measure 
scale scores from patients who completed therapy (completers) versus those who did 
not complete therapy (non-completers). 
Note. *significant at adjusted p - value Holm-Bonferroni correction. CI = confidence interval; 
LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. CORE-10 = Core Outcome in Routine Evaluation-10, 
BIPQ= Brief Illness Perceptions Questionnaire, PHQ-15= Patient Health Questionnaire- 15, 
MHS= Mental Health Summary Scale, PHS= Physical Health Summary Scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Completers 
Non-
completers    95% CI 
Measure M SD M SD df t p LL UL 
EPS-25 5.33 2.10 4.68 2.28 41 -.96 .36 -2.03 0.66 
PHQ-15 13.75 5.35 14.63 5.52 35 .47 .64 -2.78 4.52 
CORE 10 19.82 9.20 18.00 9.94 41 -.60 54 -7.96 4.10 
BIPQ 53.52 10.50 60.50 11.30 31 1.80 .08 -.38 14.26 
MHS 39.72 9.94 40.72 10.70 37 .30 .80 -5.90 7.67 
PHS 36.60 11.80 35.88 11.34 37 -.15 .86 -7.44 7.75 
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6. Discussion 
FND are one of the commonest reasons patients will consult a neurologist 
(Stone et al., 2010). FND have also been associated with greater disability and distress 
than equivalent neurological symptoms which are explained by diseases characterised 
by clear structural or pathophysiological changes (Carson et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
medical problems not associated with these changes, such as FND, are estimated to 
cost the UK economy more than dementia (approximately £18 billion) (Bermingham 
et al., 2010; Edwards & Bhatia, 2012). In spite of these facts, FND is relatively 
unheard of by the general public, and has received comparatively little academic 
attention. Traditional explanations of FND aetiology highlight the importance of 
overwhelming emotions. Therefore, the aim of this thesis was to contribute to the 
existing knowledge of emotion dysregulation in this putatively ‘psychogenic’ 
disorder, by taking a structured and theoretically-driven approach. I set out to 
empirically test hypotheses concerning emotion dysregulation in FND using a 
combination of self-report, behavioural, and physiological measures. Some of these 
predictions were generated from the EPM (Gross, 2015), but I also wanted to address 
other important clinical questions such as whether or not emotion dysregulation is 
related to clinical symptomology, and whether changes in emotion dysregulation can 
be meaningfully tracked throughout therapy using patients’ self-report. 
6.1. Key findings 
Chapter Two consisted of a systematic review synthesising the existing 
research on emotion dysregulation in NEAD – which has been the most widely 
researched form of FND. The studies identified by the literature search were subjected 
to a bespoke quality assessment and synthesised according to the stages of the EPM 
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(Gross, 2015). The majority of studies were found to be of low quality, an appraisal 
largely driven by small sample sizes. Nevertheless, the systematic review suggested 
that emotion dysregulation in NEAD is characterised by deficits in the identification 
of the patients’ own emotional states, as well as the selection and implementation of 
maladaptive regulatory strategies which may be related to abnormalities in the 
processing of exteroceptive emotional information. A key conclusion was that the 
NEAD population are psychologically heterogeneous; subgroups of patients with 
NEAD seem to exist, characterised by quantitatively different deficits in emotion 
regulation which are also likely related to other psychological or clinical factors such 
as trauma and current distress. 
Chapter Three further delineated some of this heterogeneity. A cross-sectional 
study showed that patients who experience impairments of consciousness (IOC) as 
part of their FND exhibited more severe psychopathology than those who do not. 
However, similar profiles of emotion dysregulation were observed in both groups, 
suggesting that patients with and without IOC exhibit a similar maladaptive style of 
emotion regulation characterised by high levels of avoidance, dysregulated emotional 
responding, suppression, unprocessed emotions, and an impoverished emotional 
experience. These findings emphasise the importance of understanding the patient as 
an individual and the symptoms they present with, rather than working with the 
diagnosis alone. 
In Chapter Four, I began to experimentally test the stages of the EPM in a 
smaller group of patients with FND. An interoceptive sensitivity paradigm was used 
to test the hypothesis that patients with FND experience deficits in the identification 
of their emotions (Chapter 4.1). A stress induction (The Cold Pressor Test) was 
included to test the prediction that interoceptive sensitivity would be adversely 
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affected by stress in patients but not healthy controls. Patients with FND were 
observed to have lower interoceptive sensitivity and a more impoverished emotional 
experience (EPS-25 subscale) than healthy controls. Contrary to our hypothesis, 
interoceptive sensitivity was enhanced by stress in both groups. We concluded that 
patients with FND are impaired in the identification of their own emotional states, but 
that this is not further impaired by the kind of stress induced by the Cold Pressor Test.  
The work presented in Chapter 4.2 aimed to test the selection and 
implementation stages of the EPM in patients with FND. Anecdotal and self-report 
findings suggested that patients with FND have a tendency to select and implement a 
maladaptive regulatory strategy - expressive suppression. Patients and healthy controls 
took part in a picture-viewing paradigm designed to elicit negative affect. Participants 
were instructed either to respond as they normally would if they came across such an 
image in their daily lives, or to try and suppress their response. Explicit and implicit 
measures of affect in response to the pictures were taken, and participants were also 
given a self-report measure of their habitual use of expressive suppression and 
cognitive reappraisal (ERQ). Consistent with the experimental hypothesis, patients 
self-reported an increased tendency to use expressive suppression on the ERQ. 
Implicit and explicit measures of affect suggested that patients with FND implicitly 
felt less positive than healthy controls, which is consistent with the habitual selection 
and implementation of expressive suppression.  However, patients exhibited greater 
facial reactivity in response to negative pictures than healthy controls when instructed 
to suppress their expression, suggesting they are impaired in their ability to implement 
expressive suppression. We therefore found mixed support for the hypothesis that 
patients with FND exhibit a tendency to select and implement the (arguably) 
maladaptive regulatory strategy, expressive suppression.  
 206 
 
The aim of Chapter 4.3 was to test the hypothesis that patients with FND have 
lower resting Heart Rate Variability (HRV) than healthy controls. In this part of the 
research project, we tested the potential of using HRV as a biomarker of emotion 
dysregulation in FND. Exploratory correlational analyses were also conducted on two 
measures of HRV: Cardiosympathetic Index (sympathetic tone) and Cardiovagal 
Index (vagal tone).  As predicted, vagal tone was lower in patients with FND than 
healthy controls. Exploratory correlational analyses showed that vagal tone negatively 
correlated with self-report measures of emotion dysregulation and Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder Symptomology across both groups. Vagal tone also positively 
correlated with interoceptive sensitivity (measure of the identification stage), 
suggesting that patients with FND experience chronic autonomic arousal, which may 
be related to emotion dysregulation, trauma, and decreased interoceptive sensitivity.  
Finally, Chapter Five examined if the newly developed Emotional Processing 
Scale – 25 (EPS-25) could be used to track changes in emotion dysregulation 
associated with a course of Brief Augmented Psychodynamic Interpersonal Therapy 
for FND. As measured by the EPS-25, emotion regulation improved following 
intervention, and changes in emotion dysregulation correlated with changes in mental 
health related quality of life and psychological distress. These data suggest that 
emotion dysregulation and psychopathology can be treated in FND and that these 
changes can be captured by a self-report measure (EPS-25). Nevertheless, further 
work is required to elucidate the relationship between these changes and FND 
symptomology, as well as to more rigorously assess the effectiveness of the 
intervention in a more highly-powered and controlled study.  
6.1.1. Conclusions from key findings. The work presented in this thesis 
suggests that patients with FND appear to exhibit signs of emotion dysregulation, 
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characterised by deficits in the identification of their emotional state, a tendency to 
select and implement maladaptive emotion regulatory strategies, and chronic 
autonomic arousal. However, the data also suggest that the precise nature of 
psychological distress is heterogeneous across patients suffering from FND and that 
there is some association between particular functional symptoms and certain 
abnormalities of emotion regulation.  
In particular, my work identified a theme of impairments at the identification 
stage (Gross, 2015). Raised levels of alexithymia as measured by the TAS-20 and 
other self-report measures, as well as discrepancies between self-reported and 
objective measures of affect and a tendency to perceive life as unduly stressful were 
found in the systematic review (Chapter Two). Study One (Chapter Three) found that 
in a group of patients with FND, scores on the ‘impoverished emotional experience’ 
subscale of the EPS-25 were raised above healthy norms, and did not differ 
significantly whether FND patients experienced impairments of consciousness or not.  
Likewise, the sample of patients included in studies Two, Three, and Four (recruited 
from Study One) also exhibited significantly higher scores on the impoverished 
emotional experience subscale of the EPS-25 than healthy controls. Furthermore, in 
Study Three, we found that the impoverished subscale score on the EPS-25 negatively 
correlated with participants’ self-endorsed use of cognitive reappraisal, suggesting that 
individuals who are more impaired in identifying their own emotions are less likely to 
select and implement cognitive reappraisal as a regulatory strategy. In Study Two we 
demonstrated that this groups of patients with FND had significantly lower 
interoceptive sensitivity than healthy controls, and so are less able to perceive 
physiological information, which assists in the identification of emotions. In Study 
Four, we demonstrated that vagal tone correlates positively with interoceptive 
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sensitivity pre- and post-stress induction, suggesting that individuals with greater 
vmHRV are more sensitive to their internal physiological milieu and therefore 
theoretically more able to identify their own emotional state. Finally, in Study Five we 
demonstrated that impoverished emotional experience subscale scores improve 
following a course of psychotherapy, raising the possibility that patients’ ability to 
have insight into their own emotional experiences might be successfully treated with 
Brief Augmented Psychodynamic Interpersonal Therapy (which includes techniques 
such as encouraging patients to notice the location of feelings in their body or to link 
emotions that arise in the therapy session to other emotions inside and outside of 
therapy (Howlett & Reuber, 2009)).  The work presented in this thesis has therefore 
shown that, i) individuals who are better at identifying their emotions are more likely 
to select and implement healthier regulatory strategies and have more adaptive vagal 
control of their autonomic nervous system, but also that ii), patients with FND are 
generally more impaired at identifying and making sense of their emotions that healthy 
controls.  
With respect to the selection and implementation stages of the EPM, the work 
presented in this thesis provides less conclusive evidence. The systematic review 
(Chapter 2) showed that patients with NEAD have a tendency to select and implement 
maladaptive regulatory strategies, such as emotion-focused coping, avoidance, and 
dissociation – a tendency which is likely related to other psychological factors such as 
current distress. The review also discussed experimental work suggesting that patients 
with NEAD may exhibit cognitive biases with the potential to disrupt the 
implementation process. Study One showed that patients with FND self-report an 
increased tendency to select and implement suppression and avoidance and experience 
unregulated emotions (as measured by the EPS-25), irrespective of whether or not they 
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experience impairments of consciousness. Similarly, the sample of patients with FND 
who participated in studies Two, Three, and Four scored more highly on these 
subscales of the EPS-25 than healthy controls. Study Three showed that patients with 
FND endorse greater selection and implementation of expressive suppression and less 
frequent selection and implementation of cognitive reappraisal than healthy controls. 
However, when instructed to suppress their facial expression in response to negative 
stimuli, patients were less able to implement expressive suppression than healthy 
controls. The significantly lower vagal tone in patients with FND than healthy controls 
and the significant negative correlation between CVI and the EPS-25 scores (Study 
Four) suggest that patients with FND experience chronic autonomic arousal associated 
with emotion dysregulation – which is consistent with the proposition that patients 
with FND habitually select and implement maladaptive regulatory strategies or fail to 
implement adaptive regulatory strategies, but is not direct support for this proposition. 
Finally, Study Five demonstrated that suppression and avoidance subscale scores on 
the EPS-25 improved following psychotherapy and that changes in the EPS-25 
correlated with improvements in psychological distress and mental-health related 
quality of life. An important point to make is, whether or not an individual successfully 
selects and implements an adaptive regulatory strategy depends on the correct 
identification of their emotional state and the activation of the goal to regulate. Given 
that the work presented in this thesis strongly suggests impairments in the 
identification stage in patients with FND, it is possible that impairments in the 
selection / implementation stage stem from a failure to accurately identify one’s own 
emotions in the first instance. 
The findings regarding identification can be mapped onto the predictive coding 
model of symptom perception in ‘Medically Unexplained Symptoms’ (MUS) put 
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forwards by Van den Bergh et al. (2017). This theory takes account of previous models 
including that of a ‘Bayesian Account of Hysteria’ (Edwards et al., 2012) and the 
‘Integrative Cognitive Model’ of MUS (Brown, 2004), but focuses more closely on 
interoception. According to Van den Bergh et al. (2017), when vague and imprecise 
interoceptive input is interpreted in the context of abnormally strong pathological prior 
beliefs about the causes of the sensory input, the patient experiences MUS. In other 
words, what the patient expects to feel outweighs what they actually feel because they 
have strong, abnormal prior expectations about what particular sensory inputs means 
and are not good at correctly checking expectations against actual sensory inputs. This 
causes patients to experience innocuous physiological sensations as pathological 
symptoms (i.e., FND) or a, “subjectively real but objectively illusory experience” 
(Edwards et al., 2012). Van den Bergh et al. (2017) also propose that reduced 
interoceptive sensitivity is moderated by high-trait negative affect and threat 
processing strategies. While we did not set out to test a Bayesian model of FND or 
measure trait-negative affect in this thesis, our findings of raised psychopathology (i.e. 
symptoms of depression, anxiety, and somatization disorder) are in line with the 
account that patients with FND exhibit high trait-negative affect. Furthermore, the 
raised levels of PTSD symptomology we observed may also serve to have an impact 
on threat-processing, which would contribute to negative affect (hypervigilance is a 
recognised symptom of PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)). Therefore, 
the work presented in this thesis fits in with predictive coding accounts of FND 
(Edwards et al., 2012; Van den Bergh et al., 2017). Future work should seek to test 
these models more directly and examine patients’ prior beliefs about the causes of 
interoceptive sensations more closely.   
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6.2. Limitations 
There are several caveats that should be borne in mind when interpreting the 
conclusions of this thesis. Some are methodological and some are theoretical. These 
will now be discussed below. 
The first general methodological limitation is that the sample sizes recruited to 
or retained in each study are relatively small; the number of patients recruited to 
studies Two, Three, and Four are at the lower-bound of what we would define as a 
moderately-powered sample size (See section 2.2.3.). This combined with the number 
of analyses performed on the data means that our conclusions run the risk of 
representing false positives (even though FWER and FDR were controlled for as 
appropriate). Equally, due to the lack of pre-existing research in this area a priori 
power analyses were not conducted, and so we cannot be certain that the studies are 
sufficiently powered. When one takes into consideration the heterogeneity of the 
group (symptom type, duration, demographic, psychological, medical history, etc.), 
the importance of recruiting sufficient sample sizes and a-priori power analyses 
becomes more apparent. However, given the known barriers to recruitment in the FND 
patient population, it could be argued that we did well to recruit 26 patient participants 
for studies Two, Three, and Four. Furthermore, the effect sizes generated in this thesis 
should enable a-priori power analyses for future studies to be conducted. As such, 
these results do not represent the ‘final conclusion’ on emotion regulation in FND, but 
provide a foundation on which future researchers may build.  
A further source of methodological bias is that the individuals who participated 
in these studies may have been more willing to endorse psychological factors as 
relevant to their disorder than those who declined or did not respond to advertisement. 
Efforts were made to advertise the study in a clear but neutral tone, but nevertheless it 
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is possible that the sample is biased towards individuals who feel that emotion 
dysregulation is more pertinent to their symptoms. Another source of bias is that the 
patients who attended the university for studies Two, Three, and Four, although clearly 
disabled by their symptoms, were well enough to travel and participate. Indeed, there 
were a few patients who initially accepted the invitation to attend but later dropped 
out owing to poor health. Many of the patients who attended for these studies had also 
previously received psychotherapy (68%). This means that that our findings may only 
pertain to a subgroup of patients with FND who are relatively well and accepting of 
psychological accounts of the disorder. Therefore the findings in this thesis should not 
be generalised to the wider FND population in an uncritical fashion.  
The first theoretical limitation also relates to the interpretation of our findings. 
While the work presented in this thesis gives evidence of emotion dysregulation in 
patients with FND, the cross-sectional nature of studies One, Two, Three, and Four 
mean that it cannot answer the question of whether or not FND is indeed 
‘psychogenic’. Emotion dysregulation is still likely a relevant predisposing, 
precipitating, or perpetuating factor for FND, but should be considered within the 
context of other biological (e.g., genetic, structural / metabolic) and social (e.g., quality 
of close relationships) factors. 
A second theoretical limitation is that, at present, there is only ‘modest’ 
empirical support for the EPM (Sheppes et al., 2015). Each stage of the EPM 
(identification, selection, implementation) relies on the same three basic processes 
(perception, valuation, action) working on different types of information. This makes 
it difficult isolate and test individual stages of the EPM as similar processes are 
happening in each stage – indeed it was realised throughout the course of the PhD 
project that it was difficult to separate existing studies or measures that assessed the 
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selection and implementation stages in isolation (Chapter Two), or indeed to delineate 
these stages in the studies reported in this thesis (Studies Two, Three, and Four). 
Testing the stages directly might be improved by a self-report measure assessing each 
stage individually, but at present no such scale exists. Future research could potentially 
help to address these issues by testing and developing measures of the individual EPM 
stages.  
On a related point, the manner in which emotion regulation strategies or 
examples of emotion dysregulation have been categorised in this thesis might be called 
into question. Firstly, regulatory strategies have been framed as adaptive or 
maladaptive, but in reality individual regulatory strategies are not dichotomously 
‘good or bad’. For example there are cases where putatively maladaptive strategies 
would be adaptive – such as expressive suppression in settings where displaying 
emotion would be considered inappropriate and the associated negative consequences 
would outweigh the harmful effects of suppression (e.g., stifling nervous laughter). 
Furthermore, forms of emotion dysregulation can map onto more than one stage of the 
EPM. For example, a tendency towards experiential avoidance can represent a deficit 
in the Valuation substep of the identification stage (i.e., overvaluating the cost of 
emotional states) (Sheppes et al., 2015) or a deficit in the perception substep of the  
selection stage (i.e., reflecting the over-representation of maladaptive strategies to 
select from). These issues are particularly relevant to the interpretation of our findings 
regarding selection and implementation of regulatory strategies in FND. 
6.3. Strengths 
In spite of the theoretical limitations of the EPM discussed above, the use of 
the EPM to structure this research should also be considered a strength of the thesis. 
To my knowledge, this is the first body of research on emotion regulation in FND to 
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have been theoretically constrained by an over-arching model of emotion regulation. 
This has allowed for an empirical approach, in which theory has been used to generate 
testable hypotheses is a systematic manner. While there are issues with the EPM, it is 
at present the most recent version of the widely tested and studied theory of emotion 
regulation. A further related strength of this thesis, is that emotion regulation research 
in psychopathology has tended to focus on the problems incurred by disrupted 
implementation – by using the EPM to structure our approach, we have also generated 
findings regarding the identification stage. Furthermore, in taking a theoretically 
driven approach, we are able to gain a clearer understanding of what might be 
disrupting emotion regulation in FND and / or how this might be happening. If other 
studies were also to take this theoretically-driven approach, researchers in the field 
might be able to collaborate more closely and more rapidly advance our understanding 
of emotion dysregulation in FND.  
A further strength of this project was the inclusion of experimental studies and 
multiple forms of measurement including self-report, behavioural, and physiological 
methods. Each approach has its respective advantages and disadvantages, but by using 
different measurement modalities in conjunction we are able to capitalise on the 
benefits of each approach while mitigating some of the draw-backs. For example, self-
report measures are quick and easy to administer and give information about what an 
individual perceives but are subjective and prone to bias. Physiological measures are 
highly objective but more difficult to administer and may be interpreted in too 
reductionist a light. However, by combining various methods, we are able to build a 
more nuanced and complete picture of the construct (emotion regulation) under 
question.  
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6.4. Implications for future research 
Future work should also aim to take a theoretically driven approach. One 
option would be further to examine the EPM in patients with FND. Alternatively, 
future research could aim to test predictions made by other accounts of FND / MUS, 
such as the predictive coding models proposed by Edwards et al. (2012) and Van den 
Bergh et al. (2017), or the Integrative Cognitive Model of Psychogenic Nonepileptic 
Seizures proposed by Brown and Reuber (2016b). The generation of testable 
predictions embedded within a wider theory might afford a clearer understanding of 
how emotions may be dysregulated in FND. A further advantage of pursuing a theory-
driven approach is the increased ease of comparison and synthesis with other studies 
based on the same model. This would allow for easier collaboration between 
researchers and for the field to advance as a whole towards an improved understanding 
of emotion regulation in FND.  
The work presented in this thesis also illustrates the importance of taking into 
account heterogeneity in the FND population. For example, in Chapter Two, studies 
were identified that showed how there are subgroups of patients with NEAD 
characterised by quantitatively different emotion regulation profiles (e.g., Brown et 
al., 2013; Uliaszek et al., 2012). Other studies showed that the extent of emotion 
dysregulation in patients with NEAD correlated with other psychological or clinical 
factors (e.g., Dimaro et al., 2014; Urbanek et al., 2014). The work presented in Chapter 
Three showed that irrespective of FND subtype (e.g. NEAD, FMD), patients who 
experience impairments of consciousness as part of their FND also self-reported 
higher levels of psychopathology (symptoms of Generalised Anxiety Disorder, 
Somatization Disorder, and PTSD) than those who did not. Moreover, both patients 
with and without NEAD reported impairments of consciousness (and vice versa.), and 
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so this finding illustrates the point that an individual person’s clinical symptomology 
may also give clues about the relevance of emotion dysregulation, over and above that 
of the diagnostic label. Therefore, future studies should also seek to elucidate some of 
this psychological and clinical heterogeneity.  
6.5. Potential for translational research 
 The ultimate aim of improving our understanding of emotion dysregulation in 
FND is to improve treatment and outcomes for patients. The work presented in this 
thesis showed that, while patients with FND do appear to have similar styles of 
emotion dysregulation (as measured by the EPS-25), they do not have homogenous 
psychopathological profiles or indeed all report a history of trauma. This means that 
clinicians should not make assumptions about an assumed psychological aetiology, 
and instead take a person-centred approach. Our findings also allude to two interesting 
potential avenues for treatment / monitoring outcomes: emotion identification and 
HRV.  
With respect to emotion identification, Study Two showed that patients with 
FND report having less insight into their emotions and were also observed to have 
lower interoceptive sensitivity than healthy controls (as recorded by the Heart Beat 
Detection Task). We concluded that this was indicative of an impairment in the 
identification stage. It stands to reason that if an individual cannot detect or make sense 
of their own emotions, they are limited in their ability to regulate them effectively. A 
therapeutic aim may therefore be to improve patients’ ability to detect and identify 
their emotions by using mindfulness techniques, such as those described in Study Five, 
which teach the individual to notice physiological sensations arising in their body and 
link them to emotions or thoughts. This technique is already taught as one of the first 
steps towards seizure control in patients with NEAD attending The Royal Hallamshire 
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Psychotherapy Services, although Biofeedback methods (such as those focusing on 
heart rate or vmHRV) may present one potential complement to this intervention, 
which patients could utilise at home. The Heart Rate Tracking task may also represent 
a useful pre-and post-intervention measure, but a prospective controlled study to 
establish the effectiveness of this approach in relation to symptom frequency and 
severity would be needed.  
The use of vmHRV in diagnosis and as an outcome measures also warrants 
further exploration. vmHRV could be used to distinguish between an epileptic or 
nonepileptic episode. It could also be compared pre- and post-psychotherapeutic 
intervention to assess whether the patient’s autonomic arousal and therefore emotion 
dysregulation has decreased.  However, more work is needed to verify the relationship 
vmHRV and emotion dysregulation, as well as its relationship to FND symptomology.  
Moreover, the development of a unified FND symptom rating scale similar to 
the UPDRS for Parkinson’s disease (Goetz et al., 2008) or the Liverpool Seizure 
Severity Scale for epilepsy (Baker, Smith, Jacoby, Hayes, & Chadwick, 1998) could 
facilitate the assessment of interventions. At present, other scales such as the PHQ-15 
are used to assess levels of somatic symptomology, but this measure might be 
criticised for being non-specific to FND. Given that many patients with FND 
experience more than one type of symptom, a unified FND symptom severity 
questionnaire might be a more parsimonious and easier-to-compare measure.  
As a more general point, research on FND speaks to the issue of dualism in 
medicine, which has traditionally treated the mind and the brain as two separate 
entities. This much is reflected in the fact that two different specialisms exist (i.e., 
neurology and psychiatry) for treating neurological disorders and mental disorders, in 
spite of the fact that both commonly co-occur and both are disorders of the brain. 
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While there has been a recent trend towards neurologists and psychiatrists identifying 
themselves as ‘neuropsychiatrists’, neuropsychiatry is not a clearly defined speciality. 
Equally, FND is still considered a ‘medically unexplained symptom’, even though 
there are many other medical problems that are defined by the very fact that their cause 
is unknown (e.g., Juvenile Idiopathic Arthritis, idiopathic Parkinsons’ disease), but 
that are not labelled as ‘medically unexplained’ or ‘functional’ or ‘psychogenic’. 
These issues may stem from the relative discrimination against mental health in 
medicine (Giandinoto, Stephenson, & Edward, 2018), which has also been internalised 
by patients with FND (Rommelfanger et al., 2017). To the patient, a diagnosis of FND 
can mean they feel disbelieved or that they are ‘going mad’ - because of the negative 
connotations associated with mental health, and ultimately rejection of the diagnosis. 
A fuller exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is hoped that 
as our scientific understanding of FND improves, so will the experience and treatment 
of patients with FND.  
6.6. Conclusion 
 The work presented in this thesis aimed to contribute towards the current 
understanding of emotion dysregulation in FND by taking a theoretically-constrained, 
empirical approach, using a combination of self-report, behavioural, and physiological 
measures. Evidence of emotion dysregulation characterised by difficulties in the 
identification of one’s own emotional state, as well as the selection and 
implementation of maladaptive regulatory strategies was observed. Another key 
finding was that psychopathology or specific forms of emotion dysregulation in the 
FND population is heterogeneously distributed and likely related to other 
psychological or clinical variables. The final study presented in this thesis 
demonstrated that emotion dysregulation in patients with FND can be tracked 
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throughout intervention using a self-report tool, and suggested that emotion 
dysregulation may respond to psychotherapeutic treatment. The question of whether 
FND is caused by emotion dysregulation cannot be answered by this thesis. However, 
it is likely that emotion dysregulation is a predisposing, precipitating, and perpetuating 
factor for many patients with FND.  
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Patient Demographic Questionnaire 
Personal Information 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. The information you are giving 
us will be treated as confidential. Personally identifiable data (such as your name, 
address and date of birth) will not be stored and analysed together with the data 
provided on the self-report questionnaires. 
1. Full name:_____________________________________________________ 
2. Address:_______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
3. Post code:______________________ 
4. Home phone number:____________________________________________ 
5. Mobile phone number____________________________________________ 
6. Email address:__________________________________________________ 
7. Date of birth:___________________________________________________ 
8. Age today:______________   
9. Gender (please tick the correct option):    
       Male  Female                         
 
       Other please specify:________________________ 
 
10. How would you describe your ethnic background?  
Please tick the box that applies to you, or write an answer in the space provided. 
White- English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/ British  
White- Irish  
White- Gypsy or Irish Traveller  
White- Any other white background  
Mixed/ multiple ethnic group- White and Black Caribbean  
Mixed/Multiple ethnic group - White and Black African  
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Mixed/Multiple ethnic group - White and Asian  
Mixed/Multiple ethnic group   
Any Other Mixed/multiple ethnic background   
Asian/Asian British – Indian   
Asian/Asian British – Pakistani  
Asian/Asian British – Bangladeshi  
Asian/Asian British – Chinese   
Asian/Asian British - Any other Asian background  
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British – African   
Black /African/Caribbean/Black British – Caribbean  
Any other Black / African / Caribbean background   
Other ethnic group – Arab   
Any other ethnic group (please 
specify) 
 
 
11. How would you describe your current employment status? Please tick the 
box(es) that applies/apply to you or write an answer in the space provided. 
In full-time paid work   
In part-time paid work  
In full-time education   
In part-time education  
Full-time carer/homemaker   
On leave/out of work due to illness or disability  
Retired  
Other (please specify):  
 
12. What is your highest educational qualification? Please tick the box(es) that 
applies/apply to you or write an answer in the space provided. 
No educational qualifications   
Standard grades, O grades, O levels, GCE/GCSEs  
Highers, advanced highers, A levels   
Vocational qualification (e.g. SVQ, NVQ, SCOTVEC)   
HNC/HND  
Degree (e.g., BA, BSc)   
Postgraduate qualification (e.g. MSc, PhD)   
Professional qualification (e.g. CAEW, CIIA)    
Other (please specify):  
 
13. When did you first experience a functional neurological symptom (e.g. 
psychogenic nonepileptic seizure, tremor)?  
(For example, 6 months ago or 3 years ago)   
 
               ________________months ago 
               ________________years ago 
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14. What functional neurological symptom was it (e.g. tremor, weakness, seizure)?  
______________________________________________________________ 
15. Do you experience any other functional neurological symptoms? If so, please 
list them below. 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
16. a) Do you experience nonepileptic attacks (also known as dissociative seizures/ 
psychogenic nonepileptic seizures) (please tick)?  
  
b) If the answer is ‘yes’, how many have you had in the last month? 
______________________________________________________________ 
17. Do you ever experience any of the following as part of your functional 
neurological symptom(s) (please tick)? 
 YES NO 
I have spells during which I black out/ lose consciousness 
completely. 
  
I have spells during which am aware of what is going on, 
but I am unable to respond to other people. 
  
I have spells during which I can perform actions, but I am 
not aware of what I am doing. 
  
 
18. a) Are you currently taking any medication (please tick)?    
 
   
b) If yes, please list your medication below: 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
YES NO 
YES NO 
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19.  Have you received or are receiving any form of psychological treatment 
(please tick)?  
 
 
 
20. a) Would you like to be contacted about stage 2 of this study (please tick)? 
 
 
 
b) If you would like to be contacted about stage 2 of this study, how would you 
like to be contacted (e.g. on my mobile phone, by email) and at what time (e.g. in 
the afternoon, Friday day time)?  
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for completing this demographic questionnaire. 
Please now proceed to the other questionnaire pack. 
YES NO 
YES NO 
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The Emotional Processing Scale- 25 (EPS - 25) 
Baker, R., Thomas, S., Thomas, P.W., Gower, P., Santonastaso, M., & 
Whittlesea, A. (2009). The Emotional Processing Scale: scale refinement and 
abridgement, Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 68 (1), 83-88. 
 
This scale was reproduced for use in data collection with special permission of 
the Publisher, Hogrefe Ltd, Hogrefe House, Albion Place, Oxford, OX1 1QZ, UK. 
Further reproduction is prohibited without permission from Hogrefe. 
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Patient Health Questionnaire - 9 (PHQ - 9) 
 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? 
  
 
 
 
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
Several 
days 
More 
than 
half 
the 
days 
 
Nearly 
every 
day 
 
1 
 
 
Little interest of pleasure in doing things 
    
 
2 
 
 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 
    
 
3 
 
 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or 
sleeping too much 
 
    
 
4 
 
 
Feeling tired of having little energy 
    
 
5 
 
 
Poor appetite or overeating 
    
 
6 
 
 
Feeling bad about yourself- or that you 
are a failure or have lets yourself or your 
family down 
 
    
 
7 
 
 
Trouble concentrating on things, such as 
reading the newspaper or watching 
television 
 
    
 
8 
 
Moving or speaking so slowly that other 
people could have noticed? Or the 
opposite - being so fidgety or restless that 
you have been moving around a lot more 
than usual 
 
    
 
9 
 
 
Thoughts that you would be better off 
dead or hurting yourself in some way 
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Generalized Anxiety Disorder -7 (GAD - 7) 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following 
problems? 
   
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
Several 
days 
More 
than 
half 
the 
days 
 
Nearly 
every 
day 
 
1 
 
 
Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge 
    
 
2 
 
 
Not being able to stop or control worrying 
    
 
3 
 
 
Worrying too much about different things 
    
 
4 
 
 
Trouble relaxing 
    
 
5 
 
 
Being so restless that it is hard to sit still 
    
 
6 
 
 
Becoming easily annoyed or irritable 
    
 
7 
 
 
Feeling afraid as if something awful might 
happen 
    
 
Appendix 5 
 
245 
 
Patient Health Questionnaire – 15 (PHQ - 15) 
During the past 4 weeks, how much have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? Please tick as appropriate. 
  
Not 
bothered 
at all 
Bothered 
a little 
Bothered 
a lot 
1 
Stomach pain 
   
2 Back pain    
3 
Pain in your arms, legs or joints (knees, 
hips etc.) 
   
4 Menstrual cramps (women only)    
5 Headaches    
6 Chest pains    
7 Dizziness    
8 Fainting spells    
9 Feeling your heart pound or race    
10 Shortness of breath    
11 
Pain or problems during sexual 
intercourse 
   
12 Constipation, loose bowels or diarrhoea    
13 Nausea, gas or indigestion    
14 Feeling tired or having little energy    
15 Trouble sleeping    
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PTSD Checklist for DSM - 5 (PCL - 5) 
Instructions: Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have in response to a very stressful 
experience. Please read each problem carefully and then circle one of the numbers to the right to 
indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem in the past month. 
In the past month, how much were you bothered by: 
N
o
t 
a
t 
 
a
ll
 
A
 l
it
tl
e
 
 b
it
 
M
o
d
e
ra
te
ly
 
Q
u
it
e
 a
  
b
it
 
E
x
tr
e
m
e
ly
 
1 
Repeated, disturbing, and unwanted memories of the  
stressful experience? 
     
2 
Repeated, disturbing dreams of the stressful  
experience? 
     
3 
Suddenly feeling or acting as if the stressful experience 
were actually happening again (as if you were actually 
back there reliving it)? 
    
4 
Feeling very upset when something reminded you of 
the stressful experience? 
     
5 
Having strong physical reactions when something 
reminded you of the stressful experience (for example,  
heart pounding, trouble breathing, sweating)? 
     
6 
Avoiding memories, thoughts, or feelings related to the  
stressful experience? 
     
7 
Avoiding external reminders of the stressful experience 
(for example, people, places, conversations, activities, 
objects, or situations)? 
    
8 
Trouble remembering important parts of the stressful 
experience? 
     
9 
Having strong negative beliefs about yourself, other 
people, or the world (for example, having thoughts such as 
as: I am bad, there is something seriously wrong with 
me, no one can be trusted, the world is completely 
dangerous)? 
     
10 
Blaming yourself or someone for the stressful 
Experience or what happened after it? 
     
11 
Having strong negative feelings such as fear, horror, 
guilt, or shame? 
     
12 
Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy? 
 
     
13 
Feeling distant or cut off from other people? 
 
     
14 
Trouble experiencing positive feelings (for example, 
being unable to feel happiness or have loving feelings 
for people close to you)? 
     
15 
Irritable behaviour, angry outbursts, or activing 
aggressively? 
     
16 
Taking too many risks or doing things that could cause 
you harm? 
     
17 
Being “superalert” or watchful or on guard? 
 
     
18 
Feeling jumpy or easily startled? 
 
     
19 
Having difficulty concentrating? 
 
     
20 
Trouble falling or staying asleep? 
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
Instructions and Items  
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you 
control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct 
aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. 
The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, 
gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, 
they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer by marking on the scale where 1= 
strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
 
 
1. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m 
thinking about.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
 
2.  I keep my emotions to myself.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
 
3. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m 
thinking about.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
 
4. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
 
5. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps 
me stay calm.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
 
6. I control my emotions by not expressing them.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
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7. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
8. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
 
9. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
 
10. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
agree 
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Expressive suppression study image disgust ratings 
The images used in Chapter 4.3. had previously been validated in a student sample for 
a master’s project (Walsh, 2012). The mean disgust ratings of images used in the passive (Table 
26) and suppress condition (Table 27) were compared with an independent measures 
bootstrapped t-test. There was no significant difference between mean disgust ratings between 
conditions; t(10) = -1.3, p = .90, 95% CI [-5.03, 5.78].  
Table 26 – Passive condition disgust ratings 
Image name Mean Disgust valence 
1_Skin ulcer 71.25 
89_Parasite 73.75 
2_Rotten teeth 75.06 
8_Herpes eye 74.13 
90_Faeces 74.31 
78_Maggoty foot 84.07 
Mean (SD) 75.43 (4.23) 
 
Table 27 - Suppress condition disgust ratings 
Image name Mean Disgust valence 
19_Tongue tumour 75.45 
86_Dog wound 79.14 
80_Pus 66.92 
83_Faeces 74.31 
71_Scaley foot 77.19 
6_Infected toenail 81.69 
Mean (SD) 75.78 (5.07) 
 
 
 
